Can establish a uniform rule of naturalization.
Congress, then, although they have the power to lay taxes and duties, and to make laws of naturalization, are bound to make them uniform; and in another article, are prevented from giving a preference by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another. But the Treaty-making power is not so confined; it may relieve one of our ports from this uniformity of duties, or one of the States from the uniformity of naturalization; that is, it may relieve goods imported in British bottoms into New York, from the one-tenth extra duty, and let it remain on all the other ports of the Union. But, say gentlemen, it is unfair to reason against the use of power by its probable abuses. He thought it advisable to guard against abuses; but has this abuse not already taken place? He thought it had. Not with respect to a port of the consequence of New York; that would have been too palpable; but on the Lakes, by the third article of the Treaty, goods imported to the territory in that quarter, in British bottoms, are subjected to no higher duty than goods imported in American vessels to the Atlantic ports. Here appeared a departure from that uniformity required by the constitution; here appeared a preference given to the ports of one State over those of another; and yet gentlemen contend, that the House have no right to inquire into the business. Indeed, so delicate was one gentleman (Mr. Buck) on the subject, that he opposed committing the Algerine Treaty, lest it should establish a claim to investigation! It was true, the trade on the Lakes was small, but it would increase. Thus, although Congress were very wisely restricted, when laying duties, to make them uniform, yet the President and Senate would be capable, by the assistance of a foreign power, to destroy that uniformity.
Mr. S. then stated, that he did not mean, and he hoped he should not be understood to preclude himself from voting to carry the Treaty into effect. He held himself entirely open to conviction; and if he should find that the same was expedient, whatever might be his opinion at present on the instrument, (and in truth he did not think it good,) yet he would keep himself at full liberty to act as he might think most to the interest of this country, when that subject should come before the House.
March 18.—In Committee of the Whole, on Mr. Livingston's resolution:
Mr. Isaac Smith did not pretend to prescribe limits to other men's faith, but he never could believe that men, as wise as those who compose the convention, would have left so important a regulation, as was now contended for by some gentlemen, to mere uncertain construction. He believed, if they intended that House should have had an agency in the making of Treaties, they would have said so in express terms. Had they done so? Nothing like it. So far from it, that they had unequivocally appropriated the Treaty-making power to the President and two-thirds of the Senate, in terms as express and positive as words could form: and the gentleman in opposition could not, did not deny it. But, say they, this power may be abused, shamefully abused, and, therefore, we will construe it out of the hands the people have placed it in. We will assume and declare ourselves the sole guardians of the people, and we will cry out liberty, liberty; and, as the people love the sound, (he hoped they would always love the substance,) perhaps they will believe us. Here rests the fallacy. The people knew, whether they knew or not, that they chose the President, and they firmly believe, as well they may, that he is their guardian. The people knew, also, that they chose the Senators, and they likewise think they are their guardians. How we, said he, became sole guardians, will require a modesty superior to that of New England to explain. The people have declared that the President and Senate shall make Treaties, without a single exception, and, lest there should be any mistake or cavilling about it, they have put it in written words, as they thought, too plain to be doubted, too positive to be contradicted. It appeared to him that it was a sufficient answer, though a short one, to all the laborious arguments had in favor of their interference, to say, that the people wills it otherwise: sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas. If they had under consideration alterations or amendments to the constitution, those arguments might, perhaps, be proper; but, as matters now stand, they are mere inapplicable declamation.
Mr. Livingston said, that the very able support this resolution had received, might seem to release him from any obligation of speaking in its defence; nor would he now trouble the committee with any observations on the subject, if those he made on the introduction of the business had not been misstated, and his subsequent explanation partly suppressed. He had stated, when he had laid the resolution on the table, as a reason for requesting the papers, that important and constitutional questions would probably arise on the discussion of the Treaty. It had been represented, (certainly from misapprehension, not design,) that he confined the use of the papers to the elucidation of a constitutional question only; and it had been asked, with an air of great triumph, how the instructions and correspondence could throw any light on the question of constitutionality, to decide which nothing was necessary but a comparison of the Treaty with the constitution? Mr. L. said he had not confined the utility of the papers to that point, but that, if he had, it would not be difficult to suppose a case in which they were necessary to determine the constitutionality of the Treaty. The constitution, he said, gave to the President the power to make Treaties, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Men, respectable for their talents and patriotism, had supposed that, by the true construction of this clause, the President could make no Treaty unless by the previous advice and consent of the Senate; in other words, that the Senate should advise the making of a Treaty, which they could only do before it was commenced; and should consent to it by a ratification after it was concluded. He would give no positive opinion on this subject, but supposed it a point worthy the attention of the House. The construction, he said, appeared reasonable, and had been heretofore sanctioned by practice. Two instances he could recollect; one was in the Treaty of Holston, where Governor Blount was "vested with full powers and specially empowered by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." The other instance was found in the answer of the President to the French Minister, who offered to enter into negotiations for a Treaty of Commerce, which the President declined, by referring him to the meeting of the Senate, which was not then in session. If the President supposed he could not commence a negotiation without the concurrence of the Senate, it gave force to this construction; and, if it was a true one, nothing was more demonstrable than that the papers were necessary to determine whether the Treaty in this point had been constitutionally made.
Two positions had been assumed, differing not materially in the power ascribed to Treaties, but distinguished chiefly by the mode of applying this power.
By some it was contended, that the interference of the Legislature was necessary in some instances, but that the Treaty operated by way of moral obligation, to enforce the necessary steps to give it validity; and that though there is a physical power of refusal, yet it ought in no case to operate against the superior obligation.
Others had asserted, that Treaties being the supreme law, might operate directly, without the intervention of any other body. That where existing Legislative acts opposed their execution, the Treaty was paramount, and could repeal them.
These positions were in fact the same, because, if a Treaty was, at all events, to have effect, it was perfectly immaterial, whether it operated directly by its own power, or indirectly by the instrumentality of another body; both, he thought, equally subversive of the principles of the Government; but the first was most degrading to the Legislative dignity. Nor could he discover from what part of the constitution it was inferred. Wherever, in that instrument, a duty was imposed, it was clearly and explicitly assigned, as in case of the President's compensation, that of the judges, and many other instances. It is not, then, to be conceived, that so important an obligation as this should have been left to implication. If it had been intended so to annihilate this discretion, the same language would have been used, "Congress shall pass laws to carry every Treaty into effect," but nothing of this kind appears. Again, if it had been intended to make Treaties paramount over laws, it would seem to have been the more simple mode, to have dispensed with their interference. Why leave a phantom of discretion, an unreal mockery of power, in the hands of the Legislature? In order to get rid of this difficulty, some gentlemen seem willing to allow a species of volition, but it was a pittance that would be scarcely worth accepting. In cases of extreme necessity, and in others, where, from corruption or other good cause, the compact is void, this House, they say, may refuse to carry it into effect. In the first case, where it is impossible to give efficacy to a Treaty, the power of refusing it was surely of little value. And where the compact is void in itself, the liberty of not being bound by it, would scarcely be contended for. If the subject were less serious, Mr. L. said, one would be tempted to smile at the efforts that are made to reconcile the constitutional predestination contended for, with the free agency of discretion. It was as difficult to be understood, as the most entangled theological controversy, and, like most disputants in that science, they concluded with anathemas against all who could not comprehend, or would not believe them. We have a discretion, whether to act or not, say they; but we are under an obligation to act, and if we do not, we are guilty of treason and rebellion. This was the same kind of discretion a man has, whether he will commit murder or let it alone; he may do it, but if he does, he will be hanged. This was a worse alternative than that generally called Hobson's choice—that was, "this or nothing;" but here we are told, "do this, or be hanged for a traitor." So that hereafter, when any one intended to express an inevitable necessity, he would call it Congressional discretion.