15. 'Freedom' has been taken above (as by English psychologists generally) as applying to will, whatever the character of the object willed
16. If taken (as by the Stoics, St. Paul, Kant (generally), and Hegel) as applying only to good will, it must still be recognised that this particular sense implies the generic
17. Whatever the propriety of the term in the particular sense, both 'juristic' and 'spiritual' freedom spring from the same self-asserting principle in man
18. And though the former is only the beginning of full freedom, this identity of source will always justify the use of the word in the latter sense
19. But does not the conception of 'freedom' as = the moral ideal imply an untenable distinction like that of Kant between the 'pure' and 'empirical' ego?
20. The 'pure' and 'empirical' ego are one ego, regarded (1) in its possibility, (2) as at any given time it actually is
21. In man the self-realising principle is never realised; i.e. the objects of reason and will only tend to coincide
22. So far as they do coincide, man may be said to be 'free' and his will to be 'autonomous'
23. The growing organisation of human life provides a medium for the embodiment, and disciplines the natural impulses for the reception, of the idea of perfection
24. The reconciliation of reason and will takes place as the individual more and more finds his own self-satisfaction in meeting the requirements of established morality