Loyola and the Educational System of the Jesuits

by Thomas Hughes

First, Professors shall adhere to St. Thomas Aquinas as their standard in theology.

Secondly, they shall take care, in their manner of teaching, always to consolidate faith and piety.

Thirdly, he lays down a principle of still wider application, and one which seems vital in the whole theory and practice of teaching: "Let no one defend any opinion which is judged by the generality of learned men to go against the received tenets of philosophers and theologians, or the common consent of theological schools." This touches a vital element in education. If we suppose that the teacher's art lies, not in giving forth the lucubrations of his own private thoughts and theories, but in imparting solid results, approved and ascertained, to those who come for such results, and wish to receive them in the most approved way, then the Professor in his chair ought not to mistake himself for the author in his study, nor should he practise on living men, whose life is all before them, what he might, with more propriety, first practise on the leisured world, and test elsewhere, either in the printed page, or in conference with his equals. The Professor, as such, is not the original investigator. In mathematics, he is notoriously not so. In that branch, the best teacher is the man who walks along a definite line, turns neither to the right nor left, and finishes in a definite time; or else his scholars will never finish. To a certain degree, the same holds in all courses. If a man is theorizing, when he ought to be instructing, he goes off the line of perfect system, however much pains he takes with his matter; just as much as if, taking no pains whatever, he neglected his matter altogether, went behind it, or around it, gave histories of his branch, methods of teaching it, and descanted on pedagogics, to young people who were never sent to him for that purpose. They are sent to learn definite matter, and to be formed therein on a good plan, by the man who understands it. Then, as Loyola said in another connection, "when they have experienced in themselves the effects thereof," they will be qualified for all the rest, for understanding the plan itself on which they have been formed, and enjoying all the practical results of it; and, if their line of life invites, for understanding other plans too. This is practical wisdom in education; neither dilettantism nor speculation.

Fourthly, Aquaviva lays down a principle regarding the public advocacy of opinions. He is not referring to authorities denouncing, or Professors repudiating, them; but merely to certain conditions for putting them forward: "If opinions, no matter whose they be, are found in a certain province or city to give offence to many Catholics, whether members of the Society or not, that is, persons not unqualified to judge, let no one teach them or defend them there, albeit the same doctrines may be taught elsewhere without offence." The word "defence," in a context like this, means publishing and sustaining theses against all comers in public disputations; wherein the Professor represents the school, and the school is put to the account of the Order. The principle seems discreet. If a corporate body does not want to be compromised, it is not for the member to compromise it. If he wants to use the perfect freedom of his opinions, and deliver himself of his own pronouncements, he ought first to assure himself that his circumstances are such as to set him free from representing others. This is an elementary principle of social and urbane existence.

The fifth point concerns the march of improvement in the advancement of opinions. It describes the method of discreet development: "In questions which have already been treated by others, let no one follow new opinions, or, in matters which in any way pertain to religion, or are of some consequence, let no one introduce new questions, without consulting the Prefect of Studies, or the Superior. If, then, it still remains dubious, whether the new opinion, or the new question, is permissible, it will be proper for the said authority, in order that things may proceed more smoothly, to learn the judgment of others in the Society upon the subject; and then he will determine what appears best for the greater glory of God." In the sixth and last point, Aquaviva calls attention to a former decree, upon the manner of treating the Aristotelian philosophy.[146]

So much for this letter of Aquaviva. On the sense and purport thereof he invited the communication of views from the Order at large, as well as on the document which he encloses, the preliminary Ratio Studiorum. To this we may now turn our attention.

The six Fathers, who drew it up, state, in their introduction, that there are two mainstays and supports of the Society of Jesus, "an ardent pursuit of piety and an eminent degree of learning," ardens pietatis studium et præstans rerum scientia. If piety is not illumined with the light of learning, it can be, no doubt, of great use to the person who possesses it, but of scarcely any use in the service of the Church and of one's neighbor, in the administration of the Word and of the Sacraments, in the education of youth, in controversies with those who are hostile to the faith, in giving counsel, answering doubts, and in all other offices and functions, which are proper to men of the Order. All these call for an endowment of learning not common, but excelling in its degree.

To acquire such learning, it is of supreme consequence that we set before ourselves what path we enter on, what arts we employ, and what means we use; because, unless a ready and tried method be adopted, ratio facilis ac solers, much labor is spent in gathering but little fruit; whereas, if the labor of studies be guided by some sage rule, great results are compendiously obtained, at the cost of little research.

Then the Commission goes on to say: "We have undertaken to teach, not only members of the Order, but youth from the world outside. The number of this latter class is vast; it includes brilliant talent, and represents the nobility. We cannot imagine that we do justice to our functions, or come up to the expectations formed of us, if we do not feed this multitude of youths, in the same way as nurses do, with food dressed in the best way, for fear they grow up in our schools, without growing much in learning. An additional spur is felt in the circumstance, that whatever concerns us is public and, day after day, is before the eyes of all, even of those who are not well disposed towards us." The Fathers consider it unnecessary to enlarge upon that harmony of views, so much commended in the Constitution, as to matters of public policy or teaching; they say, "sufficient regard could not, up to this, be paid to such harmony; for, when no common order or form was as yet prescribed, every one thought that he could hold what sentiments he liked, and teach them to others in the manner he himself preferred; so that sometimes the members of the Order disagreed as much among themselves, as with others outside."[147]

After describing, in vivid terms, the manner in which they had conducted their deliberations, and arrived at conclusions, and how, when any keen dispute had arisen among them,[148] they had divided and distinguished the disputed matter, and had examined it during two and even three days, till they came to settle at last on what all of them accepted, the critics come to the Practice and Order of Studies;[149] and upon this they enlarge, in successive chapters, under the following heads:—