83. That definition directly contradicts that of Rousseau, in (a) placing sovereignty in determinate persons, (b) making its essence lie in power to compel obedience
84. Actual sovereignty combines both definitions; the habitual obedience of subjects to the sovereign is due to the sense that by obeying they secure certain ends
85. So far as Austin means that a fully developed state implies a determinate supreme source of law, he is right as against Rousseau
86. But if sovereign power = the aggregate influences which really make the people obedient, it must be sought in the 'general will'
87. Such power need not be 'sovereign' in the narrower sense, and may coexist with a separate coercive power which is 'sovereign'
88. This has been the case in ancient despotisms, and in the modern empires of the East
89. So in states under foreign dominion, which retain a national life, the technical sovereign is not the law-making and law-maintaining power
90. Under the Roman Empire, in British India, in Russia, where the technical is also the real sovereign, its strength rests in different degrees on the general will
91. Thus the answer to question (1) depends on the sense of 'sovereign.' If it = a power which guarantees equal rights, it is implied in every 'political' society
92. But (a) it need not be the supreme coercive power, and (b) if it is so, it is not because it is so that it commands habitual obedience