The President's objections were also read; and, after debate on the subject-matter of the said bill, the question "That the House, on reconsideration, do agree to pass the bill," was determined in the mode prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and passed in the negative—yeas 23, nays 33, as follows:
Yeas.—Fisher Ames, Egbert Benson, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Thomas Hartley, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Niles, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, John Steele, George Thatcher, Thomas Tredwell, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Artemas Ward.
Nays.—John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, Robert Barnwell, John Brown, William Findlay, William B. Giles, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Wm. Barry Grove, Daniel Heister, James Hillhouse, Daniel Huger, Philip Key, Richard Bland Lee, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Francis Mercer, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Joshua Seney, Upton Sheridine, William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan Sturges, Thomas Sumter, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Alexander White, Hugh Williamson, and Francis Willis.
And so the bill was rejected, two-thirds of the House not agreeing to pass the same.
Monday, April 9.
Apportionment Bill.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill for an Apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to the first Enumeration; at the ratio of one for every —— thousand persons, in the respective States.
Mr. Giles observed, that, although this subject has been heretofore thoroughly discussed, and the minds of gentlemen probably fatigued with the discussion, yet he could not help trespassing upon the patience of the committee, by mentioning some of the principal reasons which would influence his vote against the motion, and in favor of that ratio which will afford the greatest number of Representatives authorized by the constitution. He was induced to do this from an opinion that, in the usual course of things, arguments will have an effect upon the public mind in some measure proportioned to their own solidity, and the purity of the motives which actuate them. That the compound of these qualities form a common standard, by which all arguments would and ought to be measured by the great majority of the people; and he had no objections to submitting his reasons to the application of this common standard; he meant, however, to confine himself to general remarks, and not to fatigue the committee unnecessarily with minute exemplification of them.
He proceeded by observing, that the expression in the constitution induced and justified the general expectation among the people of the United States, that one Representative for every thirty thousand persons was secured to them by the constitution; that a definitive certainty in the number of Representatives, as well as the manner of procuring them, is, in its nature, of constitutional and not of legislative provision, and affords a reason against varying the ratio mentioned in the constitution, although that ratio be expressed in terms of latitude; that Congress had confirmed the general expectation in the public mind by the proposed amendments to the constitution, and had at least given a solemn opinion in favor of the ratio of one to thirty thousand, until the number of Representatives should amount to one hundred, after acquiring which number by that rule only, a qualified discretion is admitted; that the opinions of the great bulk of the people of America were in favor of an increased representation, at least as far as the utmost limits prescribed by the constitution; that this circumstance was evidenced by the conventions which adopted the constitution; that it was further evidenced by the several Legislatures which adopted the proposed amendments before alluded to; that it was still further evidenced by the number of Representatives in the respective State Legislatures; that this last circumstance is rendered peculiarly forcible by a comparative view of the objects of legislation chartered to the Government of the United States, and those retained to the State Governments. The objects of legislation chartered to the Government of the United States, are wholly national and important; the objects of legislation retained to the State Governments are comparatively local and subaltern: those peculiarly prompt temptation and invite corruption—these offer no inducements to either. In the Government of the United States, the constituents of the Representative body are complex and diversified; in the State Governments they are comparatively simple and assimilated. That a sympathy with the feelings of the people should characterize this branch of the Government; wisdom is the expected characteristic of the Senate; and despatch of the Executive.
To the inequality of representation relatively to States suggested to result from the application of this rule, Mr. G. replied that the inequality complained of is rather ideal than real; that to determine how far this consideration really ought to exist among States, it is right and proper to ascertain the whole comparative Government: and the issue of this inquiry will be, that those States in whose favor the rule is said to operate, possess the least governmental influence in the Senate, proportioned to numbers; and that the casual gain here is no equivalent for the certain loss there. As far, therefore, as the governmental influence of States in relation to numbers is to operate, it will furnish a motive of preferment for the rule he contended for.