The Cod Fisheries.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House, on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."
On a motion to strike out the words "bounty now allowed," and insert allowance now made, &c.—
Mr. Giles observed, that he conceived the vote of yesterday against striking out the first section, was a decision in favor of the policy of granting Governmental aid to the fisheries; the inquiry of to-day will be on what terms this aid shall be granted? He felt but little regret at the decision of yesterday, because he had himself previously contemplated some reasons, not unimportant, to justify that decision, and others had been suggested by several gentlemen in the course of the debate. The principles of this policy, he thought, however, might be combated by reasons of at least equal, and as far as he was able to judge, of paramount importance; but as he admitted considerable weight in the reasons on each side of the question, he was not particularly tenacious of the preference which his own opinion suggested. When he first mentioned his doubts respecting the principle of the bill, it was with diffidence, and those doubts in some measure arose from an idea that the bill contained a direct bounty upon occupation; upon a more minute examination, he thought the term bounty unnecessarily introduced into the bill, and that the object of it could be answered without the use of terms, which might hereafter be deemed to contain a decision upon the general principle of the constitutional right to grant bounties; it was to avoid any thing which might wear the appearance of such a decision, that induced him to make the present motion.
He proceeded to remark, that as great a difference of opinion often existed respecting the precise meaning of the terms used, as the consequences which flow from them after attaining such precision of meaning; and it is of importance to the present discussion that an accurate definition of the terms used in the bill, and those proposed to be used, should be had. The avowed object of the bill is not to increase, but to transmute the sum, or a portion thereof, now allowed to the fisheries in lieu of the drawback upon salt, from the merchant who is now supposed to receive the sole benefit, to the fishermen really employed in the fishing vessels. This is a mere chimerical project, but if it be admitted that this is the object to be effected by the bill, the term bounty is improperly applied.
A gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Ames,) who rests the defence of this bill almost solely upon this position, that those who receive the benefit intended by it, are of right entitled to such benefit in consideration of a previous advancement in value, and that this bill contains a mere permission to them to retain their own, has at the same time declared, that he thought the term bounty the most proper and technical, to convey this idea. In this, the gentleman appears to have deviated from his usual accuracy. A bounty is the granting a benefit without a correspondent return in value; a drawback is the retaking of something in consideration of a previous advancement; this is always founded upon a consideration previously received—that is a grant of favor ex mero motu. But the great characteristic distinction between bounties and drawbacks as they essentially relate to the administration of this Government consists in the governmental objects to which they may severally be applied: drawbacks are necessarily confined to commercial regulations; bounties may be extended to every possible object of Government, and may pervade the whole minutiæ of police. They may not only be extended to commerce, but to learning, agriculture, manufactures, and even the sacredness of religion will be found too feeble to furnish complete protection from their influence. The people of the United States have always been scrupulously tenacious of a constitutional security for the most free and equal exercises of this right, but through the medium of bounties, even this right may be invaded, and the only security against such invasion must be governmental discretion. The same characteristic distinction will attend that species of bounty which may incidentally result from commercial regulations; and direct bounties upon occupation founded upon the broad basis of discretionary right. The specification in the constitution of the right to regulate commerce, may possibly in some cases give rise to this indirect species of bounty, not from any right in the constitution to grant bounties, but as the necessary result from the specified right to make commercial regulations; and this specification can be the only foundation of justification to this indirect species of bounty; but there is no specification in the constitution of a right to regulate learning, or agriculture, manufactures, or religion, and so far as the sense of the constitution can be collected, it rather forbids than authorizes the exercise of that right.
Arguments used to deduce any given authority from the term general welfare, abstractedly from the specification of some particular authority, are dangerous in the extreme to rights constitutionally reserved, and ought ever to be viewed with great caution and suspicion. They serve directly to show that this Government is not only consolidated in all its parts, but that it is a consolidated Government of unlimited discretion; that it contains no constitutional limitation or restriction. If any given authority be inferred from the term general welfare in the abstract, any other authority is equally deducible from it, because the term is applicable to every possible object of Government, and differs only in degree, as to the several Governmental objects.
He could not see the force of the novel and curious distinction taken by a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhouse) between general welfare and particular welfare; for every particular welfare, however minute, may be in a degree for the general welfare, and if the decision respecting the existence of this distinction, have no other limitation than Congressional discretion, it is equally destructive of all constitutional restraint. Gentlemen who have advocated this principle of construction, appear startled at some consequences suggested to result from it, and have denied that they have made the admission of such consequences. This is true, nor have those in reply so asserted, but they have taken up the principles of construction furnished by its advocates, and made the application of it to the consequences which they themselves infer; and if the principle be admitted, it is undeniable that the conclusions drawn from it will necessarily follow in their utmost latitude.
A gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Barnwell) confidently spoke of the inherent rights of this Government; this is a new source of authority, and totally inapplicable to this Government. If there be inherent rights in governments at all, they must belong to governments growing out of a state of society, and not to a government deriving all its authorities by charter from previously existing governments, or the people of those governments. In such a government, the exercise of every authority not contained in the instrument, or deducible from it by a fair and candid construction, is an unjustifiable assumption and usurpation. He did not mean to analyze this subject further at this time, and had been led into these general remarks, because the impatience of the committee to have the question upon striking out the section had caused him to refrain from delivering these sentiments at that time.