And what was the slender basis on which the presumption was built? Why, say the gentlemen, the instructions from the President to the Secretary, which have been laid before the House, relate only to the payment of the French debt, and convey no authority to draw any of the foreign loan into this country for the purchase of stock; and hence they infer, he had no authority for this latter purpose.
To comprehend the fallacy of the inference, it was only necessary to recur to the laws, and to the President's commission to the Secretary to negotiate the loans. Two acts of Congress had passed; one on the 4th of August, the other on the 12th of August, 1790. The first authorized a loan of twelve millions of dollars, applicable to the payment of the French debt; the other, a loan of two millions, applicable to the purchase of the domestic debt. The President's commission to the Secretary embraced both acts and both objects, and under that commission one loan was negotiated applicable to both objects. True it is, that the President's first instructions were confined to one object, namely, the French debt; but the inference is not that no other instructions were given, and that the Secretary acted without authority; but the very reverse, that the President either left the other object to the general discretion of the Secretary, who was, ex officio, the proper agent and his representative; or that he reserved it for subsequent and occasional instructions.
This inference must be the true one; first, because a contrary supposition would impute to the President an illegal intention, that of applying all the moneys borrowed under both acts to the object of one only; secondly, because the commission extending to the borrowing fourteen millions of dollars, and embracing both objects, and the instructions being confined to twelve millions of dollars, and to only one object, it followed that the other either was left to discretionary management, or to after regulation, for the law enjoined the execution of both.
If presumption, then, was to govern, the more natural presumption was, that the officer acted according to some general discretion reposed in him, or according to instructions from time to time given. These instructions may have been verbal, as well as written. The written instructions given in the first instance were evidently confined to the object of the first act. The necessary conclusion is, that the application of the moneys borrowed under the second act was not meant to be included in that instruction, but was left to be regulated by a general discretion, or by occasional directions, verbal or otherwise.
Having gone through this resolution, Mr. S. observed, that, if there was as little of criminality in the subsequent charges as in that which he had just discussed—and from an attentive examination he sincerely believed it—he was satisfied that, notwithstanding all the severe animadversions within, and all the virulent calumny without, the walls of Congress, the conduct of the Secretary would come forth chaste and unblemished. Instead of any thing being detected which would disgrace Pandemonium, nothing could be chargeable to him which would sully the purest angel in heaven. Whatever difference of opinion might exist as to the wisdom and benefit of his measures, he was confident in saying, that in every thing the Secretary had done, he had been guided by principles honorable and patriotic, and he trusted that a very great majority of the committee would, by their votes, evince the same sentiment. The sword of justice, it was said, ought at times to be taken from its scabbard to keep great public functionaries within the pale of the law; but it should be remembered that if Justice had its sword to punish the guilty, it had likewise its shield to protect the innocent. If the Secretary had committed a wanton violation of law, let the sword be drawn forth for his punishment; but if he has pursued the dictates of an enlightened patriotism, the committee were called upon to raise the shield for the defence of a faithful officer.
Mr. Findlay addressed the Chair as follows:
Mr. Chairman: Being strongly impressed with the importance of our time, which is now so near an end, though I had the honor of seconding the resolutions, I took no part in the debates of yesterday; nor will I now detain you with replies to many of the arguments which have been offered against the resolution now under discussion.
Upon one argument frequently introduced by the gentleman last up, viz: the greatness of the Secretary's character, &c., I will only make a single remark. There is no character officially known in Executive departments of this Government, who merits pre-eminence, or to whom a degree of greatness can be ascribed, but in proportion to his prompt execution of the laws, and the attention with which he discharges the duties of his office. From this rule, the President himself is not exempt, much less a subordinate Secretary, whose appointment is during pleasure, and the duties assigned him of a changeable and temporary nature. But to come to the resolution before us. The first questions that offer themselves, are: Was the money in question appropriated to special and distinct purposes? Did the Secretary of the Treasury apply the money to other uses than the law directed?
In answer to the first, it is only necessary to advert to the law authorizing the loans. The law authorizing the twelve million loan, appropriates whatever amount may be borrowed solely to the payment of debts then due to France and Holland. The law authorizing the two million loan directs the application thereof to the redemption of the domestic debt, in aid of about —— dollars, arising from the revenues previous to the 1st of January, ——. These appropriations are precise, distinct, and unconditional. With respect to the uses, no room was left for the exercise of discretion. The will of the Legislature was express and clearly defined; it left no room for evasion, nor any excuse for mistake; nor did the President transfer to the Secretary any other authority or instructions than what the law expressed.
But the gentleman from South Carolina says, that the presumption is, that the President did give other instructions than he has communicated; that, in this case, presumption should be admitted as conclusive testimony, and that neither the Secretary nor the President is obliged to communicate the instructions or authority to us. The gentleman is a lawyer: I will appeal to himself; I will appeal to all the professional members on the floor, whether presumptions can be admitted as proof, where, in the nature of the case, positive testimony can be procured. Surely, in courts of justice, positive testimony is always required, and presumptive is rarely admitted; but in this case, the presumptive is by the gentleman set in opposition to the positive. However, this is not the case in fact. The President did give commission and instructions, and those are fully communicated to us. If he conceived we had no right to demand them, he would have told us so; if he had kept any part of them back, he would have informed us, and assigned his reasons for doing so. I presume that the President has acted the part of a candid, honest man; the gentleman presumes the reverse. The suggestion that this House, which has the exclusive right of originating the appropriation of money, has no right to be informed of the application of it, is so novel and extraordinary, so inconsistent with every idea of propriety and good government, that it requires no reply.