This bill is, it appears to me, one of the most insidious and dangerous of the various measures which have been directed against the interest of the people of this country. It is another of the measures designed to take away the essential rights of the State. I know that when I speak of States and State rights, I enter upon unpopular subjects. But, sir, whatever other gentlemen may think, I hold that the rights of the States are the rights of the Union, that the rights of the States and the liberty of the States are essential to the liberty of the individual citizen. * * *
Now, it may be said that there is no reason for this distinction; but I claim that there is. And there is no man that can look upon this crime, horrid as it is, diabolical as it is when committed by the white man, and not say that such a crime committed by a negro upon a white woman deserves, in the sense and judgment of the American people, a different punishment from that inflicted upon the white man. And yet the very purpose of this section, as I contend, is to abolish or prevent the execution of laws making a distinction in regard to the punishment.
But, further, it is said the negro race is weak and feeble; that they are mere children—“wards of the Government.” In many instances it might be just and proper to inflict a less punishment upon them for certain crimes than upon men of intelligence and education, whose motives may have been worse. It might be better for the community to control them by milder and gentler means. If the judge sitting upon the bench of the State court shall, in carrying out the law of the State, inflict a higher penalty upon the white man than that which attaches to the freedman, not that I suppose it is ever contemplated to enforce that, yet it would be equally applicable, and the penalty would be incurred by the judge in the same manner precisely.
But I proceed to the section I was about to remark upon when the gentleman interrupted me. The marshals who may be employed to execute warrants and precepts under this bill, as I have already remarked, are offered a bribe for the execution of them. It creates marshals in great numbers, and authorizes commissioners to appoint almost anybody for that purpose, and it stimulates them by the offer of a reward not given in the case of the arrest of persons guilty of any other crime.
It goes further. It authorizes the President, when he is apprehensive that some crime of that sort may be committed, on mere suspicion, mere information or statement that it is likely to be committed, to take any judge from the bench or any marshal from his office to the place where the crime is apprehended, for the purpose of more efficiently and speedily carrying out the provisions of the bill.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Thayer) tells us that it is very remarkable that it should be claimed that this bill is intended to create and continue a sort of military despotism over the people where this law is to be executed. It seems to me nothing is plainer. Where do we find any laws heretofore passed having no relation to the negro in which such a provision as this tenth section is to be found? Generally the marshal seeks by himself to execute this warrant, and failing, he calls out his POSSE COMITATUS. But this bill authorizes the use in the first instance of the Army and Navy by the President for the purpose of executing such writs.
The gentlemen who advocate this bill are great sticklers for equality, and insist that there shall be no distinction made on account of race or color.
Why, sir, every provision of this bill carries upon its face the distinction, and is calculated to perpetuate it forever as long as the act shall be in force. Where did this measure originate but in the recognition of the difference between races and colors? Does any one pretend that this bill is intended to protect white men—to save them from any wrongs which may be inflicted upon them by the negroes? Not at all. It is introduced and pressed in the pretended interest of the black man, and recognizes and virtually declares distinction between race and color.
I deprecate all these measures because of the implication they carry upon their face, that the people who have heretofore owned slaves intend to do them harm. I do not believe it. So far as my knowledge goes, and so far as my information extends, I believe that the people who have held the freedmen as slaves will treat them with more kindness, with more leniency, than those of the North who make such loud professions of love and affection for them, and are so anxious to pass these bills. They know their nature; they know their wants; they know their habits; they have been brought up together; none of the prejudices and unkind feelings which many in the north would have toward them.