The committee rose, the Chairman reported, and the House took up the bill as reported.
The House adhered to the amendment of the Committee of the Whole.
Mr. Livingston next moved that the whole appropriation for the Mint should be struck out.
Mr. Murray said, that had the gentleman from New York moved for delay, for the purpose of introducing a motion to repeal the law which rendered this appropriation necessary, he would not have troubled the House with a single remark; but his motion to strike out an appropriation for the purpose of bringing the policy of the law itself into discussion, contained a principle in his mind so repugnant to the great Legislative duties of the House that he would oppose it. The object of the appropriation is not a temporary one, but a part of the machinery of our Government, under the express authority of the constitution by law. The doctrine now contended for by the gentlemen from New York and Pennsylvania (Mr. Livingston and Mr. Gallatin) was that this House have a discretionary power of appropriating or not. To this doctrine, taken in the extent which he conceived they contended for, he could not give his support. On the contrary, he thought that in all cases where an appropriation flowed from a law to make good a contract, or to erect a permanent organ in the Government, and from any law whose object was permanent, the true doctrine was, that it was the duty of the House to vote an appropriation. A law is the will of a nation. The same powers only that formed it can repeal it. If it be a constitutional act, no power can lawfully obstruct its operation or its existence. But attending to the doctrine maintained to-day, it would follow, that though this House had not the power of repealing a law made by all the branches of Government, it may obstruct its operations and render it a dead letter; though it cannot repeal, it may do what shall amount to a repeal, which is the assumption of a power almost equal to that of exclusive legislation. He thought he saw in this an evil of great extent, and an anarchy of theoretic principles. It appeared to him that though we originate money bills, we had no right to refuse an appropriation to existing laws that either secured a debt or any contract, or that related to objects permanent by the law that created or acknowledged them, as long as the law itself remained unrepealed. We had but a share of Legislative power. Where a law relative to such objects as he had alluded to existed, from which an appropriation followed, till the law ceased by repeal or by other constitutional means, it was obligatory upon us as well as upon our constituents, and the only powers we could exercise of a discretionary sort resolved themselves either into this mode of making good the appropriation, or of voting for its repeal. The other branches would then judge of the propriety of our proceeding; but till they who assisted in its enacting, judged with us the necessity of doing it away, a duty resulted that we should give it the energy intended by its enaction.
Mr. Dayton conceived the question brought under discussion of too delicate a nature to be decided at the present time. He, however, expressed it as his opinion that the power of making appropriations was intended and ought to be a check on establishments.
Mr. Nicholas conceived the House bound to weigh the merits of every law when an appropriation was to be passed to carry it into effect, and no appropriations should obtain the sanction of the House, unless they were convinced of the propriety of the law.
Mr. Giles said he did not expect to hear a doctrine so novel broached in the House as that advanced by the member from Massachusetts, (Mr. Sedgwick.) He had declared that he conceived the House could exercise no discretionary power when about to pass an appropriation bill.
Mr. Sedgwick rose to explain. The principle he advocated was, that when a law was made pledging the public faith, the House had no discretion to withhold, or not, an appropriation; at least as long as common honesty was more than a name.
Mr. Giles said that if this doctrine was admitted in its full latitude, the House would become a mere office for the registering of edicts. He contended that the House had a right, by withholding appropriations, to put an end to an institution without the concurrence of the Senate. He would not say that the present was a case that called for the exercise of that right, but they had in all cases of this nature a right to exercise their discretion.
Mr. Murray considered the laws of the land as depending upon two other branches of the Government besides this House, and conceived it highly improper in the House to attempt to obstruct them by withholding necessary appropriations. What would be the effect of a contrary doctrine? It must contain the seeds of governmental anarchy. While a law remained in force it was the duty of the House to do what was needful to carry it into operation. He made some allusion to the British House of Commons, who, by privilege, contend for the right of withholding supplies to be a check on the patronage of the Crown. But such a principle, he contended, could not apply here; our Government could not proceed if it were admitted. As long as a law exists, it is the duty of the House to make the needful appropriations. The whole wisdom of the Government is not in this House. The same power is required to repeal laws as to make them. It is true the constitution has given to the House the more immediate command of the purse-strings; but they were under an obligation to open them when necessity required. There is a constitutional way of repealing laws; but the House has no right to obstruct their operation while in force. A member from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gallatin,) he observed, appeared on a former occasion to coincide with his opinions on this subject; for he argued that the House was bound to pass such an appropriation, as a law existed giving the salary to the officer which it was meant to provide for.