159. Or that (b) those who are killed have incurred the risk voluntarily. Even if they have, it does not follow that they had a 'right' to do so
160. It may be said that the right to physical life may be overridden by a right arising from the exigencies of moral life
161. But this only shifts the blame of war to those who are responsible for those exigencies; it remains a wrong all the same
162. But in truth most wars of the last 400 years have not been wars for political liberty, but have arisen from dynastic ambition or national vanity
163. Admitting, then, that virtue may be called out by war and that it may be a factor in human progress, the destruction of life in it is always a wrong
164. 'But if it be admitted that war may do good, may not those who originate it have the credit of this?'
165. If they really acted from desire to do good, their share in the wrong is less; but in any case the fact that war was the only means to the good was due to human agency and was a wrong
166. (2) (See sec. 157). Hence it follows that the state, so far as it is true to its principle, cannot have to infringe the rights of men as men by conflicts with other states
167. It is not because states exist, but because they do not fulfil their functions as states in maintaining and harmonising general rights, that such conflicts are necessary
168. This is equally true of conflicts arising from what are called 'religious' grounds