All things necessary to salvation, are contained in faith and obedience.
2. Now all things necessary to salvation are comprehended in two virtues, faith and obedience. The latter of these, if it could be perfect, would alone suffice to preserve us from damnation; but because we have all of us been long since guilty of disobedience against God in Adam, and besides we ourselves have since actually sinned, obedience is not sufficient without remission of sins. But this, together with our entrance into the kingdom of heaven, is the reward of faith; nothing else is requisite to salvation. For the kingdom of heaven is shut to none but sinners, that is to say, those who have not performed due obedience to the laws; and not to those neither, if they believe the necessary articles of the Christian faith. Now, if we shall know in what points obedience doth consist, and which are the necessary articles of the Christian faith; it will at once be manifest what we must do, and what abstain from, at the command of cities and of princes.
What kind of obedience that is, which is required of us.
3. But by obedience in this place is signified not the fact, but the will and desire wherewith we purpose, and endeavour as much as we can, to obey for the future. In which sense the word obedience is equivalent to repentance; for the virtue of repentance consists not in the sorrow which accompanies the remembrance of sin; but in our conversion into the way, and full purpose to sin no more; without which that sorrow is said to be the sorrow not of a penitent, but a desperate person. But because they who love God cannot but desire to obey the divine law, and they who love their neighbours cannot but desire to obey the moral law; which consists (as hath been showed above in chap. III.) in the prohibition of pride, ingratitude, contumely, inhumanity, cruelty, injury, and the like offences, whereby our neighbours are prejudiced; therefore also love, or charity, is equivalent to the word obedience. Justice, also, which is a constant will of giving to every man his due, is equivalent with it. But that faith and repentance are sufficient for salvation, is manifest by the covenant itself of baptism. For they who were by Peter converted on the day of Pentecost, demanding him, what they should do: he answered (Acts ii. 38): Repent and be baptized every one of you, in the name of Jesus, for the remission of your sins. There was nothing therefore to be done for the obtaining of baptism, that is to say, for to enter into the kingdom of God, but to repent and believe in the name of Jesus; for the kingdom of heaven is promised by the covenant which is made in baptism. Furthermore, by the words of Christ, answering the lawyer who asked him what he should do to inherit eternal life (Luke xviii. 20): Thou knowest the commandments: Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, &c.: which refer to obedience; and (Mark x. 21): Sell all that thou hast, and come and follow me: which relates to faith. And by that which is said: The just shall live by faith; not every man, but the just; for justice is the same disposition of will which repentance and obedience are. And by the words of St. Mark (i. 15): The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent ye, and believe the gospel; by which words is not obscurely signified, that there is no need of other virtues for our entrance into the kingdom of God, excepting those of repentance and faith. The obedience therefore which is necessarily required to salvation, is nothing else but the will or endeavour to obey; that is to say, of doing according to the laws of God; that is, the moral laws, which are the same to all men, and the civil laws; that is to say, the commands of sovereigns in temporal matters, and the ecclesiastical laws in spiritual. Which two kinds of laws are divers in divers cities and Churches, and are known by their promulgation and public sentences.
What faith is, and how distinguished from profession, from science, and from opinion.
4. That we may understand what the Christian faith is, we must define faith in general; and distinguish it from those other acts of the mind, wherewith commonly it is confounded. The object of faith universally taken, namely, for that which is believed, is evermore a proposition, that is to say, a speech affirmative or negative, which we grant to be true. But because propositions are granted for divers causes, it falls out that these kind of concessions are diversely called. But we grant propositions sometimes, which notwithstanding we receive not into our minds; and this either for a time, to wit, so long, till by consideration of the consequences we have well examined the truth of them, which we call supposing; or also simply, as through fear of the laws, which is to profess, or confess by outward tokens; or for a voluntary compliance sake, which men use out of civility to those whom they respect, and for love of peace to others, which is absolute yielding. Now the propositions which we receive for truth, we always grant for some reasons of our own; and these are derived either from the proposition itself, or from the person propounding. They are derived from the proposition itself, by calling to mind what things those words, which make up the proposition, do by common consent usually signify. If so, then the assent which we give, is called knowledge or science. But if we cannot remember what is certainly understood by those words, but sometimes one thing, sometimes another seem to be apprehended by us, then we are said to think. For example, if it be propounded that two and three make five; and by calling to mind, that the order of numeral words is so appointed by the common consent of them who are of the same language with us, (as it were, by a certain contract necessary for human society), that five shall be the name of so many unities as are contained in two and three taken together, a man assent that this is therefore true, because two and three together are the same with five: this assent shall be called knowledge. And to know this truth is nothing else, but to acknowledge that it is made by ourselves. For by whose will and rules of speaking the number || is called two, ||| is called three, and ||||| is called five; by their will also it comes to pass that this proposition is true, two and three taken together make five. In like manner if we remember what it is that is called theft, and what injury; we shall understand by the words themselves, whether it be true that theft is an injury, or not. Truth is the same with a true proposition; but the proposition is true in which the word consequent, which by logicians is called the predicate, embraceth the word antecedent in its amplitude, which they call the subject. And to know truth, is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words. Neither was it rashly nor unadvisedly said by Plato of old, that knowledge was memory. But it happens sometimes, that words although they have a certain and defined signification by constitution, yet by vulgar use either to adorn or deceive, they are so wrested from their own significations, that to remember the conceptions for which they were first imposed on things, is very hard, and not to be mastered but by a sharp judgment and very great diligence. It happens too that there are many words, which have no proper, determined, and everywhere the same signification; and are understood not by their own, but by virtue of other signs used together with them. Thirdly, there are some words of things unconceivable. Of those things, therefore, whereof they are the words, there is no conception; and therefore in vain do we seek for the truth of those propositions, which they make out of the words themselves. In these cases, while by considering the definitions of words we search out the truth of some proposition, according to the hope we have of finding it, we think it sometimes true, and sometimes false; either of which apart is called thinking, and also believing; both together, doubting. But when our reasons, for which we assent to some proposition, derive not from the proposition itself, but from the person propounding, whom we esteem so learned that he is not deceived, and we see no reason why he should deceive us; our assent, because it grows not from any confidence of our own, but from another man’s knowledge, is called faith. And by the confidence of whom we do believe, we are said to trust them, or to trust in them. By what hath been said, the difference appears, first, between faith and profession; for that is always joined with inward assent; this not always. That is an inward persuasion of the mind, this an outward obedience. Next, between faith and opinion; for this depends on our own reason, that on the good esteem we have of another. Lastly, between faith and knowledge; for this deliberately takes a proposition broken and chewed; that swallows it down whole and entire. The explication of words, whereby the matter enquired after is propounded, is conducible to knowledge; nay, the only way to know, is by definition. But this is prejudicial to faith; for those things which exceed human capacity, and are propounded to be believed, are never more evident by explication, but, on the contrary, more obscure and harder to be credited. And the same thing befalls a man, who endeavours to demonstrate the mysteries of faith by natural reason, which happens to a sick man, who will needs chew before he will swallow his wholesome but bitter pills; whence it comes to pass, that he presently brings them up again; which perhaps would otherwise, if he had taken them well down, have proved his remedy.
What it is to believe in Christ.
5. We have seen therefore what it is to believe. But what is it to believe in Christ? Or what proposition is that, which is the object of our faith in Christ? For when we say, I believe in Christ, we signify indeed whom, but not what we believe. Now, to believe in Christ is nothing else but to believe that Jesus is the Christ, namely, he who according to the prophecies of Moses and the prophets of Israel, was to come into this world to institute the kingdom of God. And this sufficiently appears out of the words of Christ himself to Martha (John xi. 25-27): I am, saith he, the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die. Believest thou this? She saith unto him, yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the Christ the Son of God, which should come into the world. In which words, we see that the question, believest thou in me, is expounded by the answer, thou art the Christ. To believe in Christ therefore is nothing else but to believe Jesus himself, saying that he is the Christ.
That that article alone, that Jesus is the Christ, is necessary to salvation, is proved out of the scope of the evangelists.
6. Faith and obedience both necessarily concurring to salvation, what kind of obedience that same is, and to whom due, hath been showed above in [art. 3]. But now we must enquire what articles of faith are requisite. And I say, that to a Christian[[21]] there is no other article of faith requisite as necessary to salvation, but only this, that Jesus is the Christ. But we must distinguish, as we have already done before in [art. 4], between faith and profession. A profession, therefore, of more articles, if they be commanded, may be necessary; for it is a part of our obedience due to the laws. But we enquire not now what obedience, but what faith is necessary to salvation. And this is proved, first, out of the scope of the Evangelists, which was, by the description of our Saviour’s life, to establish this one article: and we shall know that such was the scope and counsel of the Evangelists, if we observe but the history itself. St. Matthew (chap. i.), beginning at his genealogy, shows that Jesus was of the lineage of David, born of a virgin: chap, ii., that he was adored by the wise men as king of the Jews; that Herod for the same cause sought to slay him: chap. iii., iv., that his kingdom was preached both by John the Baptist and himself: chapters v. vi. vii., that he taught the laws, not as the Scribes, but as one having authority: chapters viii. ix., that he cured diseases miraculously: chap. x., that he sent his apostles, the preachers of his kingdom, throughout all the parts of Judea to proclaim his kingdom: chap. xi., that he commanded the messengers, sent from John to enquire whether he were the Christ or not, to tell him what they had seen, namely, the miracles which were only compatible with Christ: chap. xii., that he proved and declared his kingdom to the Pharisees and others by arguments, parables, and signs; and the following chapters to xxi., that he maintained himself to be the Christ against the Pharisees: chap. xxi., that he was saluted with the title of king, when he entered into Jerusalem: chaps. xxii., xxiii., xxiv., xxv., that he forewarned others of false Christs; and that he showed in parables what manner of kingdom his should be: chaps. xxvi. xxvii., that he was taken and accused for this reason, because he said he was a king; and that a title was written on his cross, this is Jesus the king of the Jews: lastly, chap. xxviii., that after his resurrection, he told his apostles that all power was given unto him both in heaven and in earth. All which tends to this end; that we should believe Jesus to be the Christ. Such therefore was the scope of St. Matthew in describing his gospel. But such as his was, such also was the rest of the Evangelists; which St. John sets down expressly in the end of his gospel (John xx. 31): These things, saith he, are written, that ye may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God.