It has been said (continued Mr. G.) that the representation of the States in the Senate is strictly defined by the constitution, and that therefore the consideration of the relative influence of the States, then, should not be resorted to as an argument in the apportionment of Representatives to this House. But, it should be observed, that the rule contended for, though not so strictly defined, is equally within the pale of the constitution; and the most extended use to be made of this consideration is, to manifest the impropriety of resorting to the pretended inequality among States, as a conclusive argument to vary that ratio of representation for this House which is admitted to be the most proper, upon its intrinsic merits, and when viewed without a reference to that consideration. This particular subject suggests a peculiar equity and propriety, in taking into consideration the comparative governmental influence of the States in the Senate, proportioned to numbers; because, it is in consequence of a representation by States, there, that they gain this unequal influence: and nothing more is contended for by this rule than a representation of the people through the medium of the several States, here. The rule of representation is not the cause of the present inequality, as far as it may appear to exist; it is a mere contingent circumstance, depending upon arbitrary facts and numbers, which cannot be rendered subservient to any general rule. It should also be remarked, that most of the States supposed to be favored by the operation of this rule, have, heretofore, been unequally represented in the extreme; and from the extent and rapid population of these States, it may be concluded, with certainty, that previously to the expiration of the present apportionment, the real inequality of representation in this House, as well as in the Senate, will continue to bear particularly hard upon them. Perfect equality is unattainable; and the proposed ratio is, in the principle, equally subject with any other to all the inconveniences which it is intended to remedy.
The inconveniences of the rule he contended for, in their utmost extent, can never be very great, because the same rule is applied in the same manner to the respective States; and the most extended scope for its unequal operation must be confined to the casual result of the fractional numbers within the several States. In reflecting upon this argument of inequality of representation in relation to States, an idea had presented itself to his mind which seemed to him both novel and important; and that is, that a quality exists in the Government, from its peculiar organization which enables a minority of constituents, through the medium of a majority of Representatives, to give law to a majority of constituents, absolutely against the will of their minority of Representatives. This quality of the Government arises from the State representations in the Senate; and it exists not merely in speculation or idea—it has been sensibly felt in practice, and there is a real tendency in the Government to make it still more so. The very bill now under consideration will probably furnish one strong evidence of its efficacy in practice; it would have passed very differently from the present proposition, if it had not met with this unnatural check; and I am concerned, said he, to remark, that almost in every important measure of the Government, the minority of the people of the Union had given law to the majority of the people, against their consent, as far as this can be evidenced through the medium of their Representatives. This, it is to be feared, is a radical evil in the Government, and its magnitude would be in a great measure proportioned to the extension of the objects of legislation by this Government. If the people be the only legal source of governmental authority, and this right of individuals be equal, this is certainly a heterodox principle in the Government. He would not pretend to say, however, that this was a cancer upon the body politic too inveterate and vital to admit of a cure; but he conceived it to be a sore of that sort which it would be unwise to irritate or tamper with: and he conceived, also, the present proposition not to be without its irritating qualities.
Mr. G. then proceeded to consider, upon general principles, of increasing the representation in this House to the full extent authorized by the constitution, and particularly with a view to the necessity of establishing, in this branch of the Government, a permanent sympathy with the landed interest. He observed, that all Representative Governments appeared to possess a natural tendency from Republicanism to Monarchy; that, great inequalities in the distribution of wealth among individuals, consequent upon the progress of all governments, appeared to be the cause of their political evolutions; that no competent remedy against this evil had been heretofore discovered, or at least practically applied by any Government; that perhaps this great political light may first shine forth through the medium of the American constitutions, and serve, as some others have previously done, to illumine not only the American, but the European world.
The peculiar circumstances of the United States, however, since the late Revolution, and in the infancy of the American Governments, favored extremely this natural principle of the growing inequality in the distribution of wealth amongst individuals. An extensive, unexhausted, fertile country furnished full scope for agriculture, the plenty and cheapness of provisions and rude materials for manufactures, and an unshackled commerce for the merchant; and to these were added the blessings of peace, and laws securing to the individual the exclusive possession of the fruits of his own industry, however abundant. There were intrinsic circumstances; there was a contingent one. A public debt—the price of the Revolution itself and its consequent blessings—had been incurred, and, from the imbecility of the then existing Confederacy, and other causes, was depreciated considerably below its nominal value; but it was then in small masses, and not very unequally spread amongst the individuals throughout the whole United States. The Government of the United States, instead of managing this contingent circumstance with caution, and declaring so in its ministration, seized upon it with its fiscal arrangement, and applied it as the most powerful machine to stimulate this growing inequality in the distribution of wealth—a principle perhaps too much favored by other existing causes. The Government, not satisfied with the debts contracted by the former Confederacy, assumed the payment of a great proportion of the debts contracted by the respective State Governments, and established funds for paying the interest of the whole. This measure produced two effects, not very desirable amongst individuals. It gathered these scattered debts, at a very inferior price, from the hands of the many, and placed them in the hands of the few; and it stimulates the value of them. Thus collected into greater masses, beyond all calculation, by the artificial application of fiscal mechanism, it produced a variety of serious effects with respect to the Government. In opposition to the agricultural or republican, it enlisted a great moneyed interest in the United States, who, having embarked their fortunes with the Government, would go all lengths with its Administration, whether right or wrong, virtuous or vicious, by rendering the debt but partially redeemable, passing perpetual tax laws, and mortgaging their products to the payment of the interest of this perpetually-existing debt. It gave the Executive a qualified control over the best moneyed resources of the United States, not contemplated by the constitution, nor founded in wisdom. It gave rise to an unauthorized incorporation of the moneyed interest, and placed it as far as possible from the reach of future Legislative influence. It established the doctrine that one systematic financier was better able to originate money bills and tax the people of the United States, than the whole collected wisdom of their Representatives, with the aid of a reciprocity of feeling. It gave rise to the idea of a Sinking Fund, without limitation as to amount, to be placed in the hands of a few trustees, and there to be protected from Legislative control by all the sanctions and securities annexed to private property. In short, it established the doctrine that all authority could be more safely intrusted to, and better executed by a few, than by many; and, in pursuance of this idea, made more continual drafts of authority from the Representative branch of the Government, and placed it in the hands of the Executive; lessening, by this mechanism of administration, the constitutional influence of the people in the Government, and fundamentally changing its native genius and original principle. He (Mr. G.) knew of no competent remedy against the abominable evils to be apprehended from the future operation of these unhallowed principles, but a permanent establishment of the candid or Republican interest in this House; and the best chance of effecting this great object he conceived to be a full representation of the people. His alarms respecting these fashionable, energetic principles were greatly increased by a perspective view of some of the proposed measures of Government. He saw systems introduced to carve out of the common rights of one part of the community privileges, monopolies, exclusive rights, &c., for the benefit of another, with no other view, in his opinion, but to create nurseries of immediate dependants upon the Government, whose interest will always stimulate them to support its measures, however iniquitous and tyrannical, and, indeed, the very emoluments which will compose the price of their attachment to the Government will grow out of a tyrannical violation of the rights of others. He would forbear to mention a variety of other circumstances, to prove that principles having a tendency to change the very nature of the Government, have pervaded even the minutest ramifications of its fiscal arrangements, nor would he dwell upon the undue influence to be apprehended from moneyed foreigners, who had become adventurers in the funds, nor the various avenues opened to facilitate the operation of corruption. He would merely remark, that, acting under impressions produced by these considerations, and strengthened by others not less pertinent and important, suggested by a number of gentlemen, in the course of the discussion of this subject, and believing that a full representation of the people will furnish the only chance of remedy for the existing, and a competent protection against future evils, he should feel himself criminal if by his vote he should give up a single Representative authorized by the constitution. The same impressions would have induced him to have voted for the proposition which gave one hundred and twenty members, had it not been for a conscientious and paramount regard for the preservation of the constitution. The difference of the position of the members throughout the United States, which would have been assumed by the difference in the manner of making the apportionment, never amounted to the minimum of a consideration with him against the proposition; for he felt a conviction that the agricultural or equalizing interest was nearly the same throughout all parts of the United States; and he hoped that the increased representation would furnish strong testimonies of the truth of the position. He would remark, generally, the Government of America was now in a state of puberty, that is, at this time. She is to assume a fixed character, and he thought it in some degree rested upon the vote now to be given, whether she would preserve the simplicity, chastity, and purity of her native representation and Republicanism, in which alone the true dignity and greatness of her character must consist; or whether she will, so early in youth, prostitute herself to the venal and borrowed artifices and corruptions of a stale and pampered Monarchy? Whatever his own opinions or suspicions may be respecting the tendency of the present Administration, and whatever may be the discussion of to-day, he should still preserve a hope that the increased representation, supported by the enlightened spirit of the people at large, will form an effectual resistance to the pressure of the whole vices of the Administration, and may yet establish the Government upon a broad, permanent, and Republican basis.
When Mr. Giles had concluded, the committee rose, and reported an amendment, viz: to fill up the blank with the word "thirty-three;" which was carried in the affirmative—yeas 34, nays 30, as follows:
Yeas.—Fisher Ames, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Jonathan Dayton, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Hartley, Daniel Heister, James Hillhouse, Daniel Huger, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, Amasa Learned, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Niles, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, William Smith, Jonathan Sturges, Peter Sylvester, George Thatcher, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Artemas Ward.
Nays.—John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, John Brown, William Findlay, William B. Giles, Samuel Griffin, William Barry Grove, Philip Key, John Laurance, Richard Bland Lee, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Francis Mercer, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Joshua Seney, Upton Sheridine, John Steele, Samuel Sterrett, Thomas Sumter, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Alexander White, Hugh Williamson, and Francis Willis.
Ordered, That the said bill, together with the amendments, be engrossed and read the third time to-morrow.