5. It is true in so far as society does supply to the individual concrete interests which tend to satisfy the desire for perfection
6. Though (like the corresponding conception in St. Paul) it is not and could not be realised in any actual human society
7. In all these uses 'freedom' means, not mere self-determination or acting on preference, but a particular kind of this
8. The extension of the term from the outer to the inner relations of life, though a natural result of reflection, is apt to be misleading
9. Thus the question, Is a man free? which may be properly asked in regard to his actions, cannot be asked in the same sense in regard to his will
10. The failure to see this has led to the errors (1) of regarding motive as something apart from and acting on will, (2) of regarding will as independent of motive
11. Thus the fact that a man, being what he is, must act in a certain way, is construed into the negation of freedom
12. And to escape this negation recourse is had to the notion of an unmotived will, which is really no will at all
13. The truth is that the will is the man, and that the will cannot be rightly spoken of as 'acting on' its objects or vice versa, because they are neither anything without the other
14. If however the question be persisted in, Has a man power over his will? the answer must be both 'yes' and 'no'