It had been said, that the constitution was similar to that of Great Britain in the part respecting Treaties. This, he contended, was an incorrect statement: in his opinion they were very different. The constitution of Great Britain was formed almost entirely of usages. It had been, for a great length of time, the usage for the King to lay before Parliament, for their approbation, Treaties—especially those of a commercial nature. If this was a usage, all that could be said of it was, that it was a part of their constitution. He supposed this right had been given by the Crown, at some time, to obtain a grant of money; but he could not recollect that the Parliament, with all their pretensions to a right of rejecting Treaties, had ever exercised it. They generally made a pretext of dislike to a Treaty to change the Administration. This had been often done; it was on the Treaty of Peace of 1783. The Treaty of Utrecht, which was concluded in 1713, had been cited as an instance of rejection by the British Parliament. It was a fact, in that instance, that nothing was rejected but a conditional Treaty. In forming the Treaty, there were many distinct parts: one part of it was a Commercial Treaty between England and France, separately signed and conditional—that is, "within the space of two months after a law shall pass in Great Britain, whereby it shall be sufficiently provided, &c., the general tariff made in France, &c., shall take place there again, &c." The law did not pass in Great Britain, and of course the Commercial Treaty failed. Mr. T. said he had searched all the Treaties made by Great Britain since the Treaty of Munster, which, if his memory was accurate, was concluded in 1648, and could not find an instance of the Parliament's refusing their assent to a Treaty made unconditionally; and he really believed, if they practised fully on the right they claimed, it would very soon destroy their Government. It had been said, Blackstone in his Commentaries had defined the powers of the King of Great Britain to be unlimited in the making of Treaties. He observed, that, let Blackstone or any other Crown lawyer say what he would in favor of prerogative, it was well known the usage had been to submit to Parliament the consideration of Treaties, and that usage was a part of their constitution; and he rejoiced, that in that particular the constitution of his country was different. Gentlemen had said, Shall this House not have as much power respecting Treaties as the House of Commons in Great Britain? This question was both improper in itself, and calculated to mislead. Were we in convention, and forming a constitution, it might have weight; but in a cool discussion of a constitution already formed and adopted, and the question is, What powers are given? it could not be proper. And it ought to be remembered that Parliament, and not the Commons alone, had this right in Great Britain. In defining the relative powers given by the Constitution, there was danger of the popular branch making encroachments on the other branches, under pretence of favoring the liberties of the people. This pretence, however grateful it might sound in debate, he thought was but a pretence. It was the duty of the House to make a stand against all encroachments on their own rights, if any were attempted, but it must equally be their duty to exercise great caution not to encroach on others. He said, he considered the responsibility which was so very necessary on those in the exercise of the Treaty-making power could not exist if it was extended to the House of Representatives.
He acknowledged if a Treaty was unconstitutional, it was not then a contract of binding force, and of course contained no obligation of any kind whatever; if a Treaty was so terrible in itself, and manifested consequences ruinous to the nation, no argument could be drawn from such a statement to establish general rules. The moral law had said, we shall not kill, and yet a man may be placed in such a situation, as that he not only may, but it becomes his duty to kill; could it be said a general right to kill is proved by this concession? But could gentlemen seriously say, we now wanted these papers, mentioned in the resolution, to assist us in determining upon the question of appropriation? He thought not. He supposed the first extensive and unlimited right of interfering in the making of a Commercial Treaty could alone justify the call, and he believed that ground must be given up. He said his colleagues (Messrs. Smith and Griswold) had asserted no other doctrines than such as he now advocated, and yet they had been accused of saying that this House had no will of their own, but must in all cases implicitly obey the President and Senate. The construction he had given to the constitution he believed to be just, and trusted he could be under no necessity of declaring the purity of his intentions, as he did not doubt but every member of the House was guided in the investigation by the purest motives.
Mr. S. Smith said, that at the present state of the discussion, little was left but gleanings, and to bear testimony against a doctrine that appeared to him big with consequences fatal to the true interests of the country. He would not pursue the sophistry of the gentleman last up (Mr. Tracy) through all its windings and turnings; he would only observe that the gentleman had read some, and quoted much to prove that Treaties were the supreme law—a doctrine that was admitted by all, that is, when under the authority of the United States.
He said the resolution requested certain papers to be laid before the House. What had been the custom of the House heretofore? Invariably to ask for all and every paper that might lead to information. He well recollected that, in 1793, a great ferment had arisen in the public mind in consequence of the Proclamation of Neutrality, (which had always appeared to him to be a wise measure,) that on the meeting of Congress a great number of useful papers relative to our situation with respect to foreign nations were submitted, some of them of a most confidential nature, relating to Treaties then depending, particularly that with Spain. The President was not afraid to place his confidence in that House, and he was right; the public mind was restored to quiet, and the people of Kentucky (then restless) were satisfied that the Executive were doing every thing in their power to obtain the free navigation of the Mississippi. The President went further; he sent a special agent to Kentucky to communicate to that Government the line of conduct then pursuing for their welfare. Had the public mind been less disturbed on the late Treaty than in 1793? He thought not; and that every paper which would tend to satisfy that the Treaty was expedient, or to give information on a subject that must be discussed before that House, might with propriety be asked for.
A gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Buck) repeated by another from South Carolina (Mr. Smith) said, to vote for this resolution would be treason against the laws and constitution. Why this harsh language? Did it lead to a discovery of truth? Where did these gentlemen find that definition of treason? Not in the constitution, for there it was properly defined.
Mr. S. said, gentlemen had taken a ground that appeared alarming, viz:
That the President and two-thirds of the Senate may, by the aid of a Treaty, do any thing, and every thing, not morally impossible, (provided they do not infringe on the constitution,) and that the immediate Representatives forming this House, have only to be informed thereof, and to obey.
Let us pause for a moment, and ask, Was this possible? Could this be the fair construction of our so much boasted constitution? If it should be, he would not regret the services rendered his country during the late glorious Revolution, nor the part he had taken to promote the adoption of the constitution; nor would he, by inflammatory speeches within, nor his actions without doors, do any thing that should tend to destroy the harmony then subsisting, or to disunite a people whom nature and relative wants seemed to have connected together; but he would endeavor, in a constitutional manner, to obtain amendments to the constitution, which would prevent the evil in future. But is there occasion for amendments to the Treaty-making power? He thought not. There were checks and balances sufficient in the constitution to prevent the evils that might arise out of it. He said, he could offer nothing new, but would pursue the train of reasoning began by a gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison.)
In the eighth section of the first article of the constitution, Congress have power to lay duties, &c., &c., but all duties shall be uniform throughout the United States:
Can regulate trade with foreign nations: