28. Though the moral idea of personality is later in formulation than the legal, and this again than the actual existence of rights
29. Rights which are directly necessary to a man's acting as a moral person at all may be called in a special sense 'personal'
30. Nor is there any objection to calling them 'innate' or 'natural,' if this means 'necessary to the moral development of man' in which sense 'duties' are equally 'natural'
31. Without a society conscious of a common interest there can be only 'powers,' no 'rights'.
B. Spinoza.
32. Spinoza, seeing that 'jus naturae' = 'potentia,' and not seeing that it is not really 'jus' at all, identifies all 'jus' with 'potentia,' both in the state and in the individual
33. From which it follows that the 'right' of the state against its individual members is only limited by its 'power'
34. And the same principle applies to the relations of one state to other states
35. But, according to Spinoza, though everything is 'lawful' for the state, everything is not 'best,' and the 'best' state is that which secures a life of 'peace,' i.e. rational virtue or perfection
36. This conclusion does not seem consistent with his starting-point, according to which men are 'naturally enemies'