207. (4) (See sec. 156). The right of free life is coming to be more and more recognised amongst us negatively; is it reasonable to do so little positively to make its exercise possible?
208. First observe that the capacity for free life is a moral capacity, i.e. a capacity for being influenced by a sense of common interest
209. This influence will only be weakened by substituting for it that of law, but the state can do more than it usually does without deadening spontaneous action; e.g. 'compulsory education' need not be 'compulsory' except to those who have no spontaneity to be deadened
210. So too with interference with 'freedom of contract'; we must consider not only those who are interfered with, but those whose freedom is increased by the interference.
N. The right of the state in regard to property.
211. As to property two questions have to be kept distinct, (a) how there has come to be property, (b) how there has come to be a right of property. Each of those again may be treated either historically or metaphysically
212. The confusion of those questions and methods has given rise either to truisms or to irrelevant researches as to the nature of property
213. Property implies (a) appropriation, i.e. an act of will, of a permanent self demanding satisfaction and expression
214. (b) Recognition of the appropriation by others. This recognition cannot be derived from contract (Grotius), or from a supreme force (Hobbes)
215. Locke rightly bases the right of property on the same ground as the right to one's own person; but he does not ask what that ground is