169. Thus no state, as such, is absolutely justified in doing a wrong to mankind, though a particular state may be conditionally justified
170. It may be objected that such a 'cosmopolitan' view ignores the individuality of states, and could only be realised if they wore all absorbed in a universal empire
171. It is true that public spirit, to be real, must be national; but the more a nation becomes a true state, the more does it find outlets for its national spirit other than conflicts with other nations
172. In fact the identification of patriotism with military aggressiveness is a survival from a time when states in the full sense did not exist
173. And our great standing armies are due, not to the development of a system of states, but to circumstances which witness to the shortcomings of that system
174. The better the organisation of each state, the greater is the freedom of communication with others, especially in trade, which, beginning in self-interest, may lead to the consciousness of a higher bond
175. As compared with individuals, any bonds between nations must be weak; on the other hand, governments have less temptation than individuals to deal unfairly with one another.
L. The right of the state to punish.
176. (3) (See sec. 156). What right has the state to punish? The right to live in a community rests on the capacity to act for the common good, and implies the right to protect such action from interference
177. A detailed theory of punishment implies a detailed theory of rights. Here we can only deal with principles