The President and Senate, Mr. C. observed, were expressly authorized to make Treaties. To what should they compare Treaties? Might they not say that they were betwixt nations what bargains were betwixt individuals? And, after he had employed an agent to make a contract, with full discretion, and he had in pursuance of his authority made it, was it not binding? Though in public as well as in private contracts he acknowledged there might be circumstances which would justify a non-compliance with the terms of the bargain; yet, in case all the circumstances had been fair, the contract must be complied with.
It appeared to him not unimportant to consider whether, when Treaties were made, they were not the laws of the land. A power to make, carried in his mind a power to complete. But if this were doubtful, where should they look for information? He expected the gentleman from Georgia—knowing him to be well acquainted with the proceedings of Government for a long time—would have referred them to the old Confederation. It would certainly have been more natural to have referred them to the old Congress than to the Parliament of Great Britain. If they looked into the powers of the old Congress they would find that they had the power to enter into Treaties and alliances, which he apprehended to be the same power as that placed in the President and Senate in the present Government; and it was natural to conclude that a Treaty made by the present power was equally binding with those made under the old government; for it will be recollected that the general power was delegated to the General Government; and if they had the same powers, he could not see that there should be any difference in the exercise of them. If it had been intended otherwise, the convention at the forming of the constitution, would have added a proviso that no Treaty should be made by the President and Senate which included commercial regulations.
It appeared to him that a subject of such recent date as their constitution could not receive much elucidation from the opinions held concerning it in the conventions, at or about the time of passing it. He confessed he found little aid to assist his mind to form a judgment on the matter from any other source than the constitution itself; indeed he thought the light was there so clear that nothing more was wanted. There were four members, he said, in that House who were members of the convention who formed the constitution. The sentiments of two of those gentlemen he was not acquainted with; but two of them had spoken on this subject. If those gentlemen had come forward and declared that such a power as the Treaty power was contended to be was not intended to be placed in the hands of the President and Senate, but that that House was meant to have certain powers with respect to Treaties, he would not say but that such a declaration would have shook his faith on the subject; for, though he should still have been guided by the instrument itself, yet authority so respectable would have its weight on his mind. But what did the gentlemen who have delivered their sentiments say? The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Baldwin) mentioned the necessity of inquiring into the true meaning of the phrase, "make Treaties;" and, instead of telling them what had been the practice in the old government, he went over the water to Great Britain. What did they get from the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison?) He produced five sets of doubts and one problem upon the construction of the constitution. This had the same effect on his mind as if they had declared that the meaning of the constitution was well understood, in the convention which formed it, to vest the Treaty-making power completely in the President and Senate. It was certainly matter of great importance where the different powers of Government were placed, and caused considerable debates in the convention. Some thought the Treaty-making power should be placed in the Legislature, but that was greatly objected to; it was urged by others that the powers should be in the President and a majority of the Senate; it was again proposed that two-thirds of the whole number of the Senators should consent to a Treaty—but finally passed as it is found in the constitution. He was far from accusing those gentlemen with impropriety of conduct on the occasion. If they think it would be better for the interests of the people that that House should have a share in the making of certain Treaties, and believe the constitution will bear that construction, it was not for him to impeach the purity of their motives or propriety of their conduct; but it would require strong arguments to convince his mind that the constitution placed any such power in that House, contrary to the unanimous understanding of the members of the convention who formed it.
The arguments which had been urged for placing certain powers in that House with respect to Treaties were drawn from the practice of Great Britain, and from the danger of the Treaty power being vested wholly in the President and Senate. He did not think that the Government of Great Britain had been introduced for any other purpose than illustration, though other use had been made of it out of doors. With respect to the principles of that government, let them inquire into its sovereign power; for it was a just position that Treaties must be made by the sovereign power of a nation. Where should they find that power in Great Britain? The King and Parliament were allowed to be omnipotent. Parliament have altered the continuation of their existence from three to seven years. Where must they look in the United States for the sovereign power? They must go to the people at large; for in them it lay alone. Their constitution limited the powers of every branch of government, and it was therefore improper to apply foreign ideas to their constitution. But if a Treaty was made by the agents of a sovereign power, authorized for the purpose, the end was answered: in the United States, the sovereign power can act only by its agents.
The Legislature of Great Britain, he said, it was true, consisted of three branches, and that was almost the only feature in that Government resembling that of the United States. In Great Britain, their Executive is an hereditary Monarch, whereas the President of the United States is elected every four years. Their House of Lords consisted of bishops and an hereditary nobility—the bishops appointed by the Crown, and the nobility were increased at the King's pleasure; whilst the Senate of the United States is elected every six years. Gentlemen say the Senators are not elected by the people, but they are chosen by the Legislatures of the different States, who are elected by the people. The House of Commons in Britain, which is the only representation of the people their Government contains, is elected by a very small part of the people; and the Crown has such an influence in it as to be able to carry most questions at its pleasure. How could it then bear a comparison with that House, who were chosen by the whole people every two years? The absurdity might be admitted, in that Government, that the King had the power to make Treaties, and that the sanction of the Legislature was still necessary to give them legal validity, because the influence of the Crown was so great in both Houses as to carry any measure it pleased through them. But it would not do in this country. The comparison, therefore, betwixt the two Governments fails, and no arguments can be drawn from it.
The other argument respecting the danger of the power being placed solely in the Executive arose from the comparison with Great Britain. If the powers of the President and Senate of this country could with any tolerable degree of justice be compared to those of the King and House of Lords in Great Britain, as little taste as he had for revolutions, he would not say but he should be induced to join gentlemen, either by fraud or force, to overturn the constitution. He looked on the representation in the Senate to be as complete as in that House. Gentlemen were very fond of calling that House the popular branch of government. He agreed that a criticism on words was in general trifling. That gentlemen from Virginia might assert this, he allowed, as they had nineteen members out of the hundred and five in that House, and in the Senate only a fifteenth part of the body; but gentlemen did not mean, when they spoke on that subject, to have reference to particular States, but to the whole. The Senators and Representatives were regularly apportioned for the whole Union; and, though on different principles, were as completely represented in the one House as in the other.
Mr. C. concluded with saying, that he had no doubt the powers vested by the constitution were well vested; and if the constitution was fairly considered, little doubt could remain on the subject. But if the House passed the resolution now before the committee, he should not consider the question as decided; but if the construction was still insisted upon, he was happy the constitution was not wholly in their hands—that there were joined with them in the guardianship of it, the President, the Senate, and the people of the United States.
Mr. Hillhouse said, it was with diffidence he rose to speak on a subject which had been so copiously and ably handled by gentlemen who had preceded him. It had been his intention to have given a silent vote on the resolution on the table, but the turn which the debates had taken—involving an important constitutional question, relative to the powers vested in the different branches of Government—seemed to create a necessity of expressing his sentiments, lest by his vote he might seem to subscribe to certain doctrines in the latitude in which they had been laid down. And as he should differ in some respects from most of the gentlemen that had spoken, he asked the indulgence of the committee whilst he made a few remarks on a subject which he conceived to be of vast importance, as a wrong decision might give a direction to their government which might be of serious consequence.
On the one hand, he did not think that Treaties could not, under any circumstances, be the subject of Legislative consideration or discussion, and that they were not to look into them. It appeared to him, that they not only had the right, but that it was their indispensable duty to look into every Treaty, when called upon to aid in its operation; to see whether it had the constitutional forms; whether it related to objects within the province of the Treaty-making power, a power which is not unlimited. The objects upon which it can operate are understood and well defined, and if the Treaty-making power were to embrace other objects, their doings would have no more binding force than if the Legislature were to assume and exercise judicial powers under the name of legislation. It might be proper, also, to examine the merits of a Treaty, so far as to see whether it be of such a ruinous nature as, according to the law of nations, it would be null, and whether they would be justified in withholding Legislative provision to carry it into effect. He also considered Treaties as subject to Legislative control, so that their operation, so far as related to the people of the United States, might be suspended or annulled whenever, in the opinion of the Legislature, there was sufficient cause. And further, that the clause in the constitution which provides that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but "in consequence of appropriations made by law," as vesting in the different branches of Government a check adequate to every purpose of security.
On the other hand, he did not consider the House of Representatives as having a constitutional right to interfere in making Treaties, or that a Treaty needed any concurrence of that House, or Legislative sanction, to make it the law of the land. He had always supposed that Treaties were exactly on the footing of laws in their operation on antecedent laws, suspending and repealing such as were repugnant. Treaties may sometimes require Legislative aid to carry them into effect; so may laws, and they were constantly in the habit of making laws to carry into effect laws heretofore made.