122. (b) That if he is to be an intelligent patriot as well as a loyal subject, he must take a personal part in the work of the state
123. And (c) that even then his patriotism will not be a passion unless it includes a feeling for the state analogous to that which he has for his family and home
124. But are we not again assuming what was disputed, viz. that a sense of its serving a common interest is necessary to the existence of the state?
125. Observe that the idea of an end or function, realised by agencies unconscious of it and into which it cannot be resolved, is already implicit even if the state be treated as a 'natural organism'
126. Such a treatment, however, would ignore the distinction between the 'natural' and the 'human' or 'moral' agencies which have operated in the production of states
127. It may be objected that these 'human' agencies are not necessarily 'moral,' but on the contrary are often selfish
128. But though human motives are never unalloyed, they only produce good results so far as they are fused with and guided by some unselfish element
129. If e.g. we would form a complete estimate of Napoleon, we must consider not only his ambition but the particular form in which his ambition worked
130. And further reflect that the idiosyncrasy of such men plays but a small part in the result, which is mainly due to agencies of which they are only the most conspicuous instruments
131. Thus an ideal motive may co-operate with the motives of selfish men, and only through such co-operation are they instrumental for good