Dear Sir,—In mine of the day before yesterday, I informed you that to comply with a request of Governor Cabell, I had undertaken to lay down rules of intercourse with the British vessels, at first intended for Captain Decatur only, but afterwards extended with equal power to the officer commanding by land, so that each should have equal power to send and receive flags. I now send you a copy of that letter. Since that I have received from the Governor a letter, pointing out difficulties occurring in the execution of the Volunteer act, from the restriction of issuing commissions until the companies be actually raised, the brigades, &c., organized. Another difficulty, not mentioned in the letter, embarrassed him, with respect to accepting more than the quota of each district. I learnt, through a direct channel, that he was so seriously impressed with these legal obstacles, that no commissions were likely to be issued, and then, certainly, that few volunteers would be raised. In answering his letter, therefore, I have dwelt more on these points than might otherwise have seemed necessary. I enclose the letter for your consideration, that if you find no error in it material enough to require a return of it for correction, you will be so good as to seal and forward it to him without delay. But if you think anything material in it should be corrected before it is sent, I will pray you to suggest the alteration, and return me the letter. I salute you affectionately.
P. S. Be pleased to return the Governor's letter to me.
TO HIS EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR CABELL.
Monticello, August 11, 1807.
Dear Sir,—Your favor of the 7th is received. It asks my opinion on several points of law arising out of the act of Congress for accepting thirty thousand volunteers. Although your own opinion, and those of some of your counsellors, more recent in the habit of legal investigation, would be a safer guide for you than mine, unassisted by my ordinary and able associates, yet I shall frankly venture my individual thoughts on the subject, and participate with you in any risks of disapprobation to which an honest desire of furthering the public good may expose us.
In the construction of a law, even in judiciary cases of meum et tuum, where the opposite parties have a right and counter-right in the very words of the law, the Judge considers the intention of the law-giver as his true guide, and gives to all the parts and expressions of the law, that meaning which will effect, instead of defeating, its intention. But in laws merely executive, where no private right stands in the way, and the public object is the interest of all, a much freer scope of construction, in favor of the intention of the law, ought to be taken, and ingenuity ever should be exercised in devising constructions, which may save to the public the benefit of the law. Its intention is the important thing: the means of attaining it quite subordinate. It often happens that, the Legislature prescribing details of execution, some circumstance arises, unforeseen or unattended to by them, which would totally frustrate their intention, were their details scrupulously adhered to, and deemed exclusive of all others. But constructions must not be favored which go to defeat instead of furthering the principal object of their law, and to sacrifice the end to the means. It being as evidently their intention that the end shall be attained as that it should be effected by any given means, if both cannot be observed, we are equally free to deviate from the one as the other, and more rational in postponing the means to the end. In the present case, the object of the act of Congress was to relieve the militia at large from the necessity of leaving their farms and families, to encounter a service very repugnant to their habits, and to permit that service to be assumed by others ardently desiring it. Both parties, therefore, (and they comprehend the whole nation,) would willingly waive any verbal difficulties, or circumstances of detail, which might thwart their mutual desires, and would approve all those views of the subject which facilitate the attainment of their wishes.
It is further to be considered that the Constitution gives the executive a general power to carry the laws into execution. If the present law had enacted that the service of thirty thousand volunteers should be accepted, without saying anything of the means, those means would, by the Constitution, have resulted to the discretion of the executive. So if means specified by an act are impracticable, the constitutional power remains, and supplies them. Often the means provided specially are affirmative merely, and, with the constitutional powers, stand well together; so that either may be used, or the one supplementary to the other. This aptitude of means to the end of a law is essentially necessary for those which are executive; otherwise the objection that our government is an impracticable one, would really be verified.
With this general view of our duty as executive officers, I proceed to the questions proposed by you.
1st. Does not the act of Congress contemplate the association of companies to be formed before commissions can be issued to the Captains, &c.?
2d. Can battalion or field-officers be appointed by either the State or Congressional laws, but to battalions or regiments actually existing?