The War in the East: Japan, China, and Corea

by Trumbull White

Ex-Secretary Foster was treated with especial courtesy during his stay at Tokio and Kobe. Mr. Foster exchanged many telegrams with the Chinese government in reference to the power and authority of Chang and Shao, the Chinese peace commissioners, regarding which the Japanese were all along very doubtful. The diplomatic contest promised to be stubborn. China did not seem to realize that Japan would demand a cession of territory, and it was anticipated that the humiliation of losing any of her continental domain would be more than she was willing to endure. Mr. Foster was frankly given to understand that unless ample powers were guaranteed by their credentials the envoys would not even be admitted to a hearing.

Count Ito and Viscount Mutsu who were appointed to treat with the Chinese peace envoys, received the credentials which were presented them as coming from the emperor of China, and found them to read as follows: “By decree we appoint you our plenipotentiaries, to meet and negotiate the matter with the plenipotentiaries appointed by Japan. You will, however, telegraph to the Tsung-li Yamen for the purpose of obtaining our commands, by which you will abide. The members of your mission are placed under your control. You will conduct the mission in a faithful and diligent manner, and fulfill the trust reposed in you. Respect this.”

It was immediately officially announced that the plenary powers with which the mikado’s government demanded that the Chinese envoys should be invested, were found to be utterly defective. The envoys were therefore refused further negotiations, and were requested to leave Japan without delay. It was believed by many that the Chinese envoys were quite ignorant of the trick that had been played upon them by their government. They supposed that they had been given full powers to treat for peace, but they found that not only had they no power either to conclude or sign a treaty, but that their credentials did not even contain an intimation of the purpose of the mission which they had to Japan. The ministers, however, told them that Japan was willing to reopen negotiations with a properly empowered embassy. The envoys therefore left Hiroshima after two days in the Japanese city, and returned home via Nagasaki.

The rebuff sustained by the Chinese envoys created some astonishment among the highest officials in Peking, but not much apparent concern. Just at this time, early in February, they were having glowing reports from General Sung in Manchooria. He claimed to have already beaten the Japanese on many occasions, and promised if well supplied with men and stores to drive every invader from Chinese soil. Japan’s excuse for refusing to treat with the envoys, scarcely satisfied some export diplomats. It was insisted that it would have been very unusual for any government to endow its agents with final powers as long as it was able to communicate with them daily and hourly if necessary by cable. The Chinese government once gave final powers to one of its ambassadors who went over to Russia to negotiate a boundary treaty, and his head would have been amputated when he returned to Peking, had it not been for the intercession of the Russian ambassador, who suggested that his government would resent such punishment inflicted upon a person so recently honored by the Czar. He offered at the same time to consider the treaty suspended, until the Chinese authorities might have an opportunity to examine it and suggest any changes they might like to have made. After this experience it was not likely that the emperor of China would confer final powers upon any ambassador. It was asserted that since modern forms of communication had been introduced, it has not been the custom to give final powers to agents who visit civilized nations. Therefore it was assumed that the objection raised in Japan to the credentials of the Chinese envoys was a diplomatic ruse for the purpose of gaining time for the Japanese generals to reach Peking. This was disproven by the cessation of efforts, which Japan might have made to reach Peking, but it may have been true that Japan wished to bring China into still further distress, so that her demands would be more surely granted.

The very important action was now taken by the Chinese emperor of restoring to Li Hung Chang all his honors which had been taken away, because of the succession of defeats in the early weeks of the war, and appointing him imperial commissioner to negotiate for peace with Japan. China then requested that the Japanese peace commissioners might meet Li Hung Chang at Port Arthur to conduct the negotiations at that place. A prompt reply was received from Hiroshima, in which the Japanese government absolutely declined to treat anywhere but upon Japanese soil. The Grand Council of the Chinese empire met on Sunday, February 24, and deliberated for several hours upon the question, “Shall the war with Japan be prolonged or shall we treat for peace?” It was resolved that before the council took a final decision, the same question should be put to all the provincial authorities, from the first to the third rank inclusive. Their opinion was urgently demanded by telegraph. The replies received were nearly all to the effect, that although the war was unjustly provoked by Japan, it was very desirable that peace should be concluded. Some of the replies, however, declared that the terms of peace should not be too exacting. China had learned something by her failures of two peace missions, Detring’s and the last embassy.

One of the ancient Chinese methods of waging battle was to play “Soft, voluptuous airs to melt the heart of the enemy.” How far China had advanced in practical wisdom might be gathered from her latest diplomatic manœuver which seemed to indicate that the Chinese diplomacy of the present followed the military usages of antiquity. Ever since the eventual triumph of the Japanese became a moral certainty, China had been given vague intimations of a desire to secure peace. These intimations unaccompanied by any definite terms were steadfastly ignored by Japan, until the Chinese government gave notice that it had sent a peace commission to the mikado. When the useless credentials of these commissioners were examined in Japan, they were turned back without consideration, and the Chinese pretended surprise at the treatment, asserting that Japan was simply seeking to further humiliate the empire. To unbiased observers it seemed quite as reasonable to believe that the Chinese were playing to gain time, meanwhile assailing the enemy with the “soft, voluptuous music of peace.” This policy of antiquated diplomacy was terminated abruptly.

Li Hung Chang’s star was again in the ascendant. Even as he journeyed towards Peking his calumniators continued their attacks. In Shanghai it was positively asserted that he was now given a chance to accomplish what he had long awaited, the overthrow of the Manchoorian dynasty in China. It was also declared that Kung, the disgraced Ex-Taotai of Port Arthur, had made a confession showing the traitorous designs of Li. It was said that Li had been leagued with the officials of the palace at Peking for the overthrow of the dynasty, ever since he was deprived of his yellow jacket, his peacock feather, and his various offices. All this now had no weight. The privy council heartily supported Li’s mission to Japan. Prince Kung silenced all opposition to it by presenting papers showing that the previous failure was due to a backward policy, for which the council were themselves to blame, and exonerating the viceroy. The emperor completely vindicated Li Hung Chang, confessing that he had tried others and found him alone trustworthy. He therefore granted him the fullest powers to deal with the Japanese. The central government publicly assumed the entire responsibility for the condition of the national defense, explaining it as the result of blindness to the progress of other nations. This placed future reforms in the hands of Li.

The American minister at Peking assumed a personal interest in the matter at this point, and telegraphed to Japan the text of Li Hung Chang’s proposed credentials. At last, after a tedious exchange of messages, the credentials were accepted by Japan and arrangements were made for the journey of the envoy. Li Hung Chang was received in audience by the emperor and the dowager empress five times within as many days, and in his conversations with them spoke frankly of the condition of the empire. His powers to negotiate were made complete, his commission bore the emperor’s signature, and on the fifth day of March he left Peking for Japan.

There were signs at last that the Chinese were beginning to recognize the imperative necessity of concluding peace with Japan. With their strongholds in Japanese hands and their fleet practically annihilated, the sooner they made submission the more easy would be the terms which they could obtain. It was therefore gratifying to all friends of the empire to learn that the viceroy had been appointed as envoy to proceed to Japan to discuss terms of peace. Holding a position second only to that of the emperor himself, it was impossible that the Japanese should refuse to treat with him on account of his inferior station, or his insufficient credentials. His mission was the first genuine attempt that China had made to open negotiations. It was a proof that Chinese pride and obstinacy had at length been overcome, and that there was a real willingness to take steps calculated to bring the disastrous war to a close.

But for the messenger himself! Surely history, which delights in setting at naught the hopes and filling the fears of men, never saw a sadder faring forth than the journey of Li Hung Chang to Japan. He was old now, paralytic, his side and arm half useless, his eyesight dim, his family long since gone, and all the fabric of empire to which his life had been given in ruins about him. He saved it once before in straits as great. He of Honan, Honan men about him, all come down from the central hills of China, sturdy and tall above the men of the plains whom they swept aside, Gordon and Ward aiding, leading and winning the early battles, but the work in the end done, and the rich harvest reaped by those sons of Honan whom Li Hung Chang found poor among their fields of tea and millet, and raised to half the posts of honor in China. That was thirty years ago. The great work spread and grew. The old boundaries of the empire were regained. The Russian advance in Asia retired for the first time in two centuries. On the Amoor it was halted. France retired discomfited. England treated Chinese frontiers with a new respect. In Burmah, in Siam, in Nepaul, Chinese aid was sought. The big empire was never so big, never looked so strong, never had more deference or outer respect since the days of the great Tai-Tsung, when China ruled from the Pacific to the boundary of the Roman empire, and the Roman empire extended to the Atlantic—two realms between the two oceans.