A third portion of the Japanese fleet, with war ships and transports, appeared simultaneously with these other operations, sailing past Taku into the neighborhood of Shan-hai-kwan. Passing the latter city, which marks the end of the Great Wall of China where it comes down to the coast, the fleet left terror behind, and moved upon the island of Thao-hua. This island lies but a few miles off the mainland, and fifty-five miles northeast of Shan-hai-kwan, at a point where the main highway from Manchooria to Peking lies close to the coast line. It was therefore about half way between Niuchwang and Taku, the port of Peking, and an excellent base for offensive operations against the capital.
The armies in Manchooria were practically idle during the latter part of March. The Chinese had nearly all withdrawn to Kinchow, in the north, while the Japanese contented themselves with restoring order in Niuchwang and Ying-kow, and in completing the military arrangements consequent on the junction of the armies. Snowstorms prevented an intended advanced towards Kinchow.
GAP IN THE GREAT WALL AT SHAN-HAI-KWAN.
The first of April therefore found the Japanese ready to act on the offensive at several points, spread over a distance of one thousand two hundred miles, and extending from the Pescadore Islands in the south to Niuchwang in the north. On the Liao River the combined forces numbered nearly forty thousand men, with a further strength of some ten thousand men on the Laio-Tung peninsula at Kinchow, Talien-wan and Port Arthur. The whole of these troops could be transported to Shan-hai-kwan in twenty-four hours, as soon as the port of Ying-kow was free from ice. There were no troops to be spared from the garrisons at Port Arthur or Wei-hai-wei, but further levies would undoubtedly be brought from Hiroshima to these places to await transport. The distance to Shan-hai-kwan from all these ports were short so that the troops could be closely packed for the short voyage. In a few days therefore, at least seventy-five thousand men could be concentrated at Shan-hai-kwan and the transports would be available for maintaining a supply service. At the same time the possession of the island of Chao-hua would facilitate the cutting of the line of Chinese communications between Manchooria and Peking. With Hai-chow held by the Japanese and threatening the line of communication from south to north by the Grand Canal and Japanese forces threatening Formosa and the south, the possibility of the repulse of an advance in force on Peking seemed very slight. It was the approach of these dangers and the final certainty that nothing else could be done to avert them that brought the Chinese at last to humiliate themselves and sue for peace at the hands of the Japanese.
THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.
John W. Foster in Japan—Failure of a Peace Embassy—Diplomatic Discussions—Foolish Pride—Li Hung Chang Again in Favor—His Journey—The Viceroy Knew China—The Envoy in Japan—Attempted Murder—The Mikado’s Appeal—What the Assault Indicated—Declaration of the Armistice—Provisions of the Armistice—Continuing Negotiations—Signing the Treaty—Its Terms—No Alliance of China and Japan—The Mikado Proclaims—Peacefulness Enjoined—What of the Future?—Ultimate Effect of the War.
While the war operations during the first three months of 1895 were in progress, peace negotiations too were actively under way. The annals of the hostilities which have occupied the last few chapters might have been interrupted by paragraphs telling of the progress and defeat of different efforts to secure peace; but it seemed more intelligible to the prospective reader to place him in full possession of the particulars of the military affairs as they developed, without interruption. Not until the end had nearly come did the peace negotiations for one moment interrupt hostilities, and there was consequently no need to interrupt the consecutive record. It now remains a final task to outline the various peace negotiations after those that have already been described, and follow oriental diplomacy to its conclusion.
We left the Chinese peace envoys lingering at Shanghai in January, after several weeks of idleness resulting from continual postponement of their departure. At last the imperial government abandoned its hope that something would intervene to destroy the necessity of a suit for peace, and the embassy was ordered to start. The Chinese peace envoys arrived at Kobe January 30, and were received by the Secretary of the Foreign Department. When the envoys came ashore, a mob greeted them with hostile demonstrations and they had to be protected by a large force of police. After consulting with Mr. Foster, their American adviser who had reached Kobe several days before, the envoys left in a special steamer for Ujina. The general tenor of Japanese opinion was that the negotiation would prove fruitless, as China was scarcely ready to accede to the Japanese demand. It was acknowledged however, that the present embassy showed a much more sincere desire for peace on the part of China than did the Detring mission which resulted in such a fiasco.