2. A PROPOSITION is a speech consisting of two names copulated, by which he that speaketh signifies he conceives the latter name to be the name of the same thing whereof the former is the name; or (which is all one) that the former name is comprehended by the latter. For example, this speech, man is a living creature, in which two names are copulated by the verb is, is a proposition, for this reason, that he that speaks it conceives both living creature and man to be names of the same thing, or that the former name, man, is comprehended by the latter name, living creature. Now the former name is commonly called the subject, or antecedent, or the contained name, and the latter predicate, consequent, or containing name. The sign of connection amongst most nations is either some word, as the word is in the proposition man is a living creature, or some case or termination of a word, as in this proposition, man walketh (which is equivalent to this, man is walking); the termination by which it is said he walketh, rather than he is walking, signifieth that those two are understood to be copulated, or to be names of the same thing.
But there are, or certainly may be, some nations that have no word which answers to our verb is, who nevertheless form propositions by the position only of one name after another, as if instead of man is a living creature, it should be said man a living creature; for the very order of the names may sufficiently show their connection; and they are as apt and useful in philosophy, as if they were copulated by the verb is.
Subject, predicate, and copula, what they are, and abstract and concrete what.
3. Wherefore, in every proposition three things are to be considered, viz. the two names, which are the subject, and the predicate, and their copulation; both which names raise in our mind the thought of one and the same thing; but the copulation makes us think of the cause for which those names were imposed on that thing. As, for example, when we say a body is moveable, though we conceive the same thing to be designed by both those names, yet our mind rests not there, but searches farther what it is to be a body, or to be moveable, that is, wherein consists the difference betwixt these and other things, for which these are so called, others are not so called. They, therefore, that seek what it is to be any thing, as to be moveable, to be hot, &c. seek in things the causes of their names.
And from hence arises that distinction of names (touched in the last chapter) into concrete and abstract. For concrete is the name of any thing which we suppose to have a being, and is therefore called the subject, in Latin suppositum, and in Greek ὑποκέιμενον; as body, moveable, moved, figurate, a cubit high, hot, cold, like, equal, Appius, Lentulus, and the like; and, abstract is that which in any subject denotes the cause of the concrete name, as to be a body, to be moveable, to be moved, to be figurate, to be of such quantity, to be hot, to be cold, to be like, to be equal, to be Appius, to be Lentulus, &c. Or names equivalent to these, which are most commonly called abstract names, as corporiety, mobility, motion, figure, quantity, heat, cold, likeness, equality, and (as Cicero has it) Appiety and Lentulity. Of the same kind also are infinitives; for to live and to move are the same with life and motion, or to be living and to be moved. But abstract names denote only the causes of concrete names, and not the things themselves. For example, when we see any thing, or conceive in our mind any visible thing, that thing appears to us, or is conceived by us, not in one point, but as having parts distant from one another, that is, as being extended and filling some space. Seeing therefore we call the thing so conceived body, the cause of that name is, that that thing is extended, or the extension or corporiety of it. So when we see a thing appear sometimes here, sometimes there, and call it moved or removed, the cause of that name is that it is moved or the motion of the same.
And these causes of names are the same with the causes of our conceptions, namely, some power of action, or affection of the thing conceived, which some call the manner by which any thing works upon our senses, but by most men they are called accidents; I say accidents, not in that sense in which accident is opposed to necessary; but so, as being neither the things themselves, nor parts thereof, do nevertheless accompany the things in such manner, that (saving extension) they may all perish, and be destroyed, but can never be abstracted.
The use and abuse of names abstract.
4. There is also this difference betwixt concrete and abstract names, that those were invented before propositions, but these after; for these could have no being till there were propositions, from whose copula they proceed. Now in all matters that concern this life, but chiefly in philosophy, there is both great use and great abuse of abstract names; and the use consists in this, that without them we cannot, for the most part, either reason, or compute the properties of bodies; for when we would multiply, divide, add, or substract heat, light, or motion, if we should double or add them together by concrete names, saying (for example) hot is double to hot, light double to light, or moved double to moved, we should not double the properties, but the bodies themselves that are hot, light, moved, &c. which we would not do. But the abuse proceeds from this, that some men seeing they can consider, that is (as I said before) bring into account the increasings and decreasings of quantity, heat and other accidents, without considering their bodies or subjects (which they call abstracting, or making to exist apart by themselves) they speak of accidents, as if they might be separated from all bodies. And from hence proceed the gross errors of writers of metaphysics; for, because they can consider thought without the consideration of body, they infer there is no need of a thinking-body; and because quantity may be considered without considering body, they think also that quantity may be without body, and body without quantity; and that a body has quantity by the addition of quantity to it. From the same fountain spring those insignificant words, abstract substance, separated essence, and the like; as also that confusion of words derived from the Latin verb est, as essence, essentiality, entity, entitative; besides reality, aliquiddity, quiddity, &c. which could never have been heard of among such nations as do not copulate their names by the verb is, but by adjective verbs, as runneth, readeth, &c. or by the mere placing of one name after another; and yet seeing such nations compute and reason, it is evident that philosophy has no need of those words essence, entity, and other the like barbarous terms.
Proposition, universal and particular.
5. There are many distinctions of propositions, whereof the first is, that some are universal, others particular, others indefinite, and others singular; and this is commonly called the distinction of quantity. An universal proposition is that whose subject is affected with the sign of an universal name, as every man is a living creature. Particular, that whose subject is affected with the sign of a particular name, as some man is learned. An indefinite proposition has for its subject a common name, and put without any sign, as man is a living creature, man is learned. And a singular proposition is that whose subject is a singular name, as Socrates is a philosopher, this man is black.