Mr. Giles recommended a discontinuance of the Embargo. The gentleman from South Carolina had urged the public sentiment as a reason for keeping it on. He was glad to hear that the public sentiment was an argument in that House for the adoption of measures; and he was particularly highly pleased that this respect for the public sentiment had now come from the quarter from which it was at present announced. He hinted that the gentleman (Mr. W. Smith) had not always paid an equal deference to public sentiment. He was for the Embargo being taken off, because he understood that France would suffer considerably by its continuance; because it would materially affect the American farmers; and because, as the danger was now more fully known, merchants would beware of the danger, and provide more or less for their individual security. Farmers in the United States had entered into contracts of various kinds. For the discharge of these, they depended on the sale of their crops. He was originally for the measure, which had answered many good purposes, by preventing American vessels from falling into the hands of British privateers. He was likewise for it, as connected with a system of other measures. [Mr. G. alluded to the sequestration of British property, &c.] These measures had been laid aside; and therefore, he would now likewise be for laying this aside.
Mr. Dayton said, that he had been in favor of laying the Embargo, both in the first month and in the second month of its continuance; but he should now be opposed to the proposition on the table, and against extending the Embargo beyond the 25th of this month, when the present one would expire. He would not be understood to found any part of his conduct upon a belief that there was a returning sense of justice in the Government of Great Britain, or that there had been any material change in the predatory system. He lamented that any of those who were on the same side should have entertained such a belief, and especially that they should have mentioned it as an argument against the motion. Where, he asked, was the proof that the instructions of the 8th of January had effected a change favorable to this country in the conduct of that nation? If there was such a change, as some gentlemen asserted, where were the two or three hundred American vessels that have been captured and carried into the British West India Islands? If we look for them in our ports they are not to be found. It is true, that now and then a solitary vessel enters into our harbors, escaped from British depredation; but you would hear the seamen who arrived felicitating one another almost as much as if they had escaped from the clutches of pirates. He said that those instructions might make them more complacent highwaymen, but still they would be highwaymen. They might practice a little more of the solemn mockery of judicial process; they might be a little more observant of forms; but they had since continued, and would probably continue to rob us. He mentioned those things to show that there were other considerations which influenced him. These were, that an embargo would operate hereafter most unfavorably for ourselves, particularly our farmers, and for our allies, the French. Produce, he said, would certainly fall much lower, if we continued the Embargo longer than the 25th. Our farmers and planters depend upon the sale of that produce to pay their debts, or to purchase necessaries for their families; and the resolution on the table would operate doubly hard for them, not only in lowering the value of the product of their farms, but by increasing the price of every foreign article which they would need to purchase from the merchants. The injury which its further continuance would occasion to our allies, the French, had great weight with him in opposing it. It could not be denied, that France was much more dependent upon this country for supplies of provisions, in her present arduous struggle, than any other nation, or than all others; and he inferred from thence, that there could not be a disposition in that House to extend a prohibition which should add to the sufferings of those who are fighting in the cause of liberty against the most powerful combination that was ever formed to crush it.
Mr. Dexter was likewise for taking off the Embargo. It was become pretty evident that the United States are not in immediate danger of hostilities. It was difficult to continue the Embargo till we could hear from Mr. Jay, which might require six months. Farmers suffer as much by the present restraint upon commerce as they would suffer by war.
Mr. Clark was for letting the Embargo die of itself. He did not think it quite fair for gentlemen all to speak upon one side of a question. There was another embargo that Mr. C. wished to see taken off as soon as it could be done with propriety. We have been embargoed in this House, said he, for six months, and if we persist in this habit of making fine speeches upon every occasion, it will be a long time before this second Embargo can be taken off.
Mr. Gillon desired that the matter might have a full discussion. He and his colleague from Charleston supported the motion by order of their constituents.
Mr. Hunter then laid on the table a letter subscribed by forty-eight of the merchants and other citizens of Charleston, who had suffered by the piracies of Britain, with a list of the ships thus taken, and an estimate of their value. The letter was read by the Clerk.
Mr. Gillon then proceeded to make a variety of remarks in support of the motion before the House. He apologized, if any part of what he had to say, should seem a digression, as the subject was of so great an extent. Mr. G. said, that he remembered, in that Assembly, in 1777, they had used to flatter themselves, that the Eastern States would build ships, and the Southern would supply them with cargoes; and they would mutually support the interest of each other. He regretted that this cordiality was not, on the present occasion, so ardent as could have been wished. As to Britain relaxing her outrages in the West Indies, the sole object of that nation is gain, no matter by what means it could be obtained. Mr. G., to show the infamy of Britain in its proper light, quoted some passages from the letter of a captain in the West Indies, who had received the most unprovoked and the most horrible treatment from these miscreants.
Mr. G. hoped that the Embargo would continue for a longer period than to the 25th of June, the term specified in the resolution. He recommended that the House should adjourn but for a short time, and continue the restriction till they sat again. It had been said, that this step would injure our allies; that the price of imports would rise, while that of exports would fall. He would be one of the last men willing to distress our allies. He hoped that the Embargo might be restricted, so as to let the French import from this country whatever they wanted in American bottoms. This would promote our commerce, if gentlemen acquainted with that business considered the measure as practicable. Reverting to the remarks of Mr. Wadsworth, Mr. G. observed, that salt is at present only three shillings and sixpence or four shillings a bushel in Charleston. The price has fallen there, and it has not even risen at Philadelphia. He did not see much danger of a rise in the price of foreign articles here; merchant ships came at present frequently to this country. They encourage one another, as sure of a high market; and as to the Embargo, they say that it cannot hold long. If the British depredations have ceased, it certainly is not owing to any change of principle in them. But our ships are kept safe at home in our harbors; their British system changes with the course of events in Europe. No nation is more insolent in prosperity; none more humiliated in adversity. Mr. G. concluded by expressing a hope that some way might be contributed for keeping on an embargo, without injury to the farmers. If this could not be done, it must be taken off.
Mr. Murray hoped that the resolution would not succeed. Indeed he thought, that a total refusal of its terms would consist of our true policy. He said, he was among those who supported the first unsuccessful vote for an embargo, and had in each following vote been for it. There were two reasons that had led him to think the Embargo a good measure, when it was laid, and continued: the risk the American trade and seamen were exposed to from that infamous course of depredation which followed the Order of the 6th of November, and the evidence that flowed from that order of an intention to involve this country in war. The depredation on our trade had been immense; and the Embargo was not only defensible as a good cautionary measure, to secure the seamen and vessels of this country from violence, but by shutting out our vessels from the opportunity of being longer exposed to British depredation, the occasions would be diminished that would bring up the irksome question, how far Government is bound to indemnify citizens for losses sustained under a violation of the laws of nations? The same act under which the depredations had been committed, manifested a spirit of hostility that betrayed the probability of war. He had believed when he voted for the Embargo, that there was something of system in the November 6th Order. He thought that order was the first movement of a system of hostile operations, which some intermediate events had set aside: of this, the Order of the 8th January, and the subsequent dismissal of the captured vessels, was evidenced. If the depredations have ceased, and the vessels captured have been released, and if the probability of war be diminished, the leading motives that justified so strong a measure had ceased to operate. There can be no doubt that vessels that have been taken have been released: the daily arrivals in various parts of the Union prove this. Had the chance of war continued in full force, the continuance of the Embargo, as is designed by this resolution, though it stood on a prodigious sacrifice of present interest, would have been not only defensible, but perhaps essential. It would not only prove negatively a benefit in the preservation of our shipping and seamen, but would operate, in the most sensible manner, as a withdrawal of supplies from the power with whom hostilities might be expected. This great sacrifice to policy he could not now believe to be necessary longer than the term assigned by law—the 25th of this month.