2. As the predestination for which we contend is only to good, it affords the most pleasing view of the divine character. God is love. In him is no such inconsistency as is but too frequently found among men. He is not a fountain sending forth at the same place both sweet water and bitter, yielding both salt water and fresh. With the utmost safety and confidence may a humble soul commit itself into the arms of such a being. No one has any thing to fear from God but the proud and rebellious, the unbelieving and impenitent. And surely bad must be the doctrine that speaks peace to the wicked.
3. As in the present case the end, and the way leading to it, are inseparable; every reason and argument, every alarming topic, every scriptural exhortation, and every obligation to duty, are in full force. They who represent these things as inconsistent with predestination, either have a wrong view of the subject, or care not what they say nor whereof they affirm. Obligation to duty is founded on widely and totally different considerations.[[242]]
God sustains, with respect to man, a twofold character, the one is that of an equitable governor, the other that of a sovereign disposer. Answerably to this, man sustains a twofold character also; that of an accountable agent, and that of a disposable subject. As passive in the hand of a sovereign God, he is necessitated to good, in proportion as goodness attaches to him; and in the heirs of salvation this is predestination to life. As active, or a moral agent, man is treated according to the rules of reason and equity, yet mingled with undeserved favours. So that every man is, in these different respects, at once the subject of liberty and necessity.
Equally vague and unprofitable, therefore, is all controversy on the subject now alluded to while one side contends for liberty and the other for necessity to the usual exclusion of the opposite. Neither can be wholly right. For, as sure as God disposes of a man for final good, the doctrine of necessity is true; and as sure as a man is a transgressor of divine law, and thus is fitted for destruction, he is free from all decretive necessity. Therefore,
4. Here is no room for the impious inference, that when we do evil we are predestinated to it. Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for as God cannot be tempted with evil, so neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin when it is finished, bringeth forth death. Do not err, my beloved brethren; every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.—But evil, in whatever person, in whatever place, at whatever time, in whatever form or degree, is from a quarter diametrically opposite.—On the contrary,
5. When at any time we are engaged in the work of God, in any thing whatever that is morally good, then are we employed in the execution of the divine purposes; for there is no good done in time but was decreed to be done, in all its circumstances, from eternity. Even all the actions of the wicked, except the deformity or sinfulness which is in them, are also worthy of God to predestinate. This consideration, every one must allow, is a great incentive to virtue and holiness. This remark is applicable both to ministers and people. Are ministers engaged in preaching the law for conviction, the promises for encouragement, and the unsearchable riches of Christ for consolation; are they urging, according to scripture commands and example, repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; do they enforce christian duties, teaching the disciples all things whatsoever our Lord and lawgiver has commanded; do they warn sinners to flee from the wrath to come, or invite the burdened and heavy laden to seek rest in the meek and lowly, the merciful and loving Saviour? They are in all this only the instruments of a sovereign God, or the appointed means whereby he executes his eternal purposes. Again, has God enjoined the necessity of repentance, faith, holiness, obedience, and perseverance; poverty of spirit, holy mourning, purity of heart, love to enemies, &c? our personal compliance, which is evermore of grace, is only the decreed method of bringing us to that eternal glory which is the end. Once more,
6. This doctrine properly guarded, and rightly understood, shews with peculiar force the true ground of repentance, and the obligations of gratitude and holiness.—If the sinfulness of no action is decreed, but proceeds wholly from that in us which is opposite to God and his will, whether secret or revealed, rectoral or decretive, what can be more binding and reasonable than repentance toward God? And if all good, whether natural, supernatural, moral or spiritual, in ourselves and others, in time and to eternity proceed from God’s predestination, what a foundation is there laid for gratitude! Put on, therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering. Give all diligence to make your calling and election sure. And let the peace of God rule in your hearts, to the which also ye are called in one body, and be ye thankful. And whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him. Amen.
Dr. Williams.
[238]. Predestination to Death or misery, as the end, and to sin as the means, I call “an impure mixture;” a mixture, because its connexion with Predestination to life is arbitrary and forced;—impure, because the supposition itself is a foul aspersion of the divine character. St. Augustine, Calvin, Perkins, Twisse, Rutherford, &c. &c. though highly valuable and excellent men, upon the whole, were not free from this impure mixture of doctrine. But of all modern authors, if we except the philosophical Necessarians, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, Hartley, Priestly, &c. Dr. Hopkins, of America seems the most open in his avowal of the sentiment, that sin and misery are decreed in the same manner as holiness and happiness, in order to produce the greatest general good. The substance of his reasoning is thus expressed by himself: “All future existences, events, and actions, must have a cause of their futurition, or there must be a reason why they are future, or certainly to take place, rather than not. This cause must be the divine decree determining their future existence, or it must be in the future existences themselves. But the future existences could not he the cause of their own futurition; for this supposes them to exist as a cause, and to have influence, before they have any existence, even from eternity.—The cause therefore can be nothing but divine decree, determining their future existence, without which nothing could be future, consequently nothing could be known to be future.”—See his System of doctrines, 2 vol. 8vo. especially Vol. i p. 110-217.
On the sentiment itself, by whomsoever held, I would offer the following strictures: