A True Account of the Battle of Jutland, May 31, 1916

by Thomas Goddard Frothingham

In the sweep through the North Sea, with the main body of the British Grand Fleet some seventy miles distant, Vice Admiral Beatty’s advance force was cruising to southward of Admiral Jellicoe May 31, 1916, when, at 2.20 P.M., the presence of enemy ships was reported by a light cruiser. Admiral Beatty altered course “to the eastward and subsequently to northeastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 P.M. Their force consisted of five battle cruisers.” (B) This was the German advance under Vice Admiral Hipper.

It is stated in Vice Admiral Beatty’s report that it was over an hour after the first news of the vicinity of enemy ships before he increased speed to 25 knots to engage, “at 3.30 P.M.” (B) Yet Vice Admiral Beatty reports that Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas’s Fifth Battle Squadron (the four Queen Elizabeths) was still 10,000 yards away when he made this move to engage the Germans with his battle cruisers. Consequently Vice Admiral Beatty failed to impose his whole strength upon his enemy’s detached force.

It is hard to explain this situation except by believing that Vice Admiral Beatty was confident that his six battle cruisers alone would be able to cope with the enemy. Allowing his force to remain divided by such an interval was unfortunate, and it cannot be said that the best use was made of the British advance force in the first stage of the engagement.

At 3.48 “the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both sides opening fire practically simultaneously.” (B) The British battle cruisers fought on a course curving to the southeast, and then on a south-southeast course, and the five German battle cruisers fought them on a parallel course, instead of edging away from the superior British force. It is now easy to see that the trend of the action was absolutely in the direction of the approaching main body of the German High Seas Fleet, but this, very naturally, was not apparent at the time to Vice Admiral Beatty.

The first phase of the battle may properly be studied as a fight between the British and German battle cruisers, in consequence of the before-stated gap separating the two parts of Admiral Beatty’s command. This interval of 10,000 yards prevented the Fifth Battle Squadron of Queen Elizabeth dreadnoughts from being a factor at the time. Vice Admiral Beatty reports that this squadron “opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards,” and he continues: “The Fifth Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately at very long range.” Only two of the German ships were really under fire from the Fifth Battle Squadron, and these two battle cruisers were but slightly injured in the run to the south.

In this part of the action came the first of the many upsets of prewar calculations. Comparing the given strength of the two opposing squadrons in action, it will be seen that the British battle cruisers were greatly superior; in fact, the odds would have been considered prohibitive before this battle. Yet it was the British squadron that suffered, losing one-third of its ships. “At about 4.06” (J) the Indefatigable was sunk, and “at about 4.26” (J) the Queen Mary met the same fate. In each case there was a great explosion up through the turrets, suggesting that a weak turret construction is really a dangerous conductor of fire to the magazine in case of a heavy hit, and pointing to the need of better separation of the supply of ammunition from the magazine.

At 4.15 there were attacks “simultaneously” (B) by British and German destroyers which resulted in a lively fight, but no damage to any of the capital ships. Yet the possibilities of such torpedo attacks were so evident, here and later in the battle, that the destroyer at once attained a greater value as an auxiliary of the battleship. A British airplane had been sent up from a mother ship just before the engagement, though Admiral Beatty reports that it was forced to fly low on account of the clouds, and had a hard task “to identify four enemy light cruisers.” (B) There was apparently no chance of a wide observation that would have warned Admiral Beatty of the approaching German High Seas Fleet. In this short hour were concentrated many new problems of naval warfare.

The advancing German High Seas Fleet was reported at 4.38 by a light cruiser, the Southampton, and sighted at 4.42 by the British battle cruisers. A few minutes later Vice Admiral Beatty’s ships turned right about (180 degrees) in succession. The German battle cruisers also turned to a northwesterly course.

One great advantage was gained for the British in this manœuvre. By the turn in succession the four Queen Elizabeth battleships, the Fifth Battle Squadron, were brought into position to fight a rearguard action against the greatly strengthened force of the enemy. The leading German battleships, which were of the König class, fell into line, closely following Admiral Hipper’s battle cruisers, and the battle was continued at 14,000 yards on a northwest course.

In the meantime, from the north, the British Grand Fleet had been closing at utmost fleet speed on south and southeast by south courses, disposed in six divisions, numbered from port to starboard, on parallel courses as shown in [Table I]. Admiral Jellicoe had received no certain information from Vice Admiral Beatty as to the positions of the engaged ships, and he had been proceeding in the general direction of the running fight, instead of having in mind any definite point for joining forces with Vice Admiral Beatty. It must also be realized that conditions of increasing mist and intermittent fog, which rendered observation very uncertain, had become prevalent.