He did not intend by the motion he was about to make, that the whole diplomatic establishment should be destroyed at this time, but merely to reduce it to what it had been before the late increase. With this view he proposed to alter the bill so as to direct that there should be appropriated $9,000 for a Minister Plenipotentiary at London, and $9,000 more for another near the French Republic, and that the President be left at liberty to reduce the Ministers Plenipotentiary at Berlin, Madrid, and Lisbon, to Ministers resident, which would diminish their salaries one-half—a resident Minister being of a lower grade has only $4,500 per annum. He then went into a detail of the proceedings of the first Congress, in order to show that it was admitted on all sides by that body, that the constitution vested the power of specifying and limiting the salaries of foreign Ministers and Consuls; he read the speeches of Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Sherman, Mr. W. Smith, of South Carolina, Mr. Sedgwick, Mr. Huntington, and several others, from the Congressional Register, by which it appeared, that there was but one opinion on their powers under the Constitution; and showed from hence, that the only reason why the House did not undertake to enumerate and fix the salaries of foreign Ministers in detail, arose merely from the want of information as to the places where they should be fixed, and the sum necessary to cover their expenses. As his construction corresponded with that of the gentleman who fixed the principles upon which the Government was put in motion, he was encouraged to expect his motion would succeed, seeing that the House had now had sufficient experience to enable them to say what were the regulations proper to be made.
Mr. Harper supposed it would be remembered by all those gentlemen who had attended to the business of Congress for several years past, that the doctrine of the gentleman from Virginia was by no means new. The subject of foreign intercourse was never taken up, without that gentleman, or some other who agreed with him in sentiment, advancing these opinions; they never failed to speak of the danger to be apprehended from Executive influence, from its power to appoint foreign Ministers; that foreign intercourse was unnecessary; that our public affairs abroad were not to be attended to, and that commerce ought to be given up, or left to shift for itself. Nor was this a doctrine confined to this country, or this age. Whenever a set of gentlemen in any country found their views opposed by the measures of Government, they became vexed, and attributed the proceedings of those who differed from them in opinion to any motive rather than the public good. The desire of Executive favor, or Executive offices, was an usual charge, and it was at this day well understood. It would also be remembered, that whenever the subject of foreign intercourse had been discussed, though these objections had been constantly made to it, they had been as constantly disregarded by the Congress of the United States. The good sense of the country had weighed these objections in the balance, and declared them wanting; and he trusted the same fate would now meet them as heretofore.
In aid of the $40,000 per annum, originally granted for this purpose, Mr. H. said, various supplementary appropriations had been made. First, a sum of $20,000, then a sum of $23,000, and, in March last, $17,000, and, in addition to this, $14,000 for a particular appointment. The House had, therefore, not only deemed it expedient to continue the original act, but to make additional appropriations from year to year. He thought the good sense of the country had never been more firmly shown than on this subject. But now a new course was to be taken, and all former proceedings declared to have been wrong. But it was said this country had no need of foreign ministers, and that commerce might be left to itself. He did not believe the House would think so. Did not the United States trade with all the nations of the earth? How, then, was it possible to do without accredited agents to attend to our concerns in foreign countries? Were we to give up our commerce? There were gentlemen, he knew, who would answer, Yes. They would tell the House, commerce was a bad thing, and that it rather ought to be outlawed than protected. But was this the sense of the country? Was it the sense of that House? Would they discard the property of that class of citizens who depended upon it for their support and their wealth? Or would they be ready to forfeit the revenue arising from it? Mr. H. said he had often heard of the dangerous nature of foreign intercourse; but it was the discovery of a few men who believed that every thing which had been done by this Government had been radically wrong. He trusted, however, the House would adhere to what it had so frequently sanctioned, and that the proposed amendment would not be agreed to.
Mr. Gallatin believed that there were a number of people in the United States—people otherwise enlightened, and who, upon all common subjects, possessed sound understandings—who were fully convinced that there was a faction existing within the United States, and even within the walls of that House, who wished to demolish the Government; and he further believed that this opinion was supported by such declarations as had been made by the gentleman from Connecticut. He should be sorry that such a belief should be considered as dangerous to the safety of the community. Nor could he consider the determination of the Executive to employ only such persons as are of the same political opinions with themselves, as of such a nature as to produce fatal consequences, and that Government, on that account, was unworthy of confidence. He believed that such a line of conduct must flow from the present state of parties in America, divided as the people were upon many important occasions. To say, therefore, that the Executive employed persons of consonant political opinions to its own, was not to say the Government did not deserve confidence. But if the committee turned their attention to the amendment proposed, it only went to declare that ministers to London and Paris should not have a salary of more than $9,000 a year; and that ministers to other parts of Europe should not have more than $4,500. In support of this amendment, it was said that this was the ground upon which this Government first fixed the business of foreign intercourse. He believed this statement correct. Until the year 1796, there was no minister plenipotentiary except at Paris and London; at other places there were no higher grades than ministers resident. Hence the committee might be led to argue the propriety of bringing back our foreign political intercourse to what it was before that period. He said foreign political intercourse; because he thought the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Harper) had blended two subjects together, viz: foreign commercial intercourse, and foreign political intercourse. He did not believe it was the opinion of any gentleman in that House that commerce ought to be left to shift for itself, unattended to. He believed it was well understood that our commerce in foreign countries was attended to by our consuls and not by our ministers plenipotentiary; and consuls would exist if we had no ministers at all. Therefore, all that gentleman's arguments, which tended to show that the amendment would affect our commercial intercourse, had no foundation whatever.
Returning to the question of foreign political intercourse: Was it proper to bring it back to what it was eighteen months ago? And, before he proceeded further, he would observe that, though the gentleman from South Carolina had been tolerably correct in his statements of the business, he was mistaken in one point, in which he would set him right. He had stated that the first additional appropriation was $20,000; but this sum was not appropriated for foreign intercourse, but for defraying the expense of the suits of our merchants in London. On the first of January, 1796, there remained a balance of unexpended appropriation for this object, of $30,000. To that day no extraordinary appropriation had been made; the whole allowance was $40,000 a year, which was found to be more than sufficient. On the 28th of May, 1796, an estimate was sent by the President of the United States, stating the sums already appropriated for foreign intercourse, and that $23,500 were yet wanting, in order to change the establishment which had till that day existed, by sending Ministers Plenipotentiary to Madrid and Lisbon, instead of Ministers Resident. This estimate, he just stated, was received on the 28th of May, and the law received the signature of the President on the first of June, so that it could not have received a very full discussion (being passed just as the session was about to close) and he thought there was good reason for examining the thing again. The next appropriation was made in the second session of the fourth Congress. In that session, he allowed, the additional appropriation was passed after full discussion. It was made upon an estimate stating $17,900 wanted; and, during last session, an appropriation was made for a Minister to Berlin, of $13,500.
The committee had been told that it would evince great versatility if they were all at once to change what had already been done. But it must be recollected, than when the change in the system was first made, it underwent little discussion; and he would venture to say, that our business abroad was as well done from the year 1786 to 1796, as it had been done since. As the question was whether a larger or a smaller sum of money should be appropriated, he would call upon gentlemen in favor of the larger sum, to show what benefit was derived from Madrid and Lisbon by the change; what necessity there was for a Minister at Berlin, and what good was to be derived from giving a larger salary than $4,500. The gentleman from Connecticut had said, why send a Minister Plenipotentiary to London or Paris, any more than the other Courts? This was done at first, and the mover, he supposed, wished not to innovate upon the law as originally passed.
But they were told it was improper, upon this floor, to say any thing about patronage, and that all arguments of that kind are well understood, and are by no means novel in their nature; that such complaints are made under all forms of Government by discontented people out of office. To say that these complaints are well understood, was the same as to say that the ground upon which they complained was also well understood: it was to acknowledge, that persons who were in the favor of the Executive had some advantages which persons in the other party desired or envied. To admit of one position, was to admit of the other. But, if no particular advantage was to be derived from Governmental patronage, then the cause of jealousy, according to this doctrine, must cease.
Our Government, he said, was in its child-hood; and if this patronage had any existence, it could not of course be as yet alarming. But he desired gentlemen to look at all Governments where this power was placed in the Executive, and see if the greatest evil of the Government was not the excessive influence of that department. Did not this corruption exist in the Government which was constituted most similarly to ours, to such a degree as to have become a part of the system itself, and without which, it is said, the Government could not go on? Was it not, therefore, prudent to keep a watchful eye in this respect? He did not, however, speak against the power itself; it was necessary to be placed somewhere. The constitution had placed it in the Executive power. If the same power had been placed in the Legislature, he believed they would have been more corrupt than the Executive. He thought, therefore, the trust was wisely placed in the Executive; and though it was right to keep grants of money within proper bounds, in order to prevent the abuse of power, yet it was proper to grant all that was necessary.
Mr. G. concluded, by saying, that if he thought it was proper that our political intercourse should be extended, he should not support the amendment; but as the conviction was strong upon his mind that our foreign political intercourse had at least been as expensive as it ought to be; that it was owing, in a great degree, to our political intercourse with foreign nations, that our present critical situation was produced; that this intercourse produced more evil than good to us; that he wished to bring the business back to the state in which it stood in 1796. If the wisdom of future Legislatures shall think proper to abolish the establishment of foreign political intercourse altogether, it must be left to them to decide. He himself thought it would be going too far to do so at present. He believed, situated as we were, it was necessary to have some political intercourse; but he believed it would be best, by degrees, to decline it altogether.
Mr. Sitgreaves.—The constitution and laws of the country had made certain offices necessary, and left it to the Executive to fill them as he pleased; and was it for that House to attempt to control this discretion? If it were executed to the injury of the people, the constitution had pointed out the remedy to be by impeachment. But where was the crime, the offence, or the impropriety, of the conduct ascribed to the Executive, if it had been adopted? Would gentlemen say that the Executive ought to appoint persons to office who professed an opinion contrary to its own? Did gentlemen suppose that there was such a want of integrity in this department of Government, that it adopted a political opinion which it did not believe to be right? And, if it were believed to act from principle, would it be prudent or right to admit to a participation in the execution of the important duties of Government persons whose sentiments were not in unison with those of the Executive, and who could only create discord and confusion, where nothing but harmony and union ought to prevail? If the Executive acted upon just principles, it would endeavor to give singleness of design to its operations, and it could only do this by admitting persons into the Government who thought with it. This would be a right, prudent, and honorable conduct; and where it had been deviated from (as he had before observed), Government had received an awful lesson for its future conduct.