Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 2 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

JOHN ADAMS.

United States, January 18, 1798.

This Message, with the papers accompanying it, was referred to the same Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the report on the petition of William Bell.

Diplomatic Intercourse Bill.

Mr. Nicholas inquired with what sums the blanks in the bill were to be filled.

Mr. Harper said he proposed to fill the first with $40,000, and the last with $28,650.

Mr. Nicholas conceived this to be a good time for the House to attempt to bring back the establishment of the diplomatic corps to the footing on which it was settled at the commencement of the Government, and continued down till the year 1796; and to prevent in future the probable increase which he apprehended from the recent examples, he thought it necessary to take a view of this subject, not only from the increase of expense, but from a variety of other considerations. It is not the manner in which a Government is constituted which makes its operations easy and certain. But the execution of the powers of the Government itself is no more to be considered than the nature of its formation; for I do believe there is a tendency in all Governments like ours to produce a union and consolidation of all its parts into the Executive department; and that the limitation and connection of the parts with each other, as settled in the constitution, would be destroyed by the influence I have mentioned, unless there is a constant operation on the part of the Legislature to resist this overwhelming power. I think we have the most convincing proofs that a representative Government can be made most oppressive and burdensome, and yet preserve all the forms which are given to it by a constitution; and the Legislature shall appear to act upon its own discretion, whilst that discretion shall have ceased to exist. Where the Executive has an influence over the Legislature, and the Government is a representative one, the Executive is capable of carrying its views into effect in a manner superior to what can be accomplished even in the most despotic monarchy; the mischief will be carried farther in the former case than in the latter, because the people will be more inclined to submit to the decisions of a Government of its own choosing than to one which rules them by hereditary right; monarchs cannot carry their oppressions so far, without resistance, as republics. Under this general view of the subject, he conceived it to be the duty of the Legislature to guard cautiously its own independence, and to limit, as far as consistent with the general welfare, the influence of Executive patronage.

He conceived that this extension of influence of one branch of the Government over another was strictly guarded by the constitution, which was framed on the principle of checks and balances—of departments acting and controlling each other; but he was sorry to see the idea of patronage drawn into a closer compass than it had formerly been, as it increased the evil. He was sorry for it, because it tended to manifest a circumstance which had been sought to be concealed. Every insinuation that there was a division between the Government and the people had been repelled as an insidious and malignant design; but the Administration, by acting on a new principle, which he was too well assured was the fact, had established the idea that there was a division between it and a considerable portion of the people. The evidence of this fact had been long shown, and he feared the operation of circumstances of this nature on the public mind.

He gave it as his opinion on our foreign intercourse, that the United States would be benefited by having no Ministers at all. He did not think that we could be benefited by any sort of compact these foreign agents could form for us, for we only bound ourselves by any treaty we entered into, as we are totally incapable of enforcing the execution of the stipulations made by other nations by any offensive measures. It might be thought necessary to make commercial arrangements with some European powers; but, he asked, if they had the force to make a foreign country conform to its engagements? No gentleman would say that they had; therefore such regulations only tended to entangle ourselves, without rendering commerce any efficient aid. He would, therefore, leave our commerce to seek its own markets totally disembarrassed. All the protection we could furnish it with, consisted in officers of another grade than those mentioned in this bill: Consuls who should reside in the seaports, and not Ministers Plenipotentiary residing in the interior.