[234]. Vid. Senac. de Prov. cap. 5. August, de Civ. Dei, Lib. V. cap. 1, & 8. Lips Phys. Stoic. Lib. J. Diss. 12.
[235]. See Quest. XVIII.
[236]. See Quest. XXI, XXII.
[237]. When we contend for this doctrine as a truth, it should be viewed in connexion with its real importance. These two objects are extremely different in things natural, civil, and religious. There are many things true in history, in philosophy, in politics, and even in theology, which no sober person deems important. There are other things hypothetically important, whether actually true or not. And of this kind is the subject before us. Such is the nature, the connexion, and consequences of it, that if it be true, it cannot fail of being of the first importance.
But how are we more particularly to estimate the importance of this subject? By the influence which the admission or the denial of it has on the very foundations of religion. For instance, if it be NOT true, either man himself or mere chance has the principal share in effecting our actual salvation, and investing us with eternal glory. Some indeed are so lost to modesty and self-knowledge, and so unacquainted with the leading truths of christianity, that they do not scruple to ascribe the eventual difference in our future state, whether good or bad, to man himself, but attended with some verbal, unmeaning compliment to divine mercy. Such persons should first learn the rudiments of christianity, before they have a right to expect any deference shewn to their opinions. On the other hand, if this BE true, its utility is plain; it will hide pride from man; it will exclude chance from having any share in our deliverance; it will exalt the grace of God; it will render salvation a certain, and not a precarious thing; and, in a word, it will secure to them who have the Spirit of Christ the greatest consolation.
This was the view which our episcopal reformers had of the doctrine, both as to its truth, and the importance of it. ‘Predestination to life’ say they, ‘is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby, before the foundations of the world were laid, he hath constantly decreed by his counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour.—The godly consideration of Predestination and our election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their minds to high and heavenly things; as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation, to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God.’—Another observation I would make is,
2. That it is highly proper, in order to investigate the present subject with success, to keep it perfectly distinct, and free from all impure mixtures. This is what some of our early reformers, and many of the modern defenders of this doctrine have not done. For want of this, many bitter enemies have opposed it. Dr. Whitby, for instance, and most who have written on the same side of the question since his time, place predestination to death, or reprobation to misery, as the very foundation of Calvinism, and inseparable from predestination to life. But so far is predestination to death from being true, that nothing can be more untrue. It is but an arbitrary assumption; a foreign, impure mixture, having no foundation either in the real meaning of holy writ, or in the nature of things; except indeed we mean by it, what no one questions, a determination to punish the guilty.[[238]] But is not one man’s misery as certain as another man’s happiness? Yes; equally certain. What then; must they therefore be equally predestinated? No. But how can a thing be certain, if it be not predestinated? Have a little patience and I will tell you. The previous question is, Does God predestinate to sin as the means, and to death or misery as the end, in the same way as he predestinates to holiness as the means, and eternal glory as the end? This we deny, as it would be infinitely unworthy of God, making him the author of sin, or doing evil that good may come. Some indeed have distinguished between being the author or the cause of sin, and being a sinner. But the distinction itself is not solid, nor could it fully satisfy those who have made it in clearing the divine character.[[239]]
In fact, sin and holiness are not only different, but opposite effects, and their causes equally opposite; but as God is the sole cause, the sole exclusive cause of holiness, the creature, in some way, must be the sole and exclusive cause of sin. If you ask how? I reply, by exercising his liberty, which is a mere natural instrument, on himself, rather than on God. But how came he to do that? By his passive power. What is passive power? In general, it is that which distinguishes the creature from the Creator. But more particularly, it is that tendency to nothing as to being, and to defection as to well being, which is essential to every created existence. If every creature have, and must of necessity have this passive power, you will ask, how came the holy angels, and the spirits of the just, not to sin? The answer is, because divine grace upholds them. These things duly considered, though briefly stated, will shew, that as God is not the author of sin, so neither has he predestinated sin. He is the author and cause of good only. He is the author of our liberty; but that in itself is not evil. And he is the author of our nature as limited; that also of itself is no moral evil. But when our liberty unites with this limited nature, or terminates on passive power, when this latter is not controuled by grace, their offspring is imperfect, or sinfulness attaches to our moral acts.
Hence you may learn, that sin and future misery are events perfectly certain, though not predestinated. It has been often assumed, but without propriety or truth, that an event is foreknown only because it is decreed. In reality all good is foreknown, because it is decreed; for there is no other ground of its existence. But sin, as before shewn, has another ground of existence, namely, passive power, which can no more be an object of divine predestination or decree than its perfect opposite, the all-sufficiency of Jehovah. Yet, observe attentively, this has its proper nature, and God sees all things, and all essences, in their proper nature. What! Does not God foreknow the sinfulness of any event in its deficient cause, as well as the goodness of another in that which is efficient? Beside, passive power in union with liberty is an adequate, a fully adequate ground of sin and death; and therefore to introduce a predestination of sin and death, is to ascribe to God what is equally impious and needless.[[240]]—Let us, therefore, keep this doctrine free from all impure mixtures, and now proceed to a
3rd Observation, that is, When the end is maintained to be infallibly certain, the means to promote that end are included. Thus you may suppose a chain suspended from a great height, and to the lowest link a weight is fixed, which is borne by it. You do not suppose that this link is unconnected with the next, and so on till you come to the highest. Every one of the links is equally necessary with that which is next the weight; and the whole is connected with something else which is stronger than the weight, including that of the chain also, however long and heavy.