I. That there is something supposed; namely, that the soul of man is immortal; otherwise it could not be capable of happiness or misery.

II. We shall consider the happiness which the members of the invisible church enjoy; which is called communion with Christ in glory.

III. The misery which the souls of the wicked endure at death; which is contained in the latter part of the answer.

I. To speak concerning the thing supposed in this answer; namely, that the soul of man is immortal. This is a subject of that importance, that we must be first convinced of the truth of it before we can conclude that there is a state of happiness or misery in another world. But before we proceed to the proof of it, it is necessary for us to explain what we are to understand thereby; accordingly let it be premised,

1. That we read, in scripture, of the death of the soul, in a spiritual sense, as separated by sin, from God, the fountain of life and blessedness, and as being destitute of a principle of grace; whereby it is utterly indisposed to perform any actions that are spiritually good, as much as a dead man is unable to perform the functions of life. In this sense we are to understand the apostle’s words, She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth, 1 Tim. v. 6. And in this respect unregenerate persons are said to be dead in trespasses and sins, Eph. ii. 1. and a condemned state, which is the consequence hereof, is a state of death. Now that which is opposed hereunto, is called, in scripture, a spiritual life, or immortality; but this is not the sense in which we are to consider it in our present argument.

2. Immortality may be considered as an attribute peculiar to God, as the apostle says, he only hath immortality, 1 Tim. vi. 16. the meaning of which is, that his life, which includes his Being, and all his perfections, is necessary and independent; but in this respect no creature is immortal; but their life is maintained by the will and providence of God, which gave being to it at first.

3. When we speak of creatures being immortal, we must consider them either as not having any thing in the constitution of their nature, that tends to a dissolution, which cannot be effected by any second cause; or their eternal existence, pursuant to the will of God, who could, had he pleased, have annihilated them. It is in both these senses that we are to consider the immortality of the soul.

That it is in its own nature immortal, has been allowed by many of the Heathens, who have had just conceptions of the spirituality of its nature, possessed due regards to the providence of God, and those marks of distinction that he puts between good and bad men, as the consequence of their behaviour in this life. That the soul survives the body, has been reckoned, by some of the Heathens, as an opinion that has almost universally obtained in the world[[125]]. Thus Plato introduces Socrates[[126]] as discoursing largely on this subject, immediately before his death: and, in some, other of his writings, not only asserts, but gives as good proofs of this doctrine as any one, destitute of scripture-light, could do. One of his followers, in the account he gives of his doctrine, recommends and insists on an argument which he brings to prove it, which is not without its weight, namely, that the soul acts from a principle seated in its own nature, and not by the influence of some external cause, as things material do[[127]]. And Strabo speaks of the ancient Brachmans, among the Indians, as entertaining some notions of the immortality of the soul, and the judgment passed upon it in its separate state; agreeable to what Plato advances on that subject[[128]].

Some, indeed, have thought that this notion took its rise from Thales, the Milesian, who lived between two and three hundred years before Plato, and about six hundred years before the Christian Æra, from an occasional passage mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, in his life, which is hardly sufficient to justify this supposition; which he brings in only as matter of report[[129]]: And Cicero[[130]] supposes it was first propagated by Pherecydes, who was cotemporary with him; though Diogenes Laertius makes no mention of it. But it may be inferred from many things in Homer, the oldest writer in the Greek tongue, who lived above three hundred years before Thales, that the world had entertained some confused ideas of it in his time: As we often find him bringing in the souls of the deceased heroes appearing in a form, and speaking with a voice like that which they had when living, to their surviving friends. And he not only supposes, but plainly intimates that their souls existed in a separate state[[131]]. And in other places he represents some suffering punishment for their crimes committed here on earth[[132]]; which plainly argues, whatever fabulous account we have of the nature of punishment, or the person suffering it, that it was an opinion, generally received at that time, that the soul existed in a separate state.

And, indeed, this maybe inferred from the doctrine of Dæmons, or the superstitious worship of the heathens, which they paid to the souls of those heroes who formerly lived on earth, and had done some things which they thought rendered them the peculiar favourites of God, and the objects of worship by men; and that their souls existed with God in great honour and favour in a separate state[[133]]. But passing this by, it may be farther observed, that whatever notions some of the heathens had of the immortality of the soul in general; they were very much at a loss, many of them, in determining the place, or many things relating to the state in which they were; and therefore many of them, with Pythagoras, asserted the doctrine of transmigration of souls, or their passing from one body to another; and being condemned to reside in vile and dishonourable bodies; which, though it perverts, yet doth not overthrow the doctrine of the soul’s immortality; and others seemed to doubt whether, after four or five courses of transmigration of souls from one body to another, they might not at last shrivel into nothing.