I speak of this question, however, as a citizen of the United States, as a member of this House. Were I to discuss it as a citizen of Massachusetts, and in their Legislature, I should say, as the State is nearly filled with inhabitants, and our fishermen increase our commerce in peace, protect us in war, and, indeed, even enrich us by their prizes, it is our interest to encourage them to the utmost, and to prevent their going into the service of other countries. I might, therefore, as a member of the Legislature of that State, do all in my power to procure bounties for them, and indeed for all the sailors belonging to that State; but I should not think of applying to Congress for their assistance; not only because I doubt their right to afford it, but because I should look upon it as in some degree derogatory to the sovereignty and independence of the State. I should look upon such an interference of Congress as a step towards swallowing up the powers of the State Governments, and as consolidating the different States into one Government, which the wise and virtuous in every State always protested against as dangerous to their liberties; the fear of which consolidation prevented many good men from voting for the adoption of the new Government.
The framers of the constitution guarded so much against a possibility of such partial preferences as might be given, if Congress had the right to grant them, that, even to encourage learning and useful arts, the granting of patents is the extent of their power. And surely nothing could be less dangerous to the sovereignty or interests of the individual States than the encouragement which might be given to ingenious inventors or promoters of valuable inventions in the arts and sciences. The encouragement which the General Government might give to the fine arts, to commerce, to manufactures, and agriculture, might, if judiciously applied, redound to the honor of Congress, and the splendor, magnificence, and real advantage of the United States; but the wise framers of our constitution saw that, if Congress had the power of exerting what has been called a royal munificence for these purposes, Congress might, like many royal benefactors, misplace their munificence; might elevate sycophants, and be inattentive to men unfriendly to the views of Government; might reward the ingenuity of the citizens of one State, and neglect a much greater genius of another. A citizen of a powerful State, it might be said, was attended to, whilst that of one of less weight in the Federal scale was totally neglected. It is not sufficient to remove these objections, to say, as some gentlemen have said, that Congress is incapable of partiality or absurdities, and that they are as far from committing them as my colleagues or myself. I tell them the constitution was formed on a supposition of human frailty, and to restrain abuses of mistaken powers. The constitution has been said by some one to be, like answers of the oracles of old, capable of various and opposite constructions; that it has been ingeniously contrived, like some of them, to suit two events—a republican or a monarchical issue. I will not pretend to say that this is not, in some instances, too just an observation; nor will I undertake to deny that it was not the intention of some of the Convention that such ambiguities might be in their constitution, to correspond with the critical and ambiguous state of the American mind respecting government; but I will boldly affirm, that, whatever the theories of that day might lead some to think respecting the application of monarchical principles to the Government of the United States, no one can, at this day, pretend that they are applicable to their circumstances, their dispositions, or interests, or even are agreeable to the wishes of the people. Even before the adoption of the constitution, when the rights of men had not been so thoroughly investigated as they since have been, it must be remembered that whole States, and large and respectable minorities in other States complained of and objected to the aristocratical and monarchical features of the new Government. In vain did the friends of the new Government—friends of order, of union, or of liberty—contend that the powers granted by the constitution which appeared so alarming were such as would never be exerted but when all good men would acknowledge the necessity of exercising them, and that, indeed, they would be explained or restrained by some future amendments. The sagacious and eloquent Henry shook his head at such promises, sighed and submitted to the will of the majority—a small one indeed—but foretold, from his knowledge of the human heart, what would be done and said in justification of every measure which might extend the power of Congress.
Is it politic and wise, then, Mr. Chairman, to exert the power contended for, even if it be authorized by the constitution? May not the interferences of Congress in the business of regulating the trade of the Eastern States, excite, if not envy on account of a supposed partiality, a jealousy lest Congress undertake to intermeddle in the commercial regulations of other States? May not Congress with equal propriety, undertake to regulate the tobacco, the rice, and indigo trade, as well as that of the fisheries? If they intermeddle in the business of sailors, why not in that of manufacturers and farmers? Where, I may ask with my colleague, may they not go on in their zeal, and, I may add, in their laudable pursuit, of promoting the general welfare—and how totally may they be mistaken? If jealousy of rival States, instead of mutual satisfaction and pleasure—if distrust and suspicion of Congress, instead of confidence in their measures, be the consequence—how will the Union be promoted, or the General Government secured? However virtuously disposed the present members may be, (and I am ready to applaud their honest intentions,) let them consider, sir, that they had better suppress their patriotic emotions, than give a pretext for their successors to abuse the powers which they now wish to exert for the public good. I know they will quote the opinion of as wise and virtuous a citizen as is in the United States. I know his patriotism, and know well his true Republican principles; but, sir, with the freedom of a fellow-citizen, I take the liberty of saying, that his honest zeal, like that of the friends of the bill, has led him into a mistake.[43] That able statesman and virtuous citizen, like the eloquent advocates of the bill, has considered the acts now quoted as a full sanction for the one before the committee. But I am of opinion, that those acts had better be repealed than give a sanction to the enacting of a law which goes to the establishing of bounties, or drawbacks, or by whatever other name they are called, which may be used to the partial encouragement of any branch of trade or employment whatsoever. I shall therefore vote against the bill before us, and, to get rid of it shall vote for striking out of it the first section, according to the motion now before the committee. As a member of this House, I shall think it my duty to protect the fisheries, and every other branch of our commerce, the fisherman as well as every other citizen, as far as may be within my ability; but I am not permitted, as a member of Congress, I humbly conceive, to select the fisheries and fishermen as objects of more consequence than any other branches of trade, or persons employed in them, lest Congress should not only show a mistaken attachment, or, even if judiciously placed, excite jealousies and discontents between the States, and distrust, destructive of their weight and influence. My constant wish has been to see Congress confined to such acts as would form a more perfect union, promote the general welfare, ensure domestic tranquillity, and engage the confidence of our fellow-citizens.
My wish is, that the members of Congress would leave their respective States in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege they held before their adoption of the new constitution, which can be exercised without prejudice to the General Government. Let the Legislatures of the different States encourage, as far as in their power, the commerce, agriculture, or manufactures of their respective States? and let Congress, as far as can be consistent with the most steady impartiality, patronize their patriotic exertions, by wise regulations of their commerce with foreign nations, such as may open as full an intercourse with those nations as the States may desire. The emulation of the sister States in commerce, manufactures, or agriculture, would lead to the early establishment of that branch of either to which each State might be best adapted. This rivalship could produce no jealousy, no general national discontent in the States, no localities in Congress. Virginia would not attempt to rival Massachusetts in her fisheries or carrying business, nor will South Carolina and Georgia rival the manufactories of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Each State may rejoice to see its sister States enjoying the advantages with which Heaven has blessed them; and Congress, if confined to subjects which admit not of local considerations, may debate with temper and decide with unbiased judgment. I confess I have wished that Congress possessed the power that the friends of the bill tell us we do possess, and tell us we have exerted; but, on examining the constitution with a view to my wish, I found reason to think, not only that Congress has not that power, but that it ought not to possess it, unless the constitution was intended to establish a consolidated Government on the ruin of the State Legislatures; but this, I conceive, cannot be the case, because the constitution guarantees to the States their respective Republican Governments. The general powers of Congress, no doubt, ought to be (as they are) adequate to the purpose of forming a more perfect union than subsisted under the Confederation, to establish justice, &c.; but, as they are bound to guarantee to the States their respective Republican forms of Government, I cannot conceive how any of these powers can be employed, consistently with the ends for which they were given, in diminishing the power and sovereignty of the State Legislatures. How Congress can interfere in the regulations respecting the merchants and their sailors at Marblehead with more propriety than with those at Philadelphia, Norfolk, or Charleston, I cannot conceive; nor how this interference could take place without alarming those States, I know not. Viewing the bill before us in this light, Mr. Chairman, I shall vote against it, and, as I said before, to get rid of it, shall vote to strike out the first section, according to the motion now before the committee.
The question on striking out the first section was taken, and negatived—32 to 26.
Wednesday, February 8.
A message was received from the President of the United States, together with a statement of certain articles of expense, which have occurred in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and for which no provision is made by law. [The expense alluded to was incurred for the relief of a number of American sailors, impressed in England to serve on board the British navy.] The message and accompanying papers were referred to a select committee, to examine and report.
The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of War, accompanying certain communications with the Executive of Virginia relative to the existing temporary defensive protection of the exposed frontiers of that State, pursuant to the orders of the President of the United States; which were read, and ordered to lie on the table.
Mr. White, from the committee appointed, presented a bill providing for the settlement of the claims of persons under particular circumstances barred by the limitations heretofore established; which was read twice and committed.
Mr. Benson, from the committee to whom was referred the report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the petition of Comfort Sands, and others, made a report; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.