"That all sacrifices of property made by individuals for the public benefit or accommodation, should or ought to be paid out of the public revenue, and that one should not bear more of the burden than another."—Burlamaqui, b. 8, c. 5, § 27, 28.
Is it not, then, obvious to all, who will reflect on this subject, that compensation is due to these individuals, whose property has been wrested from them for Government purposes? The same author observes, in the 38th section of the same chapter:
"That as no subject can assume any part of the sovereign power without the consent of the whole, neither can any sovereign authority deprive the subject of his right and property, nor substitute another sovereign over him without his consent."
The public is in nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of every individual's private rights, as modelled by the municipal law in this and similar cases. The Legislature can, and frequently does interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by stripping the individual of his property in an arbitrary manner. No. But by giving him full and ample indemnification for the injury sustained; for there must be an end of all social commerce between man and man, unless private possessions be secured from unjust invasions. Thus, the protection of a State, in every precedent to be found in books that treat of the fundamental laws of civil society, or in the resolutions and acts of the British Parliament, means restitution, indemnity, or compensation. Grotius, when treating of the right of the sovereign authority to give up or take the property of the subject, calls it "restitution, satisfaction;" Burlamaqui, "indemnity, and indemnifying the subject for the injury sustained;" and Vattel, "recompense out of the public money." It is farther observed, that cases of this kind operate, like property thrown into the sea to save the ship, by making an estimate of the loss, and causing an equal average on the property saved, which each owner is bound to pay. So that, from the fullest conviction, I am of opinion the citizens of North Carolina are entitled to the relief reported by the select committee, and that strict justice requires we should comply with it; for, as I have said, in nothing is the Government of the United States more concerned, in a superlative degree, than in doing strict justice to her citizens, as of the last importance in preserving the affections of the people to the Government. Vacancies in our departments, civil, judicial, or military, may be supplied as well, but to restore the confidence of a people borne down with oppression, exceeds comprehension. It is like attempting to return from the grave—is without precedent, and is vain labor indeed. At different epochs it has shook the foundations of monarchies, and caused tyrants to tremble and atone for their crimes with their lives; and, as I said at an early stage of the debate, if usurpers, tyrants, and despots have been compelled to do justice by this undeniable law of nature, shall the Government of the United States, founded on the pure principles of Democracy, be less just? Surely not. Have we received a power to exercise in wantonly oppressing those who gave it? God forbid! Therefore, let it ever be impressed on our minds, that justice exalteth a nation. The House, I hope, will pardon my detaining them, at a time when every moment is precious. But the duty I owe to my injured constituents forbids silence, and will, I hope, be a sufficient apology. I shall, therefore, submit to the judgment of the House, not doubting but justice will be done.
Mr. Nicholas was satisfied that the purchasers of the lands had a claim either against the United States or the State of North Carolina. Much had been said about the Indian right; but the Indians never had been fit to occupy these lands. It could never have been the design of nature that these people should be termed the possessors of land which they were incapable to enjoy. He was, upon the whole, on the side of the claimants, though he enumerated some of the difficulties that would attend an attempt to please all parties.
Mr. W. Smith had found much difficulty in forming his opinion upon this question. He had at first been somewhat disposed against the claimants, but at last, after full deliberation, he was convinced of the justice of giving them redress. He requested the particular attention and candor of the House. The United States were, in this case, made a judge in their own cause, and therefore it became more their duty to examine every part of the subject with the more accuracy. Mr. S. then began a distinct detail of the circumstances in the present dispute. Previous to the year 1776, North Carolina was a British Colony, and the British Crown considered itself as entitled to bestow grants of territory. In that year, North Carolina became a sovereign State, and consequently she conceived herself as succeeding to the right of the British Crown, and as having a right to bestow grants in the same way as the Kings of Great Britain had done. This claim was asserted in her general Declaration of Rights, and it was incorporated into her constitution. When North Carolina entered into the Union, all the Legislative rights of the State were preserved, and, by a necessary inference, her title to the lands comprehended in her original charter. In 1783, the State opened an office to sell the absolute right of such lands as had not been disposed of. In 1789, North Carolina ceded the right of jurisdiction to the United States, but she reserved her own Legislative rights, and consequently her right to sell the lands within her own territory; and in disposing of the lands in question, the State did not intend merely to sell the right of pre-emption from the Indians, but the absolute title to the lands. Mr. S. read a part of the constitution of North Carolina, in order to explain what degree of legislation the State had conceded to the Federal Government, and what part she reserved to herself; and he was clearly of opinion, that the disposal of the lands had been reserved. In 1783 the State offered these lands for sale. In 1786, the Commissioners of the United States assigned a great part of them to the Indians. In 1788, the Legislature of North Carolina declared that they would support the purchasers. The grand question now is, did the State, by acceding to the confederation, give up her right of legislation? She gave up her right to make Indian treaties, but reserved that of legislation, because, as above observed, it formed a part of her constitution, which was understood to continue unviolated. These lands were bought with certificates, which it was alleged, on the other side, would purchase nothing else. If the certificates would purchase nothing else, it was proper at least that they should have been restored to their first owners, who might have subscribed them to a part of the public debt of the United States. They were certainly entitled either to their land or their certificates. These certificates, which were paid into the Treasury of North Carolina, were those of the United States. If the owners had only a pre-emption right, Mr. S. insisted that the certificates should be returned.
Mr. Sedgwick said, that this was quite a new fact to him, and if it was as stated, there was no necessity for Legislative interference at all. The State of North Carolina had only to come forward and subscribe them to the Treasury.
Mr. W. Smith explained, that when delivered into the Treasury of North Carolina, they had been cancelled. After this they were again ordered to be made current by the subscriptions of the officers of the State, and in that shape they were offered to the Commissioners of Loans, who refused to accept them. The exact amount of the certificates could still be ascertained, as well as the names of the persons to whom they belonged. They had been cancelled, but not destroyed.
Mr. Boudinot imagined that Mr. Smith had furnished a new and forcible argument against his own cause. This claim of North Carolina to sell the lands was wrong, and this doctrine had been the cause of all the disputes in which the Federal Government has been engaged. The Crown of Britain had never pretended to any right of this kind, nor ever thought it had a title to any lands till they were first purchased from the Indians. The question before the committee was, have the United States taken away any claim which the purchasers of these lands had? And the answer is, that the United States have not. The State of North Carolina only had a right to sell the privilege of pre-emption. This was the only right which the purchasers obtained, and this right they still possess. As to the certificates, they were not those of the United States, but those of North Carolina. They were not Continental certificates, and for that reason Continental officers would not accept them; but North Carolina has since brought these certificates into her account against the General Government. The commissioners, in 1786, had done a very great service to North Carolina, by settling a line of boundary, and putting an end to the Indian war. He thought that the best way would be for the claimants to apply to the Executive, and agree among themselves to extinguish, by an interference of that kind, the Indian right. This would be much better than for the House to involve itself in the purchase of an immense tract of land, at an expense of seven or eight hundred thousand dollars, (or how much more, Mr. B. could not tell,) when there was so much occasion for the money to pay the national debt. He again declared that he should think it the best way to obtain the good offices of the Executive in extinguishing the Indian right. The Six Nations possessed part of the territory of Pennsylvania. This State also may apply to the General Government for redress, if North Carolina were to get payment for these lands. The State of New York may do so, for the same reasons as North Carolina. This would be involving the Government in an endless labyrinth. He was as unwilling as any gentleman in the House to interfere with the rights of the Legislature of North Carolina. But he did not wish to see the House going blindfold into the business. The United States have too much land already.
Mr. Kittera.—The certificates must have been given in by North Carolina to the United States. She denied the right of the commissioners, in 1786, to make Indian treaties, but now that right is given up. He agreed with Mr. Boudinot as to his observations on Pennsylvania. Georgia also, he said, had about sixty millions of acres within her chartered limits. The business would never have an end, if the General Government was to interfere in all these cases.