He was happy, for two reasons, that the true ground of the present motion was made to appear. Because, if the resolution had passed without discussion, the motives which led to it would not have been seen; and because he wished the question of what were the powers of that House, with respect to Treaty-making, to be discussed, independent of the Treaty, which was likely soon to come before them. They stood now on the pure ground of an abstract constitutional question.
Some obscurity, Mr. C. thought, had arisen from not distinguishing the application of arguments to the different principles on which the resolution had been advocated, which he should endeavor to avoid. He considered the Treaty-making power as absolutely vested in the President and Senate; still, that when Legislative acts were necessary to carry a Treaty into effect, the Legislature were not without discretion in the passing of them; if the Legislature had a hand in making Treaties, there could be no question of the propriety of calling for papers; he should then, in the first place, examine the propriety of calling for papers, taking for granted that the Legislature had no hand in making Treaties.
If they were to consider the power by which a Treaty was made, there would be found two nations concerned, whose consent would be also necessary to repeal it. But were there no other ways of cancelling a Treaty? There were certainly ways of breaking a Treaty. There were circumstances in which the breaking of a Treaty would be justifiable. For instance, if, before a Treaty was carried into effect, there was such a change of circumstances as to make it necessary to declare war; could they not discuss the subject, whether it were more advisable to carry into effect the Treaty, and keep at peace, or break it and declare war? If a question of this kind came up, there could be no impropriety in looking into it; not with an idea of having any concern in making the Treaty, but because such alterations had taken place in the state of affairs, as to make it necessary to discuss the propriety of going to war.
There was another point of view in which that House had a check on Treaties. Granting that a Treaty is completely made, the subject of appropriation must come before them. Gentlemen had been understood to say, that no discretion could be exercised in appropriating the necessary money for carrying a Treaty into effect. But he was of a different opinion; he believed, that though they had nothing to do with the making of Treaties, yet when they were called upon to appropriate, they must exercise their discretion. It was true, that in general when Treaties were made, it would be the duty of that House to carry them into effect, in the same way as they found it their duty to carry into effect existing laws; but he said, there were justifiable grounds of refusing to appropriate money to carry into effect both laws and Treaties.
Mr. C. referred to the case of appropriations for the army. Suppose, said he, an army was raised for four years; at the end of two years a fresh appropriation is requisite to support it; but the Legislature has a discretion in doing this, or where was the use of the constitutional regulation of confining appropriations to two years? He considered, that there was some analogy between such cases of appropriation, and those requisite for Treaties. When a Treaty is made, the nation is bound by it, and its organ has an obligation upon it to carry it into effect. It might, in general, be said that there was an absolute obligation; but still there were particular cases in which that obligation did not hold. It appeared to him that a Treaty might possibly be of so ruinous a nature, as to justify the refusing to carry it into effect. Nay, he would say, that if half the lies and calumnies which had been spread throughout the
Union with respect to the late Treaty with Great Britain were true; if the negotiator had been bribed; if he had given up the rights of his country; if their liberty and independence had been sacrificed; if the President and Senate had been bribed by British gold; if he had any idea of that kind, he would not agree to carry the Treaty into effect; nor should he conceive the national faith bound by such an instrument; no matter what grounds were taken to justify the refusal, whether constitutional or revolutionary.
If these principles were just, he said, it would be allowed that that House had a discretionary power with respect to appropriating to carry a Treaty into effect, though it had nothing to do with making it. No cause, he said, had been shown for calling for papers. Why, then, call for them? Gentlemen talked about impeachment? They might impeach without papers. But did they want to bring forward an impeachment? No such thing; it was only to cover the real drift of the motion that this was mentioned.
Did any gentleman think there was sufficient evil in the late Treaty with Great Britain to authorize them in refusing to carry it into effect? It appeared to him, that that House had a right to call for any papers which might throw light on their deliberations. But they must also consider, that there was a discretion to be used by the Executive in giving up papers in his hands. When there are papers in his hands which that House had real occasion for, it was important that they should be brought forward; but, he said, as long as a proper confidence subsisted between the two branches of the Government, if that House asked for papers which the President thought it improper to send them, he would decline doing it. But it is not contended, that the papers which are the object of the present resolution will be of any real use to the House. The gentleman who brought forward the motion had read them through, and the most that he said on the subject was, that the negotiator had not complied with some of the first instructions which were given to him. Another ground of calling for the papers, which was to him a pleasing ground, was that of publicity; for he fully agreed with the gentleman from Georgia, that the more public Governmental proceedings could with propriety be made, the better; but that House had not the right to direct the President on that head; they ought rather to leave it to him to publish the papers, or not, as he pleased; for, if they considered the President as attentive at all times to the duties of his office, it would be arrogancy in that House to attempt to influence him in that particular.
But the main point in dispute was the force and effect of the Treaty-making power. What were the powers and privileges of the House on the subject? In pursuing this inquiry, he was pleased with the remark of the gentleman from Georgia, that in examining into the meaning of the words and phrases, they must take the meaning that was generally given to them, and if they could find out the true import of the phrase make Treaties, it would remove all doubts on the subject. He hoped, for this purpose, that gentleman would have examined the proceedings of his own country; but, instead of doing this, they find him referring to the practices of Great Britain.