93. Thus (retaining the technical use of 'sovereign') it is true that if the sovereign is to be so really, it must express and maintain a general will
94. Though this is compatible with the fact that some of the laws of the sovereign conflict with the general will
95. Thus as to question (2) (above, sec. 80), if sovereignty is said to rest on the general will 'de jure,' either 'sovereign' or 'jus' is not used in the strict sense
96. An antithesis between sovereign 'de jure' and 'de facto' can only arise from a confusion between 'sovereign' as = the source of law and 'sovereign' as = the 'general will'
97. Though there are cases in which (in a different sense) a sovereign may be conveniently described as 'de facto,' not 'de jure,' or vice versa
98. Similarly, to say that the people is 'sovereign de jure' is to confuse the general will with the coercive power of the majority
99. Rousseau's confusion is due to the theory of 'natural rights' (that the individual is not bound by anything which he has not individually approved)
100. The individual must indeed judge for himself whether a law is for the common good; but though he judge it not to be, he ought as a rule to obey it
101. Cases in which a doubt may arise
102. (a) Where the legal authority of the law is doubtful, owing to the doubt where the sovereignty in the state resides