Mr. G. remarked, that the people of Ireland had lately afforded an instructing lesson upon this point. They had arms in their hands for the purpose of asserting their rights; under the idea of acquiescence and submission they had surrendered them to the Government; perhaps, under the expectation of a change of Ministry. Did this act of submission render them more respectable in the eyes of the people of England? Did it encourage the hopes of those who wished the establishment of Government upon the principle of equal rights? Did it not rivet the chains upon the people of England? Did it render the people of Ireland more respectable in the eyes of the people of the United States? To these questions it was unnecessary to give an answer. The people of Ireland reaped the usual merits of submission—imposition and insult.
There was another consideration strongly in favor of the policy of the proposed measure. Applications have been already made from different parts of the United States by the immediate sufferers from the British depreciations, for an indemnification of their losses. These applications will, probably, be increased, repeated, and continued; the agricultural and other interests of the United States will, probably, never consent to equalize this burden. The claims of the sufferers upon the Government will gain additional weight, unless this fund should be offered to them for their indemnification. This is the obvious, the natural and the rightful fund for their indemnification; and he thought it was, at least, the duty of the Government to hold it as a pledge for their security. If this measure should not now be adopted, the refusal will lay a foundation for further parties in the United States, which may ultimately have a serious effect upon the Government.
An objection, of a very delicate and influential nature, has been made to the proposed measure, which required some consideration—that it would affect the character and credit of the Government. He had viewed this objection with the most deliberate attention, and felt the whole force of its imposing delicacy; but was at length perfectly satisfied that it was unfounded. This objection relates rather to the right than the policy of the United States to adopt the measure. If the United States possesses the right of reprisal upon an honest and sound interpretation of the laws of nations; if the conduct of Great Britain towards the United States be sufficient to justify the excess of the right, he believed the policy of exercising the right could never tarnish the American character, nor lessen the credit of American citizens hereafter. The world of nations, as well as individuals, will easily see, that it was a measure of compulsion, not of choice; that, although the United States believed, they regretted the necessity; that they were not the authors of the original wrongs; that they had borne them with patience, had used their endeavors to prevent the commission of them; and that, when these wrongs were committed and repeated, the United States possessed no other means of redress.
Under these circumstances, in the exercise of a substantial right, he did not believe there could flow any consequential wrong.
The motive would be looked at, and it would furnish a complete exoneration from blame, whilst the original aggressors would become justly responsible for all the consequences.
Mr. G. said, he could not sit down without making some remarks upon the fruits of the conduct heretofore observed by the United States. The most pacific system has heretofore marked the character of the Government. All America looked upon the late proclamation of neutrality as a competent guarantee for peace. He had no doubt but that it was dictated by the purest regard for peace. But what have been the fruits of it? He did not mean to condemn the conduct of the Executive. Perhaps it was suggested by the then existing state of things. He only intended to show, that it had not met with the return it merited, and which was reasonably expected from it.
It has not produced peace. A regard for peace has been construed into a fear of war. A resistance of the feelings of the people for the cause of France has been a palatable food for British arrogance and presumption. Submission to aggression has invited new aggressions; appeals for justice have been deemed testimonies of debility, till at length the United States, after having been stripped of their citizens and property, are upon the eve of a war, because they have not exerted their rights at an earlier period. If this conduct should have been heretofore wise and pacific, experience has taught us that it is no longer so; nothing can be expected from the justice, the honor, or the moderation of a court which has proved itself equally a stranger to them all; but, before such a tribunal, acquiescence will beget injuries, injuries will beget insults, and insults will beget contempt, degradation, and war.
Mr. Swift remarked that, on the first view of the subject, he had been inclined to favor the proposition, not having attended minutely to the distinction made by the laws of nations respecting the property of an enemy liable to reprisal; but on a full investigation of the subject, and mature deliberation, he was convinced that the proposition under consideration would be a direct and manifest violation of the laws of nations; he was, therefore, clearly and decidedly opposed to its adoption. Gentlemen have said much respecting the insults and the injuries which we have received from the British nation; but Mr. S. conceived it to be unnecessary that gentlemen should describe their insults and injuries in the highest colors to inflame our passions, and to animate our resentment. He believed that every gentleman in the committee deeply felt the indignity which had been offered to their country, and was convinced that Great Britain had been guilty of a violation of the laws of nations; but, under such circumstances, it was our duty to conduct with coolness, candor, and moderation. He thought that the heat and passion which had been manifested in the course of the debate were inconsistent with that dignity and propriety which ought to mark the deliberations of the Legislature.
Mr. S. observed, that the conduct of the British Court in regard to their concealing in such a singular manner the Order of the 6th of November, and the equivocal terms in which it was expressed, was greatly to their dishonor. But he thought that the words legal adjudication, would fairly admit of a construction that no American vessel that should be taken pursuant to that order, could be liable to be condemned, unless warranted by the laws of nations. There was reason to apprehend that such was the intention of the British Cabinet; and that the Courts of Admiralty in the West Indies, in their condemnations, had exceeded their jurisdiction, and contradicted the design of the Court of London. Recent intelligence confirmed the idea. No information of these illegal transactions had yet been communicated to them. It was possible that when that court were made acquainted with the injuries we had sustained that they would award restitution or compensation. Mr. S. remarked that, by the laws of nations, no nation had a right to make reprisal for any injury till all other means of obtaining justice had failed; that it was our duty in the first place to represent to the Court of Great Britain the spoliations that had been made on our commerce by the illegal condemnation of our vessels; that, till we had done this, the laws of nations would not warrant us to make reprisals on the goods and effects of the British nation. That there was a possibility of obtaining a satisfactory explanation of their conduct and reparation for the injuries we had suffered. It was, therefore, a proper subject of negotiation. But, he said, if that nation will not do us justice, then we are authorized to make reprisals.
Mr. S. then observed that, when we had taken such steps as would authorize reprisal, we should be precluded by the laws of nations from adopting the proposition under consideration. He said that a gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Mercer) had yesterday asserted that Burlamaqui was the only authority among the writers on the laws of nations against the measure; and that the opinion of Vattel was in favor of it. Another gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Smith) had read a passage from Vattel, which he considered as an authority in point, to justify the seizing of private debts; but not debts due from the public. But if these gentlemen had thoroughly examined Vattel, they would have found, instead of his being an authority in their favor, he had in the most direct terms maintained a contrary opinion. He then read a passage from Vattel, that showed that the effects of an enemy in a country at the time of a declaration of war cannot be seized, but that the owner is entitled to a reasonable time to remove them; and another passage, which expressly declared that, by the usage and custom of modern nations, public and private debts are not the subject of reprisal. Mr. S. conceived that these rules were founded in the highest wisdom; that all debts were contracted under a sanction of public faith, and an understanding that a war should not render them liable to seizure or confiscation; that a moral obligation existed between the contracting parties for the payment of the debts; and that no government could ever have a right to violate a moral obligation. That, therefore, by the law of nations in all instances where property comes into the possession of a nation by a confidence reposed in their honor and faith, as in case of public or private debts, such property can never be the subject of reprisal, because this would be to authorize a breach of public faith; but reprisals are always to be made on property in possession of the nation who has done the injury, and which may be taken without any violation of those principles, which ought to be held sacred in time of war.