He was opposed to thirty thousand as the ratio: it would, in fractions, throughout the United States, leave above three hundred and sixty-nine thousand citizens unrepresented. Thirty-five thousand he thought the most eligible number, as it would leave the fewest fractions.
Mr. Laurance agreed that an adequate number was the great object to be attended to; but he contended that the original motion would give this number more completely than a larger ratio: and it ought to be considered, that, before the next enumeration, it will not be probably more than one to fifty thousand. As to the increase of expense, he observed that the great objects being accomplished, the future sessions will be short; besides which, the compensation of the members may be diminished. But he considered a necessary increase in the expense to be fully counterbalanced by affording greater security to the liberties of the people. The firmness of a government depends on a strong Executive; but this Executive should be founded on a broad bottom; and the broader the basis, the more secure is the public freedom under a vigorous Executive.
The existence of the Union may depend on the fullness of the representation. The inequality in the proportional increase of the number of inhabitants in different States, ought also to be taken into consideration; for it is very probable that in a short time, while some of the smaller States had a Representative for every thirty thousand, others would not have one to forty thousand. He was governed by general principles, and not by any calculations of fractional numbers: the constitution contemplates the ratio he had proposed, and therefore he hoped the motion for striking out would not obtain.
Mr. Goodhue observed, that the situation and circumstances of the Government of the United States are so different from those of France or Great Britain, that no parallel could be drawn respecting them. Nor is there an absolute similarity between this Government and those of the State Governments. The objects of legislation which come under the cognizance of Congress, are but few compared with those which engage the British House of Commons and the National Assembly of France. A much larger representation for them, and in our State Legislatures, is therefore more proper, than is necessary for us in the General Government. He doubted the opinion that a large representation was less liable to corruption than a small one: some facts appear to confirm the former sentiment. He did not consider the expense as a material objection, if an increase of the number be necessary to doing more ample justice, or for the greater security of the liberties of the people; but, as he thought this was by no means the case, he was in favor of striking out "thirty," in order to insert a larger number.
Mr. Barnwell agreed with the gentleman last up. He should vote for striking out "thirty," in order to substitute the largest number that had been mentioned. Mr. B. entered into an abstract and philosophical discussion of the principle of representation in Government. The leading sentiment was, that a large proportion of Representatives is not necessary to obtain the best objects of legislation, in expressing the will of the people, or to secure the liberties of the constituent body. The great point, he observed, was, to combine the greatest portion of honesty with a due degree of activity. That number which would comprise a due proportion of these, would be competent to all the purposes of legislation, whether the number for which it legislates is ten thousand, or five hundred thousand. On this principle, he was decidedly against a large number, and in favor of a small one. Adverting to the British House of Commons and the National Assembly of France, with respect to the former, he said, their corruption is, in a great degree, owing to their numbers: as to the latter, he observed, that the National Assembly had acted, in his opinion, politically and wisely. They set out with a large representation, in conformity to the sentiments of the people at the moment; but, on experience, finding the number too great, they have reduced it from twelve hundred to about two hundred and fifty. He believed that the general sense of the people was against a large representation in Congress; the inconveniences experienced from numerous bodies in the State Legislatures have led several of the States to lessen the number. He instanced Georgia, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
Mr. Baldwin was opposed to the motion. One Representative for thirty thousand appeared to him by no means a great representation. The opinion that, of late, had been so often advanced from the press, and in public discussion, for reducing the Representative branch in Government to a small number, he held to be full of dangerous error. He was sensible that the terms great and small were so merely relative in their signification, that it was difficult precisely to understand each other in the use of them. Perhaps they may most properly, both of them, be considered as extremes. No doubt representation, which of late seems to be used as the character of Republican Government, is a great improvement upon Democracy, or legislation by the whole body of the people. He could conceive that a representation might be so large as to partake of the evils of assembling the whole body of the people; but it was a very improbable and not a dangerous extreme: the other extreme was full of danger. These observations acquire much force, when applied particularly to the Governments of this country: enfeeble the representative part of them, and you sap the very principles of life. They stand on a different basis from the Governments which have gone before them, and may justly be said to be new experiments in government; time, as yet, has scarcely given room to judge of the probable issue; but this we may pronounce with much certainty—Let the principles of representation languish, and they have no chance of success.
It had not been found practicable to ground representation in the Federal Constitution upon any other principle than that of numbers; but extent of territory is unquestionably one of the natural principles on which it rests, and should if possible be regarded. One for thirty-four or thirty-five thousand may be deemed a proper representation in the Kingdom of France, or of Great Britain. The four millions which compose the United States, compactly settled where there was great sameness in the country, and pretty equally distant from a common centre, would be properly represented by a smaller number than in their present sparse settlement. But still further: the settlement of the United States is a fillet stretched along the sea-coast for seventeen hundred miles, comprehending as great a variety of climate and interests as one of the other quarters of the globe. It is difficult to conceive of a situation which calls for a greater extension of the principle of representation.
It has been said, that one for thirty thousand will make too large and unwieldy a body. He was sensible that was a point that did not admit of being determined by any conclusive reasoning; it was a mere matter of opinion; sound judgment only is to be used, time and experience will come on and confirm or correct the opinion. In such a case, it is wise to inquire how this has been judged of by others who have had a Representative body. In France, one thousand two hundred was not thought too great a representation in forming their National Assembly; and the number established by their new constitution for their stated Legislature was not two hundred and fifty, as the member last up had stated, but, if he had not been misinformed by the publications in this country, it was nearly seven hundred and fifty.
In the Kingdom of Great Britain, five hundred is not thought too great a representation: and can one hundred and thirteen, which is the greatest number contended for, be considered in this country as a huge and impracticable mass of representation?
It had ever appeared to him to be among the strongest marks of our youth and inexperience, that we grow wise too suddenly. He was afraid this instantaneous wisdom which sprung up so at once, and set at nought, or removed to the extreme of absurdity and folly, the deliberate and tried opinions of the most profound and enlightened among men, in circumstances peculiarly favorable to honest decision, will itself be left by time on that extreme.