After these preliminary observations, Mr. H. proceeded to inquire, not what ought to be, but what was the Constitution of the United States? We were not, he said, in Convention, but in the discharge of Legislative functions under the constitution; and to understand the extent of the powers intended to be granted in the second article, section two, by these words, "the President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur," we must advert to the general definition of the Treaty-making power—what objects it may embrace, and how far it can interfere with Legislative power. A Treaty is a compact entered into by two independent nations, for mutual advantage or defence. Nothing can, therefore, come within the Treaty-making power but what has a relation to both nations, and in which they have a mutual interest. The object of this power is to secure to our citizens advantages in foreign countries which are without or beyond our Legislative jurisdiction, to enable the Treaty-making power to obtain which, it must necessarily be authorized to give some consideration or equivalent therefor. If the United States authorize an agent to make a bargain or purchase, the power of binding the United States for a reasonable consideration is necessarily given. Whenever the Treaty-making power departs from these rules, it is without its jurisdiction, and such a Treaty would be of no validity. Under this view of the subject, if we look into our code of laws, we shall find few of them that can be affected, to any great degree, by the Treaty-making power. All laws regulating our own internal police, so far as the citizens of the United States alone are concerned, are wholly beyond its reach; no foreign nation having any interest or concern in that business, every attempt to interfere would be a mere nullity, as much as if two individuals were to enter into a contract to regulate the conduct or actions of a third person, who was no party to such contract. He could, he said, illustrate his idea more readily by adverting to a law, mentioned as being affected by the present Treaty, which was the revenue law; which provides that certain duties shall be paid on goods imported into the United States, and on goods coming in foreign bottoms ten per cent. advance on the amount of such duties. This is a law no Treaty can repeal, admitting the repealing power in its fullest latitude, because no foreign nation can have any interest or concern in the duties payable by our own citizens into our own Treasury. All that a Treaty could do, would be to suspend or arrest its operation, so far as the citizens or subjects of the nations with whom we treated, were or might be affected by it. The only operation which the British Treaty has upon that law is, that in consideration of our being freely admitted to the fur trade and the trade into Canada, which opens to the enterprise of our citizens a vast source of wealth and advantage, we only give in return to the subjects of the King of Great Britain the privilege of bringing, by land or inland navigation, into the United States, goods for which they pay no more duties than our citizens pay on goods imported in American bottoms. British subjects have always been permitted to reside and trade in the United States, and peltry is to be duty free in the territories of each. According to this definition of the Treaty-making power, and as far as he could judge, he said, it was correct; it cannot have that unlimited extension which has been ascribed to it. It cannot be that monster which has been described as about to swallow up all the Legislative powers of Congress; nor can there be any danger of the President and Senate having it in their power, by forming Treaties with an Indian tribe or a foreign nation, to legislate over the United States. The Treaty-making power cannot affect the Legislative power of Congress but in a very small and limited degree. Because a Treaty or an Executive act may, in some instances, arrest the operation or progress of a law, it is no argument against the existence of the power. In article first, section eighth, of the constitution, a specific power is granted to Congress to provide for the punishment of the counterfeiters of the securities or coins of the United States. In another article, the President is authorized generally to grant reprieves or pardons for offences against the United States, excepting in cases of impeachment. Can any one seriously contend that the President has not the power of granting a pardon to a counterfeiter of securities or coins, because it would suspend and defeat the operation of a law, on a subject, specially delegated to Congress? If this doctrine be true, that all Legislative power may be exercised by the Treaty-making power, Congress, under the old Confederation, had unlimited Legislative power over the States. The old Confederation vested in Congress an unlimited power to make Treaties, excepting only that the States were to be at liberty to impose like duties on foreigners as on their own people, and that the exportation or importation of goods was not to be prohibited. Was it ever imagined that, by this general power, Congress had a right, by forming a Treaty with a foreign power, to legislate over the States to any extent? Suppose Congress, instead of taking so much pains to persuade the States to consent to their laying the five per cent. impost, and in obtaining which they were finally defeated by the refusal of one State, after every possible exertion, had undertaken to have it done by Treaty? Would not the measures have been reprobated with one voice, and the Treaty considered as a nullity?
In the first place, in Art. I., organizing a Legislative body, and delegating to them, not all, but a part only of the Legislative power of the States, in these words: "All Legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress;" and among the specified powers, the right of regulating commerce with foreign nations. How were they to regulate commerce? Not by the exercise of the Treaty-making power. This article of the constitution has not the least relation to that kind of power: it was Legislative power only that was meant: it vested Congress with the whole power, as far as the object could be accomplished by a Legislative act; but this power would embrace but a small part of the objects which come within the term of regulating commerce with foreign nations; it could extend no further than the bounds of our own jurisdiction. There is not a single expression that looks like authorizing them to act in any other than their Legislative character.
The constitution then proceeds, in the second Article, to the establishment of an Executive power, to be vested in a President, and in the second section, says: "The President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." The most general terms are used, and such as under the old Confederation had been understood to embrace every kind of Treaty, commercial as well as others, and had been exercised in the most ample and unlimited manner, and the Treaties thus formed had been declared and adjudged to have the force and operation of a law, and that they repealed all laws that were opposed to them; and these Treaties were then in full force and operation, and were the supreme law of the land. It cannot be presumed that the framers of our constitution were ignorant of the laws of the land, or that they had not well attended to and examined Treaties, which, by the constitution, they were again about to declare to be the supreme law of the land under the new Government. Now, if it really was intended that the Treaty-making power should not be as broad, and have the same extension and operation as had been exercised under the old Confederation, or that there was to be a distinction between commercial Treaties and others, or that Treaties generally should not so operate as to repeal pre-existing laws, or that the concurrence of the House of Representatives, or sanction of Congress, should, under any circumstances, be necessary to give validity or force to a Treaty, how can we account for the total silence of the constitution on this subject, and that there should not be a single sentence in the whole instrument that even looks that way? If any limitation was intended, the convention certainly knew that it was necessary it should be inserted. When we examine the constitution, and see with what accuracy and care it is drawn up, how wonderfully every part of it is guarded, that there is not a single word but appears to have been carefully examined, and when we call to mind the members of that convention, and find them to have been the ablest and most accurate men of our country, we cannot presume that we should have been left to the sad alternative, for the purpose of explaining so important an article of our constitution, which might have been so easily made definite, to be obliged to resort to the British House of Commons for precedents, and those too which were derived from the most turbulent periods of the Government of that nation; when, it is a possible case, that the change of a Ministry, or the rage of party, might have been more immediately the object of pursuit than the true interest of the nation; more especially as the practice of our own Government, and the legal opinion of our own country, were directly opposed to such a construction. But if all this might be supposed not to have had sufficient weight to have induced the convention to have introduced such a limitation, or some intimation that such limitation was intended, they must have supposed it necessary when they handed out with the constitution, which were declared by the ratification thereof to be the supreme law of the land, Treaties of every description, commercial as well as others. To me, the language of this transaction is, we have, by one article of this constitution, granted the Treaty-making power, in general terms, to the President and Senate.
March 24.—[The question was taken on Mr. Livingston's resolution, which is in the following words:]
"Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to lay before this House a copy of the instructions to the Minister of the United States, who negotiated the Treaty with the King of Great Britain, communicated by his Message of the first of March, together with the correspondence and other documents relative to the said Treaty; excepting such of said papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to be disclosed."
The division on this resolution, in Committee of the Whole, was—for the resolution 61, against it 38—majority 23.
The resolution was then taken up in the House, and the yeas and nays being called upon it, were taken, and stood yeas 62, nays 37, as follows:
Yeas.—Theodorus Bailey, David Bard, Abraham Baldwin, Lemuel Benton, Thomas Blount, Richard Brent, Nathan Bryan, Dempsey Burges, Samuel J. Cabell, Gabriel Christie, Thomas Claiborne, John Clopton, Isaac Coles, Henry Dearborn, George Dent, Gabriel Duvall, Samuel Earle, William Findlay, Jesse Franklin, Albert Gallatin, William B. Giles, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, Christopher Greenup, William B. Grove, Wade Hampton, George Hancock, Carter B. Harrison, John Hathorn, Jonathan N. Havens, John Heath, James Holland, George Jackson, Aaron Kitchell, Edward Livingston, Matthew Locke, William Lyman, Samuel Maclay, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Milledge, Andrew Moore, Frederick A. Muhlenberg, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Alexander D. Orr, John Page, Josiah Parker, John Patton, Francis Preston, John Richards, Robert Rutherford, John S. Sherburne, Israel Smith, Samuel Smith, Thomas Sprigg, John Swanwick, Absalom Tatom, Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph B. Varnum, Abraham Venable, and Richard Winn.
Nays.—Benjamin Bourne, Theophilus Bradbury, Daniel Buck, Joshua Coit, William Cooper, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Nathaniel Freeman, jr., Ezekiel Gilbert, Nicholas Gilman, Henry Glenn, Benjamin Goodhue, Chauncey Goodrich, Roger Griswold, Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Hartley, James Hillhouse, William Hindman, John Wilkes Kittera, Samuel Lyman, Francis Malbone, William Vans Murray, John Reed, Theodore Sedgwick, Samuel Sitgreaves, Jeremiah Smith, Nathaniel Smith, Isaac Smith, William Smith, Zephaniah Swift, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark Thompson, Uriah Tracy, John E. Van Allen, Peleg Wadsworth, John Williams.
Recapitulation.—Yeas 62, nays 37, absent 5—104—the Speaker 1—whole number of Representatives 105.[72]