198. The principle that punishment should be regulated by the importance of the right violated explains the severity with which 'culpable negligence is punished
199. And the punishment of crimes done in drunkenness illustrates the same principle
200. It also justifies the distinction between 'criminal' and 'civil' injuries, (which is not a distinction between injuries to individuals and to the community, for no 'right' is violated by injury done to an individual as such)
201. There would be no reason in associating terror with breaches of a right which the offender either did not know that he was breaking or which he could not help breaking
202. When such ignorance and inability are culpable, it depends on the seriousness of the wrong or the degree to which the civil suit involves deterrent effects, whether they should be treated as crimes
203. Historically, the state has interfered first through the civil process; gradually, as public alarm gets excited, more and more offences come to be treated as crimes
204. Punishment must also be reformatory (this being one way of being preventive), i.e. it must regard the rights of the criminal
205. Capital punishment is justifiable only (a) if it can be shown to be necessary to the maintenance of society, (b) if there is reason to suppose the criminal to be permanently incapable of rights
206. Punishment, though directly it aims at the maintenance of rights, has indirectly a moral end, because rights are conditions of moral well-being.
M. The right of the state to promote morality.