Mr. Brooks and Mr. Alley both deny having had any such conversation, or that Mr. Brooks ever made such a statement to Mr. Alley. If, therefore, this matter rested wholly upon the testimony of Mr. McComb, the committee would not feel justified in finding that Mr. Brooks procured the stock by such use of his official position; but all the circumstances seem to point exactly in that direction, and we can find no other satisfactory solution of the question above propounded. Whatever claim Mr. Brooks had to stock, either legal or moral, had been adjusted and satisfied by Dr. Durant. Whether he was getting this stock for himself or to give to his son-in-law, we believe, from the circumstances attending the whole transaction, that he obtained it knowing that it was yielded to its official position and influence, and with the intent to secure his favor and influence in such positions. Mr. Brooks claims that he has had no interest in this stock whatever; that the benefit and advantage of his right to have it he gave to Mr. Neilson, his son-in-law, and that he has had all the dividends upon it. The committee are unable to find this to be the case, for in their judgment all the facts and circumstances show Mr. Brooks to be the real and substantial owner, and that Neilson’s ownership is merely nominal and colorable.
In June, 1868, there was a cash dividend of $9,000 upon this one hundred and fifty shares of stock. Neilson received it, of course, as the stock was in his name; but on the same day it was paid over to Mr. Brooks, as Neilson says, to pay so much of the $10,000 advanced by Mr. Brooks to pay for the stock. This, then, repaid all but $1,000 of the loan; but Mr. Brooks continued to hold $16,000 of Union Pacific bonds, which Neilson says he gave him as collateral security, and to draw the interest upon all but $5,000. The interest upon the others, Neilson says, he was permitted to draw and retain, but at one time in his testimony he spoke of the amount he was allowed as being Christmas and New Year’s presents. Neilson says that during the last summer he borrowed $14,000 of Mr. Brooks, and he now owes Mr. Brooks nearly as much as the collaterals; but, according to his testimony, Mr. Brooks for four years held $16,000 in bonds as security for $1,000, and received the interest on $11,000 of the collaterals. No accounts appear to have been kept between Mr. Brooks and Neilson, and doubtless what sums he has received from Mr. Brooks, out of the dividends, were intended as presents rather than as deliveries of money belonging to him.
Mr. Brooks’s efforts procured the stock; his money paid for it; all the cash dividends he has received; and he holds all the bonds, except those Dillon received, which seem to have been applied toward paying for the fifty shares. Without further comment on the evidence, the committee find that the one hundred and fifty shares of stock appearing on the books of the Credit Mobilier in the name of Neilson were really the stock of Mr. Brooks, and subject to his control, and that it was so understood by both the parties. Mr. Brooks had taken such an interest in the Credit Mobilier Company, and was so connected with Dr. Durant, that he must be regarded as having full knowledge of the relations between that company and the railroad company, and of the contracts between them. He must have known the cause of the sudden increase in value of the Credit Mobilier stock, and how the large expected profits were to be made. We have already expressed our views of the propriety of a member of Congress becoming the owner of stock, possessing this knowledge.
But Mr. Brooks was not only a member of Congress, but he was a Government director of the Union Pacific Company. As such it was his duty to guard and watch over the interests of the Government in the road and to see that they were protected and preserved. To insure such faithfulness on the part of Government directors, Congress wisely provided that they should not be stockholders in the road. Mr. Brooks readily saw that, though becoming a stockholder in the Credit Mobilier was not forbidden by the letter of the law, yet it was a violation of its spirit and essence, and therefore had the stock placed in the name of his son-in-law. The transfer of the Oakes Ames contract to the trustees and the building of the road under that contract, from which the enormous dividends were derived, were all during Mr. Brooks’s official life as a Government director, must have been within his knowledge, and yet passed without the slightest opposition from him. The committee believed this could not have been done without an entire disregard of his official obligation and duty, and that while appointed to guard the public interests in the road he joined himself with the promoters of a scheme whereby the Government was to be defrauded, and shared in the spoil.
In the conclusions of fact upon the evidence, the committee are entirely agreed.
In considering what action we ought to recommend to the House upon these facts, the committee encounter a question which has been much debated: Has this House power and jurisdiction to inquire concerning offenses committed by its members prior to their election, and to punish them by censure or expulsion? The committee are unanimous upon the right of jurisdiction of this House over the cases of Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks, upon the facts found in regard to them. Upon the question of jurisdiction the committee present the following views:
The Constitution, in the fifth section of the first article, defines the power of either House as follows:
“Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds expel a member.”
It will be observed that there is no qualification of the power, but there is an important qualification of the manner of its exercise—it must be done “with the concurrence of two-thirds.”
The close analogy between this power and the power of impeachment is deserving of consideration.