[205]. See Dr. Goodwin, vol. 2. of election.
[206]. προεθετο.
[208]. This is what is meant by that axiom, used by the school-men, Decretum Dei, nihil ponit in esse.
[209]. Thus the school-men distinguish between necessitas consequentis, and consequentiæ; so that that, which is not in itself necessary, is rendered eventually so, as the consequence of God’s purpose, that it shall be.
[210]. “There is no necessity for supposing a predestination to death, in the same sense as unto life, that is to the means and the consequent end: For the occurrence of sin may be satisfactorily accounted for on other principles; though without pretending to the removal of every difficulty in a subject the entire comprehension of which is probably unsuited to our present state and faculties.”[[211]]
Smith’s Letters to Belsham.
[211]. It is acknowledged that this view of the subject is different from that which most Calvinistic writers have given. Yet several eminent divines have laid down the fundamental principles, at least, of this sentiment, and have opened the way to it: particularly Augustine, Theophilus Gale, and a class of German Theologians who may be termed the school of Leibnitz. A short time ago an attempt was made to excite the attention of thinking men to his doctrine, by a Sermon on the Divine glory, displayed by the Permission of Sin. But, since the publication of that pamphlet, the subject has been more ably and fully treated by my reverend tutor, the Rev. Dr. Williams, in his Discourse on Predestination to Life, published very lately.
[212]. αδοκιμοι.
[213]. See Whitby’s Paraphrase, &c. on Jude, ver. 4.