Mr. Tracy said, he felt a diffidence in giving his sentiments in that House, which was much increased when he considered the ability with which the question had already been discussed, and the length of time it had consumed; but the magnitude of the question would justify him, in his own opinion, for asking of the committee to indulge him with a small portion of their time and attention.
This was the first time, since the adoption of the present Government, that a discussion of the important constitutional question of the extent of the Treaty-making power could have taken place, as it respected a foreign nation; and, of course, would probably form a precedent for all future inquiries of a similar nature.
The constitutional rights of the House of Representatives to interfere with Treaties, might properly be considered in two points of view:
1. Had they a right to assist in the formation of Treaties in such a manner as that a Treaty would be incomplete without their sanction officially given? And,
2. Had they a right to refuse appropriations of moneys, (if necessary to carry into effect some provisions in a Treaty,) and in that way defeat its operation?
He acknowledged, if the first position could be supported, the right to call for the papers would be conclusive; but, he contended, they could not be wanted on the latter ground.
If the constitution was examined, it would be found the Treaty-making power was given to the President; and no interference, or right given to any other men or body of men but to two-thirds of the Senate, and that by way of consent or advice. Could it be pretended there was a shadow of authority given to the House of Representatives?
In the constitution it is said, "all Legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress," &c. Would it be pretended, had the constitution gone no further, that the then thirteen independent sovereign States, by that part of it, had parted with the Treaty-making power? No! they reserved a great share of Legislative power to themselves, and delegated it to Congress only in certain cases, best calculated, in their opinions, to advance their own happiness; and unquestionably reserved every right, power, and sovereignty, which they did not expressly give away by the constitution itself. The powers of legislation are the powers of making statutes in all cases respecting men and things within the jurisdiction of the Legislature; but it could by no means in its nature comprehend the Treaty-making power, which is the power of contracting or making bargains in the name of a nation, as a moral person, with another nation or moral person, for their mutual benefit, and to be binding and operative on them, as parties to the contract or bargain. And although this had binding force on the nation, when once formed and completed, yet it was not a Legislative act. But the constitution went further: it had actually designated the President, with the advice of the Senate, to be a Plenipotentiary for the formation of Treaties. Vattel, page 179, speaking of the various customs of nations, in the deposit of this power, says:
"All conductors of States (meaning the Executives) have not the powers, of themselves, of making public Treaties: some are obliged to take the advice of a Senate, or of the Representatives of a nation. In the fundamental laws of each State we must see what is the power of contracting, with validity, in the name of a State."
He supposed, by "fundamental laws," Vattel must mean the constitution of a State; if so, it will not follow that the supreme Legislative or Executive power of a State, as such, have necessarily the power of making Treaties; it might be, and in most countries was, an object of precise delegation, and probably always, or certainly more commonly, given to the Executive. This constitution had precisely given it to the Executive, subjoining the advice and consent of the Senate; and in this particular, and in no other, had the individual sovereignties delegated all their power without limitation. It was necessary and proper this power should be lodged somewhere, and equally necessary it should be entire and unlimited, to meet every exigency that the welfare of the nation might require. It had been said, that general expressions of power would be limited by specific: this was a general truth, but he denied the application which had been attempted. It was said, the Treaty-making power is a general power; the Congress has a specific power to regulate commerce, &c. Of course, the specific power to regulate commerce will check the operation of a Treaty of a commercial nature. He said this part of the subject had been so ably and conclusively managed by a gentleman from New Hampshire, yesterday, (Mr. Smith,) that he would not exhaust the patience of the committee by going over the same ground. He would however observe, that by the common rule of construction, all the powers given to the President which could, and in their nature would, check or operate on legislation, must be considered as a specific portion of power carved out of the general power given in the former part of the instrument. The general powers of legislation first given to Congress, and in the next place specific powers given to the President, could not fail to lead the mind directly to such a construction. "All Legislative powers, &c., are vested in a Congress," but the President has a qualified and specific check. Power to regulate commerce with foreign nations is vested in Congress, yet the specific power of contracting, bargaining, or making a Treaty, is, so far forth as it may touch Legislative points, a specific check upon it. Yet he acknowledged this was not his chief reliance. The nature of the case was such, that whatever internal regulations, or those relating to external and foreign commercial subjects, which may have become objects of Legislative attention, oppose or come in competition with a contract or bargain about the same things, must give way. It does not exclude legislation from the object of foreign commerce, but establishes certain points within which it shall operate, and which it cannot violate. The thirteen sovereignties possessing all the power, gave to Congress a certain portion of Legislative authority; but they certainly could give to the Executive, or any other body, the power to make Treaties. This he contended they had done, by the words of the constitution, in an unlimited manner.