Secondly, it is to be observed, that of positive names the former comprehends the latter; but of negatives the former is comprehended by the latter. For example, living-creature is the name of every man, and therefore it comprehends the name man; but, on the contrary, not-man is the name of everything which is not-living-creature, and therefore the name not-living-creature, which is put first, is comprehended by the latter name, not-man.
Thirdly, we must take heed that we do not think, that as names, so the diversities of things themselves may be searched out and determined by such distinctions as these; or that arguments may be taken from hence (as some have done ridiculously) to prove that the kinds of things are not infinite.
Fourthly, I would not have any man think I deliver the forms above for a true and exact ordination of names; for this cannot be performed as long as philosophy remains imperfect; nor that by placing (for example) light in the predicament of qualities, while another places the same in the predicament of bodies, I pretend that either of us ought for this to be drawn from his opinion; for this is to be done only by arguments and ratiocination, and not by disposing of words into classes.
Lastly, I confess I have not yet seen any great use of the predicaments in philosophy. I believe Aristotle when he saw he could not digest the things themselves into such orders, might nevertheless desire out of his own authority to reduce words to such forms, as I have done; but I do it only for this end, that it may be understood what this ordination of words is, and not to have it received for true, till it be demonstrated by good reason to be so.
CHAPTER III.
OF PROPOSITION.
[1.] Divers kinds of speech.—[2.] Proposition defined.—[3.] Subject, predicate, and copula, what they are; and abstract and concrete what. [4.] The use and abuse of names abstract.—[5.] Proposition, universal and particular.—[6.] Affirmative and negative.—[7.] True and false.—[8.] True and false belongs to speech, and not to things.—[9.] Proposition, primary, not primary, definition, axiom, petition.—[10.] Proposition, necessary and contingent.—[11.] Categorical and hypothetical.—[12.] The same proposition diversely pronounced.—[13.] Propositions that may be reduced to the same categorical proposition, are equipollent.—[14.] Universal propositions converted by contradictory names, are equipollent.—[15.] Negative propositions are the same, whether negation be before or after the copula.—[16.] Particular propositions simply converted, are equipollent.—[17.] What are subaltern, contrary, subcontrary, and contradictory propositions.—[18.] Consequence, what it is.—[19.] Falsity cannot follow from truth.—[20.] How one proposition is the cause of another.
Divers kinds of speech.
1. From the connexion or contexture of names arise divers kinds of speech, whereof some signify the desires and affections of men; such are, first, interrogations, which denote the desire of knowing: as, Who is a good man? In which speech there is one name expressed, and another desired and expected from him of whom we ask the same. Then prayers, which signify the desire of having something; promises, threats, wishes, commands, complaints, and other significations of other affections. Speech may also be absurd and insignificant; as when there is a succession of words, to which there can be no succession of thoughts in mind to answer them; and this happens often to such, as, understanding nothing in some subtle matter, do, nevertheless, to make others believe they understand, speak of the same incoherently; for the connection of incoherent words, though it want the end of speech (which is signification) yet it is speech; and is used by writers of metaphysics almost as frequently as speech significative. In philosophy, there is but one kind of speech useful, which some call in Latin dictum, others enuntiatum et pronunciatum; but most men call it proposition, and is the speech of those that affirm or deny, and expresseth truth or falsity.
Proposition defined.