1. It is a mere assumption, that sin, which the above proposition avowedly includes, has no possible cause of its futurition but either the divine decree, or the future existences themselves. For though God’s decrees are the cause of our being, faculties, and volitions, none of these, nor any thing else that can he traced to divine causation, will constitute sin. Nor yet is it true that sin is the cause of itself; for then sin would be self-existent. It follows therefore that it must have another origin than either the divine decree or its own existence.
2. It is equally plain that the cause of sin is not itself morally evil; For this would involve a contradiction, making cause and effect to be the same thing. Nor yet can the cause be morally good. For as from truth nothing but truth can legitimately proceed, so from good nothing but good can flow. Evil, indeed, is related to good, but not as cause and effect. Though evil could not follow were there no infinite good, no creature, no will, no freedom, yet something else must be sought as the matrix, where the monster sin is generated and fostered, and which, morally considered, is neither good nor evil.—Therefore,
3. We assert, that the origin of moral evil is to be found in the union of two principles, neither of which considered alone partakes of a moral character. These two principles are Liberty and Passive Power. Liberty, it is manifest is morally neither good nor bad, but is a mere natural instrument, if I may so speak, and may be termed a natural good of which God is the author and decreer. On the contrary, Passive Power is a natural evil of which God is not the author or decreer, yet morally considered is not evil. But this term, being little understood, requires further explanation; at least it is incumbent on me to shew in what sense I use it. My design is not to vindicate the use of it by others, but I adopt it to convey a specific idea, for which I find no other word or phrase more appropriate. By ‘Passive Power,’ then, I mean, That which is of unavoidable necessity found in every creature, as such, in direct opposition to the self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency of God. In other words, It is that tendency to nihility, physically considered, and to defection, morally considered, which of absolute necessity belongs to every dependent or created nature. That there is such a principle is self-evident, nor is it probable that any reasonable being will ever controvert its existence. Now, it is demonstrable that this, from the definition, cannot be the object of divine decree, or of will; for it is stated to be of absolute or unavoidable necessity; besides, it is absurd to suppose that God has decreed, or produces, any thing the existence of which stands in direct contrariety to himself. That it is not a moral evil is plain, for the holiest creatures are subjects of it—God alone is exempt.
4. Let it be further observed, that the First Cause, being goodness itself, impels, whether decretively or efficiently, to good only; and of this character is even our being necessitated to exercise our volitions. Yet, when the exercise of liberty, in itself innocent, unites with passive power, the fruit or offspring of this union is moral evil. This, I am fully persuaded, is the true solution of this question, Whence cometh moral evil? If any person shall think proper candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary, due regard shall be paid to them,
5. If it be asked, where lies the difference between decreeing and permitting sin to take place? I answer, the difference is, that the one would be an act of injustice, the other is doing nothing. So that until it can be shewn that there is no difference between injustice and doing nothing, there is no force in the objection. That to necessitate sin decretively would be an act of injustice, and therefore incompatible with the divine character, is, I think, demonstrable; for, it would be to decree to destruction antecedently to desert—to annihilate the sinfulness of any act, making its evil nature to consist in its effects—and to destroy the immutable essences of good and evil. Whereas to permit, or to suffer to take place without prevention, is not to act not to decree. To ‘decree to permit,’ therefore, is a contradiction in terms.
6. But, it has been said, the event is the same to the sinner, whether he hurried on to sin and misery by a decretive impulse, or these effects are not prevented when in the power of omnipotence to interpose. This objection would have some weight, if the happiness of the creature were the only, or even the principal end of God in creation. But this not being the case, its weight vanishes. To illustrate this we may suppose, that the event of a man’s execution is well known to a judge; but, instead of proceeding on the principles of law and equity, and to effect conviction and condemnation according to legal evidence, he orders the man to be executed clandestinely without any equitable process, under pretence that it could make no difference to the sufferer, for the event of his execution was certain! Besides, the spirit of the objection reflects on God’s actual dealings with his creatures, in every instance of their sufferings; because it is in the power of omnipotence to interpose. And in fact, it must be allowed, either that the happiness of the Creature is not the chief end of creation, or that the permission of sin is an act of injustice. But the case is plain, that his own glory is the chief end of creation and government, and that there is no injustice in the permission of sin.
7. It may be said, If the union of liberty with passive power be the origin of moral evil, and if the holiest creatures in heaven are both free and the subjects of passive power, how is it that they do not sin! If both are united in the same persons, does the one never terminate upon; or unite itself to the other? In answer to this enquiry, we must distinguish between having the principle, and being under its influence without control. Though the spirits of the just, and holy angels, have in them the principle, as the condition of their created existence, yet it is counteracted by sovereign favour. They may say, as well as Paul, by the grace of God we are what we are. The object of divine support is the disposition, or the seat of moral action; this being made good, or pure, or holy, prior to all acts of the will, effectually counteracts the influence of passive power. The Liberty and choice of a heavenly being therefore, terminating on such a disposition, no acts but such as are holy can ensue. Hence,
8. If we would know how this is consistent with the actual fall of beings who were once in this condition, we must attend to another important consideration; which is, that when God at any time deals in mere equity with a moral agent, without the counteracting influence of sovereign favour, the inevitable consequence is, that his liberty, or free choice, will terminate upon his passive power. Hence the certainty of the futurition of moral evil, in all possible degrees and circumstances, without any decretive efficiency in its production.—If it be asked, why the exercise of equity is assigned as the occasion of this union, rather than sovereignty; or, why leaving a free agent to the influence of his passive power should not be considered a sovereign rather than an equitable act? The best answer to this enquiry, is a definition of the two terms. By equity then I mean the principle that gives to each his due; by sovereignty, a right to do whatsoever is not inconsistent with equity. And from this definition it must appear that there may he a two-fold deviation from equity, viz. giving more than is due, or less than is due; more good and less evil, or more evil and less good than is equitable. The former of these, more good and less evil, must needs be for the advantage of the creature; and therefore it may be called a gracious deviation. Without it, there would be no room for either mercy or grace. The latter, more evil and less good than is due, is properly called injustice, and is such a deviation from equity as is not compatible with the divine character. Therefore, to do us good beyond our claim is an act of sovereignty; but to give us neither more nor less than is our due is to deal with us in pure equity.
9. Hence it follows, that when God deals with angels or men in sovereignty, according to the definitions, he does them good beyond their claim. But to make this to be the immediate cause of the sin of men and angels is absurd. On the other hand, it is incompatible with the divine character, as before observed, to give them less good and more evil than is their due; and therefore this cannot be the cause of sin, as sure as God is incapable of exercising injustice.—Wherefore, it remains that then alone can moral agents fall into sin when dealt with in pure equity. In the act of defection, or becoming sinful, they are equally free from being impelled by injustice, and upheld by sovereign favour.
COROLLARIES.