Mr. Gallatin said, in answer, that his observation had simply been, that the Committee of Ways and Means, and not the House, conceived itself bound to report an appropriation for an item established by law; but he never doubted the power of the House to pass, or not, an appropriation. In such cases the line of duty must remain to be drawn by opinion. With what degree of consistency can the House be called on for a vote if, as some members contend, they cannot have an opinion? Why are they called upon to say, yea or nay, if they are obliged to say yea?
Mr. Murray conceded that a member might say yea or nay, but his duty must in cases of this nature clearly point to one of the two; for he could not mistake the black and white marks in the court of conscience. He has the physical power to say yea or nay; but if he does his duty he must say yea. The contrary principle would go to this, that the House had a right to refuse an appropriation to pay a just debt.
Mr. Gallatin observed, in reply, that each member will be the sole judge whether it was or was not his duty to say yea, or the contrary. The constitution, he said, declared that no money should be drawn from the Treasury but by appropriations made by law: this did not look as if the voting of appropriations was intended to be merely a matter of form. In the second place, the constitution declares, that no appropriation for the support of an armed force shall be made for more than two years. Thus, though a Military Establishment may be formed by enlistments for three or more years, yet the constitution provides that the question shall be submitted to the House every two years; and this surely is not as a matter of form; but in order, at such short periods, by voting on an appropriation bill, to determine whether such an establishment should exist longer or not. He conceived the power which he advocated as residing in the House of great consequence, and to be used on important occasions only.
Mr. Nicholas, who had risen at the same time with Mr. Gallatin, and had given way to him, observed, that when he first rose, he was going to read the clause of the constitution which the member last up had referred to. As to the black and white marks the member from Maryland spoke of, they were differently placed in different persons; in matters of opinion men will differ; but the constitution is a guide not to be departed from. The power of appropriation was vested by that instrument chiefly in the House, and no power on earth would prevent his exercising his discretion when that power was to be put in activity.
Mr. Giles observed, that the member from Maryland had got into the doctrine of checks, and seemed to think that if the House exercised its constitutional check it would produce governmental anarchy.
Mr. Murray explained. He had alluded to the mode of getting rid of an establishment by refusing appropriations to carry it into effect. The constitutional mode of procuring the repeal of the law should always be had recourse to; but he insisted that the House could not, as they were bound by their duty, obstruct a law in force by refusing an appropriation.
Mr. Giles conceived that the checks provided by the constitution might be used by each of the powers of government to their full extent, limited in every particular case only by their own discretion. If the harmony of the branches was to be made an argument to prevent the exercise of checks, what, he asked, became of the checks provided by the constitution? Each branch of the government (if he understood what was meant by constitutional checks) was to exercise its own opinions and use its discretions within constitutional limits, without a reference to the opinions of other branches. He next adverted to the powers of appropriation, which he contended were in a greater degree vested in the immediate representatives of the people, to be a wholesome check. In case of an army establishment, for example, suppose the President or Senate were to refuse their assent to the repeal of a law establishing it? Will it be said that the clause of the constitution empowering the House to make a biennial appropriation for the object, does not vest in them a discretionary power in such instances of overturning the establishment by its own will? for it cannot be kept up without an appropriation. Is the House to be told that, for the sake of harmony, they must give up their own powers and opinions? He maintained that, in cases of appropriations, they had a discretionary power, to be exercised, as in all cases, discretionarily. Was one branch to be judges of discretion for another? No; each should judge for itself.
Mr. Murray said, it was known to every one that an appropriation for the support of a military establishment could not be made for a longer term than two years; but that case was widely different from the present. It was known that, by the constitution, a military appropriation cannot exist more than two years; but the doctrine he supported was in cases of debt or obligation under a law; and, in such cases, he still contended that, though the House had the physical power to refuse an appropriation to satisfy a claim thus founded, they had not the right.
Here the debate was interrupted by a motion for adjournment; which was carried, and the House adjourned.