Mr. Laurance had previously moved, that until the next enumeration the number of Representatives should be one for every thirty thousand persons.
Mr. Dayton moved to strike out "thirty," before "thousand." This amendment was under consideration.
Mr. Gerry observed, that in all the decisions of the Legislature, we ought to follow as far as possible the opinion of the great body of the people. If this opinion should be found to be against the ratio of thirty thousand, the amendment ought to be adopted; but if we refer to the amendments, proposed by the Conventions to the constitution, we shall find that five States are in favor of one Representative to every thirty thousand persons, till the number should amount to two hundred. None of the propositions now moved as amendments to the motion of the gentleman from New York, amount to that number. Several others of the Conventions were of opinion that the representation was too small to secure the liberties of this country. This Government, said he, is a Government of representation; the people may control their Representatives, but their influence is small in respect to the Senate and the Executive, and still less over the officers of Government. On what then do the people depend for checking encroachments, or preventing abuses? On their Representatives? If these should be too few, or if they should fail them, they never can redress their grievances without having recourse to violence. If the number is small, a majority may be the more easily corrupted. On the other hand, too large a number will be attended with difficulties; a medium then is most eligible. An adequate number is absolutely necessary; and to show that one to thirty thousand would not produce more than an adequate number, he referred to the ratio of representation in England and France, in which there was a greater proportion of Representatives than in the Legislature of the United States.
He then adverted to the objection arising from the additional expense; but, he observed, after Congress shall have passed a few more of the most important acts, it is not probable that the public business will in future require that the sessions should be for more than four months annually; this would reduce the expense greatly, in the first instance; and, agreeably to a calculation, an addition of forty-seven members to the present number, would make the aggregate expense but about one-eighteenth part more than at present, supposing the sessions to be four months long. But he considered the objection on account of the expense as merely speculative.
Although Congress is not positively bound by the constitution to give one member for every thirty thousand inhabitants, yet he would ask, whether the citizens of the United States did not expect that this ratio would be adopted? and whether they would not consider it as an abuse of power, if Congress, instead of one to thirty thousand, should settle the representation at one to forty thousand? Eight States have already adopted the first article of the proposed amendments to the constitution: and if the House should either settle the number of the Representative body, as it now stands, or reduce it, or establish it at one hundred, perhaps they might, before the end of the session, be obliged to repeal their act—as they would be bound by the amendment, as soon as it is ratified by a sufficient number of States. If gentlemen thought it probable that the proposed amendment would be ratified by the several States, they ought already to consider it as a rule for their conduct, and be restrained by it, from giving less than one Representative for thirty thousand inhabitants. After the representation amounts to one hundred, Congress will, no doubt, have a right to fix it there, until it is increased by the ratio of one to forty thousand: but that is a power which, he presumed, Congress will not exercise; but that they then will establish some ratio, by which the increase of representation shall keep pace with the increase of population, until the House consists of two hundred members.
Mr. Boudinot was convinced of the propriety of striking out the word "thirty." The House ought to consider what would be an adequate number for doing the business of the Union; and that number ought not to be exceeded, except to answer some very valuable purpose. Business would proceed with difficulty, if the representation was so numerous as it would become by the ratio of one to thirty thousand. The present representation of the United States is in a ratio very different from that of one to thirty thousand; and yet he thought it fully adequate. From a rough calculation, the ratio of thirty thousand would produce one hundred and thirteen members; thirty-five thousand would give ninety-seven; and forty thousand would produce eighty-one. If the number once settled was to rest there, he would not be over anxious to oppose the increase; but if gentlemen would take into view the increase consequent on the next enumeration, they would find that the number will by far exceed the due bounds.
He thought the people of the United States would be duly represented, and to their entire satisfaction, if the ratio was set higher than thirty thousand; nor could he imagine that such an exact proportion, between the Representatives and the represented, was at all requisite to secure their liberties, or to do the necessary business of Government. This indeed might be the case, if the power vested in Congress was proportionate to their number; but, since the House would possess the same powers, whether it consisted of a greater or a smaller number, he thought the people equally secure in either case. The ratio of thirty-five thousand, which would produce ninety-seven members, would, in his opinion, be a very proper one. If, however, the people should think otherwise, they had it in their power to correct the mistake, by ratifying the proposed amendment. Their not having as yet ratified it, was to him an argument that they thought the ratio too low; or, at least, that they considered the question as doubtful. Some of the States, he observed, have postponed the consideration of the amendment; and eight only have as yet agreed to it. On the whole, the House might safely adopt the ratio of one to thirty-five thousand; for that the increasing population of the United States would ever supply a representation sufficiently numerous to answer every good purpose.
Mr. Clark observed, that his objection was not merely on account of the pay of the members, but an increase in the representation would bring an additional expense on the people, by increasing the number of public officers; as almost every man would wish to see his friend provided for. The liberties of America could be in no danger from the present ratio of representation. The doors of the House are open, and the people know what their Representatives are doing.
Mr. Steele was in favor of the motion for striking out thirty. In discussing the important subject before the committee, he observed that there were two inquiries to be attended to: What is the proper number to constitute a Representative body for the United States, and what ratio will leave the fewest fractions in the respective States? One member to thirty thousand, he conceived, would give too numerous a representation. According to the present number of inhabitants, it will almost double the present number; it will divide and diminish the responsibility, make the House too unwieldy, retard public business, and increase the public expenses unnecessarily. An adequate representation, he thought, would be comprised within a much smaller number.
Gentlemen have called our attention to the House of Commons of Great Britain, and the National Assembly of France; but God forbid that we should draw our precedents from such examples as may be cited from European representation.