G. Will, not force, is the basis of the state.
113. The doctrines which explain political obligation by contract agree in treating sovereign and subject apart, whereas they are correlative
114. For the desire for freedom in the individual is no real desire unless he is one of a society which recognises it. (Slaves are not a real exception to this)
115. And without an authority embodied in civil institutions he would not have the elementary idea of right which enables him to question the authority
116. But the theory of contract expresses, in a confused way, the truth that only through the common recognition of a common good, and its embodiment in institutions, is morality possible
117. Thus morality and political subjection have a common source.
118. And both imply the twofold conception, (a) 'I must though I do not like,' (b) 'I must because it is for the common good which is also my good'
119. It is a farther and difficult question, how far the sense of common interest can be kept alive either in the government or subjects, unless the people participates directly in legislation
120. And this suggests the objection, Is it not trifling with words to speak of political subjection in modern states as based on the will of the subjects?
121. We must admit (a) that the idea of the state as serving a common interest is only partially realised, even by the most enlightened subject, though so far as realised it is what makes him a loyal subject