"2. By drawing part of the same moneys into the United States without the instructions of the President of the United States."
Mr. Barnwell.—Mr. Chairman, before I proceed to discuss the observations which yesterday fell from the gentleman who introduced the resolutions now before us, I cannot refrain from saying that I am extremely happy that, in passing through the medium of that gentleman's examination, this subject has changed its hue from the foul stain of peculation to the milder coloring of an illegal exercise of discretion, and a want of politeness in the Secretary of the Treasury. I feel happy, because I always am so when any man charged with guilt can acquit himself; and the more so now, when a man in a high responsible office, and high in the estimation of his countrymen, can reduce a charge from a quality calculated to have excited an alarm, even in Pandemonium, to such a shape as I fancy will scarce serve to satisfy the uncommon curiosity which it appears to have excited. As I have never been in the habit of taking notes, I shall depend upon memory in answering the gentleman from Virginia; although I imagine, as that gentleman usually sticks very close to his point, whatever it may be, that, in pursuing his charges, I shall substantially answer his arguments. In commenting upon the two first resolutions, to which I am by order confined, I shall consider, in the first instance, what regards the right of drawing money into this country. The gentleman appears not to have considered the law properly, for there cannot be a doubt that the President had a right to make what arrangements he pleased, in order to attain what he might consider a proper modification of the debt due by the United States abroad. He might have borrowed the money here, or have paid it here; he might have borrowed the money in England, or wherever he thought fit. I will ask the gentleman by what precise authority he borrowed the money in Amsterdam and Antwerp, and paid it in Paris? Certainly by none but that discretion which has been depended upon to modify the debt in the manner most conducive to the interest of the United States. I take it, then, for granted, Mr. Chairman, that the right of the President to draw the money borrowed here, or to send it any where, must be conceded. The question will then arise, whether the Secretary of the Treasury had a right to do this or not, and whether this has not been done without, nay, against the instructions of the President? I really consider this as one of the most extraordinary cases that I have ever known exhibited. Let us consider its form. A highly important trust, of no less import than the discretionary use of fourteen millions of dollars, is placed in the President of the United States; he, by a general commission, and by special instruction, deputes this power to the Secretary of the Treasury, stating that he is to conform to these and whatever instructions he might from time to time give him. Let any man seriously examine these powers, and I am of opinion that the Secretary, under these, had a right to draw, if he thought proper, unless instructed to the contrary; for the President conveys a complete power to modify the debt, provided that it should be, with all convenient despatch, applied to pay the principal and interest due to France; for where the payments are to be made is certainly left to the Secretary. If this has not been exercised advantageously, this is another circumstance which the gentleman himself has not questioned. But, says the gentleman, the Secretary, under these instructions, had no special authority to draw; notwithstanding which, he began to draw in 1790, and has continued to draw, at different times, into this country the enormous sum of three millions of dollars, and therefore he must have done this without, nay, against the instructions of the President, who, it is presumed, having delegated this great trust, has never, for three years, inquired into the performance of it. Can this be the inference of common sense? Can this be the inference of the experience which we have had of the President, one of the prominent features of whose character always has been an industry to investigate particulars, as remarkable as his sagacity to frame generals? If, then, instructions have not been given, or have been exceeded, was it necessary for us to come in aid of the President, he who by our law has the power, which we ourselves cannot exercise, of removing any of the Executive officers at pleasure? It certainly cannot be necessary; for, as this officer continues to act, we must conclude that he has either acted by instructions, or in such manner as to have given satisfaction to his principal without them. Really, Mr. Chairman, I cannot but believe that if suspicion had not led the gentleman from Virginia astray, the usual correctness of his understanding would have prevented him from pursuing such an ignis fatuus as this.
Mr. W. Smith regretted that so important an inquiry had been instituted at the very close of the session, when the members were thronged with business of an indispensable nature, and it was scarcely possible for them to bestow that attention and deliberation which the nature of the subject called for. But, while he expressed this regret, he assured the committee that it was mingled with much satisfaction, in finding that the vague charges of mismanagement, with which the public had long been alarmed, were at length cast into a shape susceptible of investigation and decision. Previous to an examination of the specific charge then under consideration, he claimed the indulgence of the committee in offering a few preliminary remarks, which, though they did not bear precisely upon the charge itself, yet were intimately connected with the subject-matter of the inquiry, and were justified by the general remarks of gentlemen who had preceded him.
In recurring back to the origin and progress of this examination, it must appear somewhat surprising that that which, in the commencement of the session, was sounded forth as gross peculation, now turned out to be nothing more than a mere substitution of funds, and that that which was announced as abominable corruption, was dwindled away into a mere drawing of money from Europe into this country, to be applied here according to law.
Whatever credit might be due to the motives which had originated this inquiry, every member would concur in the sentiment, that in a government constituted like that of the United States, which had nothing but the public confidence for its basis, premature alarms and groundless suspicions respecting the conduct of public officers were pregnant with the most injurious consequences. This opinion was more peculiarly applicable to the important station of Secretary of the Treasury. Intrusted with the management of a large revenue, and necessarily clothed with some latitude of discretion, it was to be expected that he would excite the jealousy of the public vigilance; but as long as he kept in view the injunctions of law, and the public good, his reputation was entitled to that security which is due to every citizen.
An officer, intrusted with the care and distribution of public moneys, is generally looked at with a watchful eye; mankind are too prone to suspect the purity of his conduct; slight insinuations are but too often sufficient to injure him in the public estimation. Such being the natural propensity of things, it doubtless behoved those who wished for tranquillity in the country to withhold charges not clearly warranted by proof—to suspend animadversions which were not likely to terminate in conviction. A contrary proceeding had an inevitable tendency unnecessarily to alarm the public mind, to instil into it suspicions against the integrity of men in high stations, to weaken their public confidence in the Government, and to enervate its operations.
There was something remarkable in the nature of the present allegations against the Secretary. Taking them all into view, they presented nothing which involved self-interested, pecuniary considerations; and in this, they essentially differed from accusations against financiers in other countries, to whom motives of interest were generally ascribed as the source of their peculations. To the Secretary, no such motive was imputed; notwithstanding former insinuations against his integrity, the sum of all the charges now amounted to nothing more than arrogance, or an assumption of power, or an exercise of unauthorized discretion.
Mr. S. proceeded next to examine the charge under consideration. It consisted of two items: the first, the application of a certain portion of the principal sum borrowed in Europe to the payment of interest falling due upon that principal, which it was contended was not authorized by any law; the second, the drawing part of the same moneys into the United States, without the instructions of the President.
The first item of this supposed violation of law appeared of so frivolous a nature that it did not merit much discussion; at any rate, it was more an objection of form than of substance. If he comprehended well the purport of the charge, it was nothing more than this—that the Secretary having moneys at his disposal in Europe applicable to the purchase of stock in this country, and having at the same time moneys in this country applicable to the payment of the interest abroad, had substituted the one for the other. He had paid the foreign interest out of the foreign funds, and he had purchased stock with the domestic funds. This was the heinous offence with which he was charged, and which was thought sufficient to remove him from office. If the moneys in Europe might have been drawn to this country by bills, for the purchase of the debt, it might have equally been drawn here, by ordering the application of a sum in Europe, for a purpose which would be represented by an equal sum here, to be applied to the purchase. The substance, not the form, is to decide whether this mode of negotiating the matter was proper. Suppose bills had been ordered to be drawn on the commissioners, and remitted to them on account of the foreign interest, would not this have been as regular as to draw them for sale? Did the execution of the law require that the Secretary, having funds in Europe with which the foreign interest might be discharged, should nevertheless remit moneys abroad for that purpose, and then, having funds in this country with which the purchases of the debt might be made, should draw bills to bring the foreign funds here? Was there any necessity for this complex operation, for the expense of remittance, the probable loss on the sale of bills, the loss of interest while the money was in transitu, when the whole matter could be negotiated by the simple and economical mode pursued? So far from this arrangement being a ground of censure, Mr. S. asserted that, had the Secretary pursued the other mode, he would have been animadverted upon with great severity for such an extraordinary course. He would have been accused of ignorance of his duty, and every loss incidental to the transaction would have been charged to his account.
The second division of the charge, being of more magnitude, required a more lengthy discussion. This instance of violation consisted in a supposed deviation from the instructions of the President, or a supposed acting without any instruction whatever. It was, however, begging the question; it was taking for granted that which did not appear, and which ought not to be presumed. And here, Mr. S. observed, the gentlemen on the other side had entirely reversed one of the fundamental maxims of criminal jurisprudence, which declared that innocence should be presumed and guilt proved; whereas they had presumed guilt, and called upon the accused to prove his innocence.