103. In such cases the truth generally is that the 'right,' on the particular issue, has not yet formed itself
104. But it does not follow that because the 'right' is on both sides, one is not 'better' than the other; though this may be the case
105. In such cases of disputed sovereignty the distinction of 'de jure' and 'de facto' may be applied, though it is better to say that the sovereignty is in abeyance
106. The individual, having no 'right' to guide him, should take the side whose success seems likely to be best for mankind
107. (b) Another case is where there is no legal way of getting a bad law repealed. Here it is a question, not of right, but of duty, to resist the sovereign
108. Nor is it a question of the right of a majority, as a majority, to resist: it may be the duty of a helpless minority
109. Some general questions which the good citizen may put to himself in such dilemmas
110. They can, indeed, seldom be applied by the agents at the time as they can be after the event
111. In simple cases we may judge of the right or wrong of an act by the character which it expresses, but generally we can only judge them by its results
112. All that the historian can say is that on the whole the best character is likely to produce the best results, notwithstanding various appearances to the contrary.