American politics (non-partisan) from the beginning to date

by Thomas V. Cooper; Hector T. Fenton

The great purpose of the power of impeachment is to remove an unfit and unworthy incumbent from office, and though a judgment of impeachment may to some extent operate as punishment, that is not its principal object. Members of Congress are not subject to be impeached, but may be expelled, and the principal purpose of expulsion is not as punishment, but to remove a member whose character and conduct show that he is an unfit man to participate in the deliberations and decisions of the body, and whose presence in it tends to bring the body into contempt and disgrace.

In both cases it is a power of purgation and purification to be exercised for the public safety, and, in the case of expulsion, for the protection and character of the House. The Constitution defines the causes of impeachment, to wit, “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The office of the power of expulsion is so much the same as that of the power to impeach that we think it may be safely assumed that whatever would be a good cause of impeachment would also be a good cause of expulsion.

It has never been contended that the power to impeach for any of the causes enumerated was intended to be restricted to those which might occur after appointment to a civil office, so that a civil officer who had secretly committed such offense before his appointment should not be subject upon detection and exposure to be convicted and removed from office. Every consideration of justice and sound policy would seem to require that the public interests be secured, and those chosen to be their guardians be free from the pollution of high crimes, no matter at what time that pollution had attached.

If this be so in regard to other civil officers, under institutions which rest upon the intelligence and virtue of the people, can it well be claimed that the law-making Representative may be vile and criminal with impunity, provided the evidences of his corruption are found to antedate his election?

In the report made to the Senate by John Quincy Adams in December, 1807, upon the case of John Smith, of Ohio, the following language is used: “The power of expelling a member for misconduct results, on the principles of common sense, from the interests of the nation that the high trust of legislation shall be invested in pure hands. When the trust is elective, it is not to be presumed that the constituent body will commit the deposit to the keeping of worthless characters. But when a man whom his fellow-citizens have honored with their confidence on a pledge of a spotless reputation, has degraded himself by the commission of infamous crimes, which become suddenly and unexpectedly revealed to the world, defective indeed would be that institution which should be impotent to discard from its bosom the contagion of such a member; which should have no remedy of amputation to apply until the poison had reached the heart.”

The case of Smith was that of a Senator, who, after his election, but not during a session of the Senate, had been involved in the treasonable conspiracy of Aaron Burr. Yet the reasoning is general, and was to antagonize some positions which had been taken in the case of Marshall, a Senator from Kentucky; the Senate in that case having, among other reasons, declined to take jurisdiction of the charge for the reason that the alleged offence had been committed prior to the Senator’s election, and was matter cognizable by the criminal courts of Kentucky. None of the commentators upon the Constitution or upon parliamentary law assign any such limitation as to the time of the commission of the offense, or the nature of it, which shall control and limit the power of expulsion. On the contrary they all assert that the power in its very nature is a discretionary one, to be exercised of course with grave circumspection at all times, and only for good cause. Story, Kent, and Sergeant, all seem to accept and rely upon the exposition of Mr. Adams in the Smith case as sound. May, in his Parliamentary Practice, page 59, enumerates the causes for expulsion from Parliament, but he nowhere intimates that the offense must have been committed subsequent to the election.

When it is remembered that the framers of our Constitution were familiar with the parliamentary law of England, and must have had in mind the then recent contest over Wilkes’s case, it is impossible to conclude that they meant to limit the discretion of the Houses as to the causes of expulsion. It is a received principle of construction that the Constitution is to be interpreted according to the known rules of law at the time of its adoption, and therefore, when we find them dealing with a recognized subject of legislative authority, and while studiously qualifying and restricting the manner of its exercise, assigning no limitations to the subject-matter itself, they must be assumed to have intended to leave that to be determined according to established principles, as a high prerogative power to be exercised according to the sound discretion of the body. It was not to be apprehended that two-thirds of the Representatives of the people would ever exercise this power in any capricious or arbitrary manner, or trifle with or trample upon constitutional rights. At the same time it could not be foreseen what necessities for self-preservation or self-purification might arise in the legislative body. Therefore it was that they did not, and would not, undertake to limit or define the boundaries of those necessities.

The doctrine that the jurisdiction of this House over its members is exclusively confined to matters arising subsequent to their election, and that the body is bound to retain the vilest criminal as a member if his criminal secret was kept until his election was secured, has been supposed by many to have been established and declared in the famous case of John Wilkes before alluded to. A short statement of that case will show how fallacious is that supposition. Wilkes had been elected a member of Parliament for Middlesex, and in 1764 was expelled for having published a libel on the ministry. He was again elected and again expelled for a similar offense on the 3d of February, 1769. Being again elected on the 17th of February, 1769, the commons passed the following resolution: “That John Wilkes, Esq., having been in this session of Parliament expelled this house was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in this present Parliament.” Wilkes was again elected, but the House of Commons declared the seat vacant and ordered a new election. At this election Wilkes was again elected by 1,143 votes, against 296 for his competitor, Luttrell.

On the 15th of April, 1769, the house decided that by the previous action Wilkes had become ineligible, and that the votes given for him were void and could not be counted, and gave the seat to Luttrell. Subsequently, in 1783, the House of Commons declared the resolution of February 17, 1769, which had asserted the incapacity of an expelled member to be re-elected to the same Parliament, to be subversive of the rights of the electors, and expunged it from the journal. It will be seen from this concise statement of Wilkes’s case that the question was not raised as to the power of the house to expel a member for offenses committed prior to his election; the point decided, and afterward most properly expunged, was that expulsion per se rendered the expelled member legally ineligible, and that votes cast for him could not be counted. Wilkes’s offense was of purely a political character, not involving moral turpitude; he had attacked the ministry in the press, and the proceedings against him in Parliament were then claimed to be a partisan political persecution, subversive of the rights of the people and of the liberty of the press. These proceedings in Wilkes’s case took place during the appearance of the famous Junius letters, and several of them are devoted to the discussion of them. The doctrine that expulsion creates ineligibility was attacked and exposed by him with great force. But he concedes that if the cause of expulsion be one that renders a man unfit and unworthy to be a member, he may be expelled for that cause as often as he shall be elected.

The case of Matteson, in the House of Representatives, has also often been quoted as a precedent for this limitation of jurisdiction. In the proceedings and debates of the House upon that case it will be seen that this was one among many grounds taken in the debate; but as the whole subject was ended by being laid on the table, it is quite impossible to say what was decided by the House. It appeared, however, in that case that the charge against Matteson had become public, and his letter upon which the whole charge rested had been published and circulated through his district during the canvass preceding his election. This fact, we judge, had a most important influence in determining the action of the House in his case.