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It is from this stage of the action that the tactics of the battle have become involved in controversy—and a new account of the ensuing events of the battle is greatly needed.
In the first place, it should be stated that a broad tactical situation existed that was almost beyond the hopes of the British. This was irrespective of any moves of the British Commander-in-Chief, or of the Commander of the British advance force. By its own act the weaker German fleet was out in the North Sea, committed to an enterprise which had taken it away from its bases. Not only that—but, by bringing out the squadron of predreadnoughts, Admiral Scheer’s fleet speed was reduced to 17 knots. Casting aside all details of tactics, this constituted the established condition that the weaker fleet of inferior speed had offered the opportunity to the British fleet—and evasion by flight alone was impossible. Looked at in this light, it was a better chance than could ever have been expected. Yet a combination of circumstances, including weather conditions, tactics, and methods, prevented a decision, where such a result seemed to be insured.
This is the underlying tragedy of Jutland—and this is why all the accounts have to deal with explanations and justifications.
One very unfavorable situation was being developed at this stage, at the time when the British advance force was seeking a junction with the Grand Fleet. As has been said, Lord Jellicoe was not receiving information that would enable him to join forces effectively with Vice Admiral Beatty. The original disposition of the British naval strength, with the advance force flung ahead of the Grand Fleet, was sound, if there were tactical coördination between the separated parts. It is impossible to say that this existed, and the imperfect information given by Vice Admiral Beatty to the Commander-in-Chief is a notable feature of the battle.
With all due allowance for interference and damage to the wireless, especially on the Lion, it is hard to see why Lord Jellicoe should have been so badly informed as to the positions of the ships engaged, and why definite information should have been so long delayed. In this important phase of the tactics of the battle we are forced to the conclusion that all means had not been taken to insure the coördination of the British advance force and the Grand Fleet through linking up ships and other methods.
This disposition of the British forces had often been used, and the logical aim of the sweep of the North Sea was to find and engage the enemy. Yet, when the enemy actually was found, it became evident that methods had not been developed for using the whole British force as parts of one great manœuvre. With the uncertain information that Admiral Jellicoe possessed as to what was going on, any such joint manœuvre could only have taken place through a miracle of luck. As a matter of fact, there was an error of twelve miles to the eastward in location.
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After the turn to the north, in the running fight in pursuit of Vice Admiral Beatty’s force, the German fleet was approaching the British Grand Fleet, which drew near in the increasing mist. To understand the course of the action at this critical stage, the reader should realize that the Germans possessed a fleet manœuvre which had been carefully rehearsed for such a contingency, in sudden contact with a superior enemy force. This was a simultaneous “swing-around” (S) of all the ships of the fleet, to turn the line and bring it into an opposite course. Admiral Scheer emphasizes the pains that had been taken to develop the ability to carry out this manœuvre, which had before been considered impracticable for a fleet in action. “At our peace manœuvres great importance was always attached to their being carried out on a curved line and every means employed to ensure the working of the signals.” (S) He is certainly justified in adding the statement that “the trouble spent was now well repaid,” as the German Admiral was by this means enabled to carry out an unexpected and very effective manœuvre on two occasions when his fleet would have been in cramped positions without this recourse. Admiral Scheer was also able to use this identical manœuvre in an attack.
The British did not have any idea that the German Command would be able to carry out this change of direction of the German line. Consequently, in the smoke and mist, these thrice-executed movements were not suspected by the British. With such an important part of the German tactics unnoticed, and not taken into account in relation to the British movements, the reasons are evident that make necessary a new story of these phases of the action.